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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 DANISH PEACE ENFORCERS AND NORWEGIAN PEACEKEPERS? 
 
Norway and Denmark are two countries with a great many similarities. The two states share a 
common Scandinavian language and culture, very similar democratic political systems, a 
generous welfare state, and even membership in the same military alliance. For many non-
Scandinavians the two states may appear almost politically and socially indistinguishable. 
However, even very similar countries can sometimes develop marked differences in particular 
sectors of society. This dissertation will argue that defence policy represents one such marked 
difference. After the Cold War Norway was reluctant to get involved in international military 
operations, and initially did so only with low-risk support units. Denmark however 
wholeheartedly embraced expeditionary employment of its armed forces, and Danish units 
were frequently among the few western forces to take part in actual combat. 
Images can provide a powerful insight into similarities and differences. Two selected 
images from Norwegian and Danish post-Cold War military operations may in this case serve 
to illustrate difference. Our first image is from the city of Tuzla in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the time is April 1994. Danish Leopard 1 main battle tanks (MBTs) engage in a regular battle 
with Bosnian Serb forces, possibly killing as many as 150 Bosnian Serbs.1 If the Danes need 
medical aid, Norwegians medics stand ready to assist, if they need medical evacuation 
Norwegian helicopters are available to fly them out, if they need logistical support the 
Norwegians can provide it.2 The Norwegians provided support, but unlike the Danes they did 
not fight. The Danes did battle; the Norwegians were "in the rear, with the gear". 
Our second image is from Afghanistan in August 2006. Danish soldiers in lightly 
armoured vehicles drive to the tiny village of Musa Qala in southern Afghanistan to relieve a 
platoon of British paratroopers. Over the next 36 days the Danish soldiers endured over 70 
Taliban attacks, killing at least 25 enemy combatants, until they were again relieved by 
British troops. The encampment they held was nicknamed "The Alamo", due to it being 
                                                 
1
 For a well written and entertaining first-hand account of the specific engagement, as well as the Danish 
experience "on the ground" in Bosnia, see the book written by the officer in command of the Danish tank 
squadron Lars R. Møller, Operation Bøllebank: Soldater i kamp (Copenhagen: Høst & Søns Forlag, 2001).  
2
 For background on the Norwegian contributions to the internatioan military engagment in the Balkans in the 
1990s, see  Jacob Børresen, Gullow Gjeseth, and Rolf Tamnes, Allianseforsvar i endring: 1970–2000, vol. 5, 
Norsk Forsvarshistorie (Bergen: Eide Forlag, 2004), Kapittel 12: Med NATO I skarpe oppdrag på Balkan. 
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totally isolated and surrounded on all sides by hostile fighters.3 The Norwegians were also in 
Afghanistan, this time also with combat troops. The Norwegian units in Afghanistan were 
trained, organised and equipped to fight, even bringing heavily armed and well-armoured 
CV9030N infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) with them. Seemingly the Norwegians were now 
ready to fight alongside the Danes. But they did not engage in the fighting. The reason was 
simple: the regular Norwegian soldiers were not in Musa Quala, but in Maymana and Mazar-e 
Sharif. Both are in the north, far from where the Danes were battling the Taliban insurgents.4  
These two simple images, taken twelve years apart, illustrate a basic difference 
between Danish and Norwegian defence policy in the post Cold-War era. While the Danes 
have been ready and able to fight alongside (mostly) British and American troops in places far 
from Denmark, Norwegian troops have been more reluctant both to go and especially to fight.  
Why is this? Is it because the Norwegian Armed Forces were still busy "defending" 
their homeland against a looming threat from the east? If so, was this a rational response to 
Norway’s geopolitical position, or was it due to cultural baggage which slowed down 
reforms? And were the Danes now simply freed from having to worry about any conventional 
military threat to their territory, and therefore now enjoyed the "luxury" of using their military 
selectively in conflicts far away from Denmark proper?5 
The Norwegian political scientist Ståle Ulriksen has a cultural exsplanation for 
Norwegian averseness. He argues that Norwegian reluctance to use its armed forces abroad 
was due to the Norwegian "defence tradition", which understood the role of the Armed Forces 
to be defence of the territory and nation of Norway. The Armed Forces were therefore less 
thought of as a foreign policy tool, and when Norwegian soldiers did go abroad, they were 
less willing to sacrifice life and limb for what were at best "secondary tasks", at worst a costly 
distraction from their "real" task.6 Not until 2001 did Norway move towards making 
                                                 
3
 The Danish light reconnaissance squadron was hailed as "the heroes of Musa Qual" by the Danish political 
scientist Jens Ringsmose. Jens Ringsmose, "Heltene fra Musa Qala," Nyhedsavisen, 6 June 2007. The Danish 
unit numbered approximately 140 troops. For a short review of the battle of Musa Qual see Thomas Donnelly 
and Gary J. Schmitt, "Musa Qala: Adapting to the Realities of Modern Counterinsurgency," Small Wars Journal  
(2008). For a detailed first-hand account of the events before, during, and after the battle of Musa Quala, see the 
book written by the officer in command of the Danish light reconnaissance squadron Lars Ulslev Johannesen, De 
danske tigre: Med livet som indsats i Afghanistan (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2008). 
4
 For a description of the Norwegian contribution to ISAF, see The Permanent Norwegian Delegation to NATO, 
"Operations: Afghanistan,"http://www.norway-nato.org/operation/afghanistan.htm. [29 October 2008]. 
5
 The Danish scholar Henning Sørensen terms this "selective security". His argument is that, because there is no 
clear enemy or threat to Danish security, security policy is increasingly driven by national preferences. Henning 
Sørensen, "Denmark: From Obligation to Option," in The Postmodern Military, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John 
Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).  Se also ———, 
"Den selektive soldat," CS Bladet 38, no. 2 (March 2008): 9-10. 
6
 The main publication putting forward this argument is the book by Ståle Ulriksen, Den norske 
forsvarstradisjonen: Militærmakt eller folkeforsvar? (Oslo: Pax Forlag A/S, 2002). Ulriksen, together with Iver 
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operations outside of Norwegian territory one of the main tasks of the Armed Forces, making 
for what Ulriksen terms a "paradigmatic shift" in Norwegian defence policy.7 
Commodore (Ret.) Jacob Børresen has a geopolitical, not cultural, explanation for 
Norway’s greater reluctance to participate in distant military endeavours. His argument is that 
the end of the Cold War had changed little about Norway’s main geopolitical challenge: the 
shared border with Russia. The Norwegian Armed Forces main role therefore remained 
relatively unchanged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. To maintain a constant 
military presence in the High North continued to be the focus of the military, in order to 
demonstrate Norwegian willingness and capacity to control its own territory and resources. 
Whereas Ulriksen argues that the armed forces were insufficiently oriented towards 
international operations in the 1990s, Børresen argues that in the new millennium too much 
attention was given to projecting military force to places far removed from Norwegian 
territory.8 
Both the cultural and the geopolitical explanation have their counterparts in the Danish 
academic debate. The Danish international relations scholar Bertel Heurlin sees geopolitics as 
being decisive for Denmark’s path to expeditionary defence. Because Denmark no longer 
faced any direct threat after the Cold War, but was now surrounded by friends and allies on all 
sides, it became necessary for Denmark to use its armed forces actively as a foreign policy 
tool. Doing so enabled Denmark to retain influence with its allies and especially with the sole 
remaining superpower. Military "activism" became a way to avoid marginalisation in a 
                                                                                                                                                        
B. Neumann, first presented his argument for specialised military audience in Iver B. Neumann and Ståle 
Ulriksen, "Norsk forsvars- og sikkerhedspolitik," Militært Tidsskrift 124, no. 5 (January 1996): 298-324. ———, 
"Gjenreis forsvarsdebatten!," Norsk Militært Tidsskrift 16, no. 12 (1997). A more general presentation came in a 
book on Norwegian foreign policy ———, "Norsk forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikk," in Norges Utenrikspolitikk, 
ed. Torbjørn L. Knutsen, Gunnar Sørbø, and Svein Gjerdåker (Bergen: Chr Michelsens Institutt/Cappelen 
Akademisk Forlag, 1997). The later publication triggered some debate in the Norwegian political science journal 
International Politikk, dealing with both the approach and the content of the book.  See Sven G. Holtsmark, 
"«Tro ej, det mörka är betydningsfullt; just det betydningsfulla är det klara»," Internasjonal Politikk 54, no. 1 
(1996). Iver B. Neumann and Ståle Ulriksen, "Kampen om sikkerhetspolitikken, akademisk avdeling. Svar til 
Sven G. Holtsmark," Internasjonal Politikk 54, no. 3 (1996). Sven G. Holtsmark, "Loreleys sang. Replikk til Iver 
B. Neumann og Ståle Ulriksen," Internasjonal Politikk 54, no. 3 (1996). 
7
 Ståle Ulriksen, "Brydningstid - paradigmeskiftet i det norske forsvar (2001–2005)," in Nationen eller Verden? 
De nordiske landes forsvar i dag, ed. Bertel Heurlin (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2007). 
Ulriksen is supported by the Norwegian Chief of Defence General Sverre Diesen, who also sees this transition as 
a "paradigmatic shift". Unlike Ulriksen, however, Diesen sees Norway as having kept up relatively favourably in 
the process of change in the post-Cold War era compared to other NATO countries. Sverre Diesen, "Mot et 
allianseintegrert forsvar," in Mot et avnasjonalisert forsvar?, ed. Janne Haaland Matlary and Øyvind Østerud 
(Oslo: Abstrakt forlag AS, 2005). 
8
 The main contribution presenting Børresens arguments is Jacob Børresen, Forsvar uten trussel: Det norske 
Forsvarets rolle og funksjon etter den kalde krigen (Oslo: Abstrakt forlag AS, 2005). Earlier publications, 
advocating a continued focus on territorial defence after the Cold War can be found in ———, "Forsvar uten 
trussel?," Norsk Militært Tidsskrift 160, no. 4 (1990): 27-35. ———, "Forsvaret og trusselen," Norsk Militært 
Tidsskrift 160, no. 10 (1990): 11-12. ———, Kystmakt: Skisse av en maritim strategi for norge (Oslo: J. W. 
Cappelens Forlag a.s/Europa-programmet, 1993). 
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unipolar world.9 In order to generate maximum political benefits from its military 
contributions, Denmark has structured its armed forces so as to be able to respond rapidly, be 
projected globally, and be able to fight alongside high-tech American troops ("first in-first out 
capacity").10 
The cultural explanation for Norwegian reluctance to participate in international 
military operations also has its counterpart in Denmark, fronted by the Danish political 
scientist Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen. He sees Denmark as having experienced a shift from a 
deterministic "what’s the use of it" attitude towards the armed forces during the Cold War, to 
one of increasing militarization of its foreign policy under the term "activism" in the post-
Cold War era. Unlike Heurlin, Rasmussen argues that there was nothing inherently necessary 
about Denmark’s decision, following the disappearance of the threat from the east, to make 
use of its newfound strategic opportunity to project military force abroad. Rather, a new 
consensus was reached amongst Danish politicians, civil servants, officers and academics 
about what could be accomplished by using the Danish military. This was the decisive 
factor.11 This new consensus was so radically different from the old, and so unquestioned 
across the political spectrum, that one can talk about the emergence of a new strategic culture 
in Denmark. 
 
The Research Question 
The objective of this dissertation is to answer the question how and why Norway and 
Denmark’s defence policies diverged after the Cold War. The time period is chosen because 
the end of the Cold War heralded a radical change in the foreign and security policies of both 
countries, but interestingly to very different degrees. At first, in Section I, I will present a 
comparative historical narrative detailing what happened, laying the foundation for the 
subsequent discussion in Section II of why it happened. While it will have its main emphasis 
                                                 
9
 Bertel Heurlin, Riget, magten og militæret: Dansk forsvars- og sikkerhedspolitik under 
forsvarskommissionerne af 1988 og af 1997 (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2004). ———, "Introduktion," 
in Nationen eller Verden? De nordiske landes forsvar i dag, ed. Bertel Heurlin (Copenhagen: Jurist- og 
Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2007). ———, "Forsvar og sikkerhed i Norden: Ligheder og forskelle hos de 
nordiske lande," in Nationen eller Verden? De nordiske landes forsvar i dag, ed. Bertel Heurlin (Copenhagen: 
Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2007). Heurlin draws heavily on the IR school of structural (or neo) 
realism, as developed by Kenneth Waltz. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979). 
10
 Bertel Heurlin, "Det nye danske forsvar: Denationalisering, militarisering og demokratisering," in Nationen 
eller Verden? De nordiske landes forsvar i dag, ed. Bertel Heurlin (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets 
Forlag, 2007). 
11
 This argument is put forward in Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, "‘What's the Use of It?’: Danish Strategic Culture 
and the Utility of Armed Force," Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies 
Association 40, no. 1 (2005). 
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on the period after the Cold War, it will also provide an overview of the pre-1990 defence 
polices of the two countries, in order to allow space for historical comparison. Particular focus 
will be put on how Norway and Denmark differed markedly when it came to participating in 
international military operations after the Cold War. The time period covered by the 
dissertation is from 1990 until 2008, the starting date being a compromise since the exact end 
of the Cold War is disputed,12 and the end date being as close to the present day as can 
reasonably be studied in contemporary history. Because the full implications of close-to-
present-day events are harder to gauge, the thesis will put more emphasis on the earlier rather 
than later part of the study. 
After presenting this chronological narrative in Section I, I will then in Section II 
approach the question of why they were so different. Rather than doing this chronologically, I 
will instead approach the question thematically, dedicating one chapter to each of the four 
factors I consider crucial for understanding the divergence. The factors have been adapted and 
developed from a number of different academic studies, and ultimately the thesis will provide 
a synthesis, demonstrating the necessary inclusion of and mutual dependence of all four 
factors. While no categorisation is perfect, as they inevitably simplify complex historical 
processes and are susceptible to accusations of arbitrariness, the analytical clarity and insight 
gained from this historical simplification nevertheless outweighs the loss of empirical focus 
and detail. 
 
The Four Factors Explaining the Difference 
Initially a cultural and a geopolitical explanation for divergence were suggested. There are 
however two main problems with restricting oneself to only the abovementioned analytical 
poles. Firstly, culture operates at many different levels in society. Organisations can exhibit a 
particular culture, affecting which tasks are considered important, appropriate, and natural for 
that organisation, somewhat independently from the grander societal norms in which they are 
embedded.13 To account for this, culture will be subdivided into the grander strategic culture 
and the narrower, organisation-focused military culture. Secondly, one problem with the 
above positions is that they are inherently structural accounts that pay insufficient mind to 
                                                 
12
 The usually suggested dates for the end of the Cold War are 1989 (the collapse of the Berlin Wall) or 1991 
(the breakup of the Soviet Union), but other dates have also been suggested. See Vladislav M. Zubok, "Why Did 
the Cold War End in 1989? Explanations of 'The Turn'," in Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, 
Interpretations, Theory, ed. Odd Arne Westad (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 344-348. 
13
 Edgard H. Schein has studied culture at the level of organisations, and argues convincingly that culture plays a 
great role at this level of analysis. Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3rd ed. (San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004). 
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human agency.14 This represents an ontological problem, because as Yale Ferguson and Rey 
Koslowski note "[a]ll collectivities are ultimately reducible to individuals".15 In order to 
incorporate agency, I will therefore introduce the concept of leadership. All of these four 
factors, geopolitics, strategic culture, military culture, and leadership, will in turn be outlined 
below. It is important to note however that ultimately these categories must be seen as just an 
analytical tool, rather than a true reflection of reality. I particularly agree with the holistic 
approach of Colin Gray, who argues that one cannot separate strategic behaviour from 
cultural behaviour.16 What Gray is saying is very commonsensical: culture matters, it inserts 
itself into every aspect of human behaviour and you cannot therefore separate e.g. 
collective/individual strategic behaviour or culture, as truly independent variables. 
Nevertheless, as analytical tools these categories provide useful counterpoints, bringing forth 
the "big picture" from the tyranny of details.17 
What exactly, then, is meant by the term geopolitics? One definition holds that 
geopolitics is commonly thought to be "about world politics, with a particular emphasis on 
state competition and the geographical dimensions of power".18 Three different levels of 
geopolitics can be identified: local, regional and global, with each having its own "code" 
which may or may not conflict with the other levels.19 A central point in the literature dealing 
with Denmark and Norway is that the end of the Cold War had enormous effects on the global 
and regional distribution of power, but for Norway it had a more modest impact on local 
power dynamics. Due to its continued proximity to Russia, and the geo-economics potential 
for conflict over Norway’s rich maritime resources, Norway remained wary of engaging in 
                                                 
14
 For a theoretical account of the agent-structure debate in IR, see Alexander E. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure 
Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organization 41, no. 3 (Summer, 1987). Also, see —
——, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapter 4 
Structure, agency, and culture. 
15
 Yale Ferguson and Rey Koslowski, "Culture, International Relations Theory, and Cold War History," in 
Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, ed. Odd Arne Westad (London: Frank Cass, 
2000), 150. 
16
 See especially Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). A shorter 
presentation of Grays’s points, and a debate with his critics, can be found in ———, "Strategic culture as 
context: the first generation of theory strikes back," Review of International Studies 25, no. 1 (January 1999). For 
a good summary of the strategic culture debate, see Stuart Poore, "What is the context? A reply to the Gray-
Johnston debate on strategic culture," Review of International Studies 29, no. 2 (2003). 
17
 In International Relations (IR) terminology the culture vs. strategic behaviour debate can be seen as a 
constructivist/post-structuralists position on the one hand, debating with a classical-realist/neo-realist on the 
other. 
18
 My italics. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "General Introduction: Thinking Critically about Geopolitics," in The 
Geopolitics reader, ed. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge (London: Routledge, 2006), 1. 
19
 Colin Flint and Peter James Taylor, Political geography: world-economy, nation-state, and locality (Harlow: 
Pearson Education, 2007), 45-46. 
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post-Cold War euphoria.20 I will argue that this difference has proved a vital necessary 
enabler for divergence in Norway and Denmark, but in and of itself an insufficient 
explanation for it. 
While geopolitics as a term is not unambiguous, culture is perhaps an even more 
contentious term. I will use Peter Wilson’s relatively short and clear definition, identifying 
culture as "the values, norms, and assumptions that guide human action".21 When applying 
culture to a nation’s foreign, security, and defence policy, one often speaks of that nation’s 
strategic culture.22 Jack Snyder offers the most authoritative definition, identifying it as: 
 
[T]he sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual 
behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through 
instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to […] strategy.23 
 
Studying strategic culture in particular allows one to say something about a society’s 
"perception of risk, goals, and the relative willingness to use force".24 I will focus in particular 
upon the latter point, because I will argue that there has been a significant difference between 
Denmark and Norway with regard to the willingness to use force as part of their foreign 
policy, and that this has been a key reason why their defence policies diverged in the post-
Cold War era. 
 However, while strategic culture operates at the level of the national community, 
military culture is a narrower term. Because this dissertation deals with a particular sub-sector 
of society, i.e. defence, the prerogative of a particular organisation (the armed forces), in both 
units of study, it makes sense to analytically examine whether particular cultural traits in the 
armed forces of Norway and Denmark have influenced the divergence in defence policy after 
the Cold War.25 Like culture generally, military cultures cannot be changed overnight, but 
                                                 
20
 Jakub M. Godzimirski, The New Geopolitics of the North?, Security Policy Libary 2-2005 (Oslo: The 
Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 2005), 31-37. 
21
 Peter H. Wilson, "Defining Military Culture," The Journal of Military History 72, no. 1 (January 2008): 14. 
22
 The academic literatures on national ways of warfare and strategic culture stretches back to Liddell Hart and 
Jack Snyder respectively, and have recently gained a number of new adherents.  For one overview, see Lawrence 
Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of War (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 123-130. For a very 
through account of military theory, its theoreticians and its application, adopting a national focus, see Azar Gat, 
A History of Military Thought: from the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001). 
23
 Jack Snyder quoted in Colin S. Gray, "Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture," Comparative 
Strategy 26, no. 1 (January 2007): 6. 
24
 My italics. Wilson, "Defining Military Culture," 14. 
25
 For a discussion of the military as an occupational culture, see Joseph L. Soeters, Donna J. Winslow, and Alise 
Wibull, "Military Culture," in Handbook of the sociology of the military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: 
Kluwer Academic, 2003). 
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change will rather involve the incremental amalgam of old and new practices.26 
Consequentially, having a culture more adapted to face the new challenges of the post-Cold 
War world, such as the requirements of expeditionary operations, will facilitate the transition 
to these new tasks. I will argue that Denmark and Norway have had military cultures that have 
differed in their adaptability to tackle the new type of international military operations in the 
post-Cold War era. Therefore different military cultures will be singled out as a source of 
explanation. 
Finally, leadership seeks to incorporate agency into the story. Theo Farrell has argued 
that a process of radical norm transplantation can be driven by individual, elite "norm 
entrepreneurs" in the centre of the decision-making apparatus, who by their actions are able to 
"communicate and push through new ideas".27 Similarly, at the organisational level, Edgard 
H. Schein argues that leaders can bring in "new beliefs, values, and assumptions" that they 
can sometimes successfully impose as shared experiences if their ideas succeed in solving the 
group’s problems.28 On this note, the Danish International Relations scholar Peter Viggo 
Jakobsen has been making the case for bringing back agency, in the form of "heroic 
leadership", when it comes to understanding Denmark’s post-Cold War military activism.29 
Jakobsen draws inspiration from those who seek to "rescue men and women, as individuals, 
from the oblivion to which political scientists have consigned them."30As I will demonstrate, 
drawing on Farrell’s, Schein’s, and Jakobsen’s arguments, bringing individual agency "back 
in" can help tremendously in understanding why two so seemingly similar units as Denmark 
and Norway developed such profound sectoral differences after the Cold War. 
Embracing the above four key factors allows me to cover several levels of analysis, 
from the individual (agent) level to the sub-societal and finally to the material and macro-
societal level (structure). Section II will outline in greater detail the order in which the factors 
will be discussed, as well as how they interact with one another. 
                                                 
26
 Donna J. Winslow and Jeffrey Schwerzel, "(Un-) Changing Military Culture?," in Building Sustainable and 
Effective Military Capabilities: A Systemic Comparison of Professional and Conscript Forces, ed. Kristina 
Spohr Readman (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2004). 
27
 Theo Farrell, "Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army," 
European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001): 83. See also Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, "The 
Sources of Military Change," in The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, ed. Theo Farrell 
and Terry Terriff (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 7-10. 
28
 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 225. 
29
 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Stealing the Show: Peace Operations and Danish Defence Transformation after the 
Cold War," in Defence Transformation in Europe: Evolving Military Roles, ed. Timothy Edmunds and Marjan 
Malešič, NATO Security through Science Series, E: Human and Societal Dynamics Volume 2 (Amsterdam and 
Washington, D.C.: IOS Press, 2005), 41-42. ———, Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in 
the Making? (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 93-94. 
30
 Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," 
International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 109. 
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Sources 
Both Norway and Denmark are open and transparent societies where the government is 
required to have their security and defence policies overseen and occasionally approved by 
directly elected parliamentary assemblies. Most documents pertaining to security and defence 
are thereafter made publicly available, and deployments of military forces abroad usually 
involve parliamentary debates outlining the reasons and size of the deployment.31 
In Norway, the most important documents pertaining to defence have been the Long 
Term Plans for the Armed Forces enacted every four years. In the period dealt with in this 
dissertation, there were five such plans (1989–1993, 1994–1998, 1999–2002, 2003–2008, 
2009–2012). When larger revisions of defence policy have been envisaged, a Defence 
Commission or Defence Policy Committee has been convened. The committee has produced 
findings that have been used as the basis for future long-term plans. A Defence Commission 
presented its findings in 1992, while a Defence Policy Committees did so in 2000 and 2007. 
All of these were preceded by a Defence Study providing the military advice of the Chief of 
Defence. 
In Denmark, the key documents in defence policy have not been parliamentary 
documents per se, but extra-parliamentary Defence Agreements reached between most of the 
Danish political parties. Five such Defence Agreements were signed in the period covered 
(1989–1991/2, 1993–1994, 1995–1999, 2000–2004, 2005–2009). As in Norway, Denmark 
also periodically convened Defence Commissions to present a report when larger revisions of 
defence policy were envisaged. Two such commissions delivered their findings, in 1989 and 
1998 respectively, and a smaller defence policy working group presented its findings in 2003. 
Besides government documents, newspapers provide another vital source of 
information, not least to account for the involvement in operations abroad of the Danish and 
Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold War. Many of the politicians, officers and academics 
involved in formulating and analysing the defence policies of the countries in question have 
also used newspapers as a vehicle for expressing their views.32 
                                                 
31
 In Denmark, parliamentary approval is required by law for all deployments of Danish soldiers abroad. In 
Norway, it is a well established custom to consult parliament prior to any deployment of soldiers, and the 
government will usually follow the outcome of the consultation. However, in that there does not need to be a 
public debate or parliamentary decision, Norway appears somewhat less open with regard to its security and 
defence policy than Denmark. Marc Houben, International Crisis Management: The approach of European 
states (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 85, 108-110. 
32
 Newspaper articles written about current events at the time of the events in question are considered primary 
source material, whereas articles commenting on events in retrospective are considered secondary sources. For 
more concerning using newspapers as sources, see Chandrika Kaul, "The press," in The Contemporary History 
Handbook, ed. Brian Brivati, Julia Buxton, and Anthony Seldon (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1996). 
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Apart from official government document and newspaper articles, I have also been in 
the fortunate position that many of the policymakers and military persons who have been 
involved in the key events of Danish and Norwegian defence policy over the last two decades 
have written and held speeches on the subject. Some have even written biographies that have 
proved invaluable in order to discern their views and motives, as well as, albeit to a lesser 
extent, providing accounts of factual events.33 
Similarly, and deserving special mention, is the large body of literature that has been 
published detailing the experience of Norwegian and Danish soldiers in military operations 
over the last two decades. While these must be treated with some care, as they tend to be 
factually less accurate than other primary sources, they provide an excellent source of 
material for examining military culture.34  
Finally, in order to improve my understanding and supplement these written sources, I 
have also conducted a few interviews. This has been done mainly to try and grasp more firmly 
the "moods" and "atmosphere" of events not always accessible from the documents, as well as 
to ascertain the perceived relative importance of certain documents over others.35  
While government documents, newspapers and academic publications together make it 
relatively easy to pin down the specifics of what happened, when, where and how, the really 
tricky issue, as always in historical accounts, has been the more analytical question of why. 
Providing explanation for the events detailed has been the major issue, indeed the very 
research question, for this dissertation. In particular, providing comparable mental histories, 
as part of the two different levels of cultural explanation, has proved challenging.36 The 
explanation can only partially be found in the narration of the events themselves. Here I have 
drawn on the plentiful academic literature concerning Danish and Norwegian foreign, security 
and defence policy. Since this is a study of contemporary history, it should be noted that many 
of the academics writing about this topic are drawn from the social sciences. While I am 
fortunate that a relative rich body of literature exists on most of the above topics, the available 
                                                 
33
 On the value and hazards of using biographies, see Michael David Kandiah, "Books and journals," in The 
Contemporary History Handbook, ed. Brian Brivati, Julia Buxton, and Anthony Seldon (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1996), 317-319. 
34
 For a discussion of the utility of military memoirs, see Yuval Noah Harari, "Military Memoirs: A Historical 
Overview of the Genre from the Middle Ages to the Late Modern Era," War in History 14, no. 3 (2007): 289-
309. 
35
 These two supplementary functions of interviews are suggested by Anthony Seldon, "Elite interviews," in The 
Contemporary History Handbook, ed. Julia Buxton Brian Brivati, Anthony Seldon (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1996), 353-355. 
36
 For a brief outline of the historiography of mental histories, as it originated in France with the Annales School, 
see Roger Chartier, "Histoire des mentalités," in The Columbia History of Twentieth-century French Thought, 
ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 54-59. 
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research is somewhat more limited when it comes to the more specialised subjects of the 
culture and mentality of the Norwegian and Danish Armed Forces and societal strategic 
cultures. I hope that this work will contribute to the ongoing research efforts in this field. 
 
Types of International Military Operations 
A brief mention is necessary of the different types of military operations that the Norwegian 
and Danish Armed Forces have been taking part in since the end of the Cold War. Apart from 
preparing for their wartime territorial defence tasks, as well as undertaking their peacetime 
tasks such as sovereignty and surveillance missions, international military operations have 
been the main activity of the these armed forces. These fall broadly into four categories. 
Firstly, there are the so-called traditional peacekeeping operations of the type 
undertaken regularly during the Cold War. Here one seeks to monitor compliance with 
ceasefires, and in some cases physically insert the peacekeepers between the former 
belligerents. This is based on a "holy trinity" of consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of 
force. Secondly, there are the so-called managing transition operations. Unlike traditional 
peacekeeping, these take place after a conflict has ended, and seek to implement a peace 
accord freely entered into by the parties involved. Both traditional peacekeeping and managed 
transitions fall under Chapter VI of the UN charter. Thirdly, so-called Chapter VI and-a-half 
missions are conducted internally in states to try to promote peace and stability, often under 
circumstances where consent is at least periodically withdrawn by the warring parties. These 
operations therefore require forces that more combat-capable, in order to protect themselves 
and solve their missions. Fourthly, peace enforcement or a Chapter VII mission involves 
using force against one or more of the warring parties in order to impose a settlement and 
restore peace and security. Since this can by its very nature involve high-intensity warfare, 
this requires the highest level of combat-capabilities from the participating forces.37 Note that 
while the military requirements of the different missions are here framed in UN Charter terms, 
they need not be led or even sanctioned by any global or regional organisation. So-called 
                                                 
37
 These categories draw on the work of Anthony Forster, as well as Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart 
Griffin, and finally the United Nations own "Capstone Doctrine" for peacekeeping. Anthony Forster, Armed 
Forces and Society in Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 198-203. Alex J. Bellamy, Paul 
Williams, and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 93-165. UN 
Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New 
York: United Nations, 2008), 13-44. While in theory impartiality remains an ideal in all the categories listed, this 
is in practical terms nearly impossible when outside actors take actions without the consent of all the warring 
parties. See Mats Berdal, "Lessons Not Learned: The Use of Force in 'Peace Operations' in the 1990s," 
International Peacekeeping 7, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 55-74. For a brief overview of the historical evolution of UN 
peacekeeping, see David R. Segal, "Five phases of United Nations peacekeeping: An evolutionary typology," 
Journal of Political and Military Sociology 23 (Summer 1995): 65-79. 
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coalitions of the willing or even individual countries can also perform them without any legal 
authorisation from the UN, NATO or regional bodies.38 
In Scandinavia the preferred term for all of the above tasks is either peacekeeping 
operations or international military operations, terms that have a benign ring in 
Scandinavian. The term expeditionary operations, often favoured in the UK and US, has not 
been common until very recently. However, since most international military operations in 
which Denmark and Norway have participated have taken place a long way from their 
territory, calling them expeditionary operations is not inappropriate. Finally, NATO employs 
a third term, Peace Support Operations (PSO),39 encapsulating all of the above categories. In 
this dissertation I will use the terms PSO, expeditionary and international military operations 
more or less interchangeably. 
 
Outline of the Thesis 
As mentioned, Section I is organised in historical narrative form. Chapter 1 gives a brief 
historical introduction to Norwegian and Danish security and defence policy since the 
Napoleonic wars and until the end of the Cold War (1807-1989/91). The object is to provide a 
point of departure, as well as to contextualise the following chapters and draw the reader’s 
attention to important similarities and differences. Chapter 2 and 3 then gives an empirical 
outline of Norwegian and Danish defence reforms since the end of the Cold War, as well as 
military operations and engagements abroad. The chapter points out the divergence between 
Norwegian and Danish defence policy in the post-Cold War era, both in defence posture and 
in military engagements abroad. In Section II this divergence is explained using the four 
categories outlined above: geopolitics, leadership, military culture, and strategic culture. 
Each factor is dealt with in a separate Chapter (4–7). The chapters demonstrate the importance 
of each factor individually, but also how they interact with one another. Finally, the 
conclusion provides a synthesis demonstrating how it all fits together. 
                                                 
38
 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace 
Operations," International Security 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005): 169-170. 
39
 NATO defines PSOs as "An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, 
normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such 
operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding 
and/or humanitarian operations." NATO Standardization Agency, AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and 
Definitions (English and French) (Brussels: NATO, 2008), 2-P-3. 
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SECTION I  
 
DEMONSTRATING DIVERGENCE: HOW NORWEGIAN AND 
DANISH DEFENCE POLICY HAS DIFFERED SINCE THE END OF 
THE COLD WAR 
 
The defence dilemmas faced by Norway and Denmark have borne many similarities, both 
being small states in the northern part of Europe. They spent the First World War and inter-
war years neutral, the Second World War under German occupation, and the Cold War years 
as members of the Western Alliance. However, after the Cold War the defence policies of 
Norway and Denmark parted company. Denmark quickly came to embrace its Armed Forces 
as a foreign policy tool in the post-Cold War era, employing it frequently in combat 
operations abroad. Meanwhile, Norway was more hesitant to utilize military instruments 
abroad, and remained reluctant to participate in combat operations, preferring the safer and 
less glamorous job of providing combat support or combat service support. 
Section I gives a narrative presentation of modern Danish and Norwegian security and 
defence history, with its main emphasis on the period of study in the dissertation, 1990–2008. 
This section will provide the empirical background to answer the first part of the research 
question, how Norway and Denmark’s defence policies diverged after the Cold War. 
Chapter 1 will provide the background for the following chapters by examining the 
long lines of the countries’ defence policies, including the different responses to German 
occupation during World War Two and the threat from the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. 
Thereafter, Chapter 2 will look at the first decade following the Cold War, in which Norway 
and Denmark responded militarily very differently to the changes in the international political 
system, the Gulf War and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Finally, Chapter 3 will look at the 
responses to the developments after 9/11, and how the differences in defence policy grew 
even more pronounced. These narrative chapters will in turn lay the foundation for Section II, 
which will thematically account for the differences we observe in post-Cold War defence 
policy
 14 
CHAPTER 1 
 
THE LONG LINES OF DANISH AND NORWEGIAN DEFENCE 
 
Norway and Denmark were both traditionally neutral states, until the German occupation 
during World War Two demonstrated the fallacy of this policy. They therefore became 
founding members of NATO in 1949, and as front-line members of the Atlantic Alliance their 
defence strategies and structures became very similar. Both developed balanced conscripted, 
mobilization-based forces designed to contain territorial invasion until allied reinforcement 
could arrive. They shared a limited exposure to warfighting during this "long peace",1 the 
most common deployments of their armed forces abroad being classical peacekeeping 
missions. 
 This chapter will chart the long lines of Danish and Norwegian defence policies, 
demonstrating how their different historical experience placed them within the same alliance, 
and made them embrace very similar modes of military organisations. It will, however, also 
demonstrate that there existed some important differences between them, which, during the 
Cold War, made Norway a more committed member of the Atlantic Alliance than Denmark, 
but which in the post-Cold War world would help to make Denmark a more avant-garde 
NATO country than Norway. 
 
Danish and Norwegian Defence Policy Until 1949 
Since the end of the Great Nordic War in 1720 until joining NATO in 1949, Danish foreign 
policy had been to avoid getting entangled in conflicts between Europe’s great powers. The 
involuntary involvement in the Napoleonic wars 1807–1814 constituted the first disastrous 
failure of this policy.2 The second was the second Schleswig War, in which the multi-lingual 
Oldenburg state became reduced to a homogenous image of modern Denmark. The third was 
the Second World War, in which Denmark experienced the trauma of being de facto occupied 
by Germany 1940–1943 and de jure 1943–1945. 
                                                 
1
 The term is employed by John Lewis Gadis to describe the lack of violent confrontation during the Cold War. 
John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987). 
2
 For a detailed and well written history of Denmark’s involvement in the Napoleonic Wars, see  
 Kurt Villads Jensen, Knud J. V. Jespersen, and Gunner Lind, Danmarks krigshistorie 1: 700–1814 
(Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2008), 370-457. 
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 Perhaps the most influential experience for Danish defence policy was the 1864 
debacle. The defeat left the country with a traumatic feeling of hopelessness, similar to the 
one experienced fifty years previously, when defeat in the Napoleonic wars forced Denmark 
to hand over Norway to Sweden.3 Symptomatic of this attitude was the statement made by the 
Liberal Member of Parliament Viggo Hørup in March 1883, when he argued against the 
government’s defence policy with the words "what’s the use of it".4 The memory of the defeat 
of 1864 is still kept alive in Denmark today, e.g. through the museum erected at Dybbøl and 
the recreations of the battle of Dybbøl held there by the members of the Danish Armed 
Forces.5 The Danish historian Knud J.V. Jespersen finds that the Danish defeat in 1864 "gave 
birth to the peculiarly Danish image of Denmark as Lilliput, with a small and insignificant 
role to play, and which could do best by turning its back on the world".6 
This small-state mentality was to prove particularly prevalent in defence policy. While 
the Danish state initially remained eager to reclaim the lost territories, the defeat of France in 
1871 and the unification of Germany left this goal unattainable. This left Denmark as a 
linguistically and culturally homogenous entity, and it is in this sense that the Danish historian 
Uffe Østergård argues that 1864 created modern Denmark.7 A referendum in 1920, stipulated 
by the Treaty of Versailles, returned northern Schleswig to Denmark. This gave Denmark 
probably the most accurate border it could hope for with Germany in terms of the language 
and disposition of the population.8  
Following its defeat, Danish defence policy became increasingly conditioned by the 
constant fear of antagonising its giant neighbour in the south. In the interwar period there was 
a political consensus that Denmark could not defend itself against a German attack, and there 
was a persistent debate whether Denmark should even attempt to offer any kind of organised 
resistance. The Social Democratic Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning clearly answered in the 
negative when he declared in his new year’s speech in January 1940 that "our country is 
                                                 
3
 Carsten Holbraad, Danish Neutrality: A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State (Oxford: Claredon Press, 
1991), 32-41. 
4
 "Hvad skal det nytte?" Quoted in Claus Bjørn and Carsten Due-Nielsen, Dansk Udenrigspolitks Historie. Bind 
3: Fra Helstat til nationalstat, 1814-1914 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal Leksikon, 2003), 404. All translations, 
unless otherwise indicated, are the author’s. 
5
 Leif O. Nørgaard, "1864-2008: Vi tabte på ny på Dybbøl," CS Bladet 38, no. 7 (September 2008): 11-13. 
6
 Knud J.V. Jespersen, A History of Denmark (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 25. 
7
 Uffe Østergård, "1864 og det moderne Danmark,"  http://www.historie-
nu.dk/site/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=507&Itemid=31. [2 November 2008]. 
8
 Bo Lidegaard, Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Historie. Bind 4: Overleveren, 1914–1945 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal 
Leksikon, 2003), 133-141. Jespersen, A History of Denmark, 24-25. 
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prepared to guard our neutrality, but warfare in any real sense is not an option".9 Stauning 
effectively ruled out persistent Danish resistance to a foreign invasion. When the German 
invasion came on 9th April1940 (at 04.15) the Danish government decided already by 06.00 
the same day to order the cessation of resistance. The Danish government chose to cooperate 
with Germany, and until 28th–29th August 1943 the government continued to function as an 
independent government in Denmark despite the German presence. When the German 
Wehrmacht moved to neutralise the Danish Armed Forces on the 29th August 1943, the death 
of 23 Danish soldiers in fact made this day a bloodier one for Denmark than 9th April 1940.10 
Unlike Denmark, for Norway 1814 was not "one of the lowest points in modern […] 
history"11 but rather a celebrated triumph for liberalism and nationalism. The subsequent 
dissolution of the union with Sweden in 1905 was a similar success for Norway, involving 
few embarrassing concessions except the demolition of a few fortresses along the Swedish 
border. While evaluation of the relative strength of Norwegian Armed Forces in 1905 varies, 
the prevalent "1905-myth"12 persisting afterwards was that "a strong defence"13 proved 
decisive in allowing for the peaceful dissolution of the union. 
When Norway left the union with Sweden in 1905, it, like Denmark, sought to remain 
outside of international entanglements. The new state wanted to focus its attention on 
consolidating its independence. Perhaps due to the absence of other threats, a possible conflict 
with Sweden remained dimensioning for Norwegian defence effort in the years following the 
dissolution of the union.14 New fortifications were erected to replace those disassembled after 
1905.15 While Norway remained publicly neutral during the period 1905–1940, there was an 
implicit understanding in Norway that Great Britain had a strong interest in ensuring that no 
other power gained control over Norwegian territory. Though seldom articulated, it was 
                                                 
9
 "Vort Land er indrettet paa at udøve en Bevogtning af Neutraliteten, men Krigsførelse i egentlig Forstand er 
udelukket". Quoted in Lidegaard, Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Historie. Bind 4: Overleveren, 1914–1945, 359-360. 
10
 Ibid., 531-532. For a description of the role of the Danish armed forces during the period 9th April 1940–29th 
August 1943 see K.G.H. Hillingsø, "Det danske forsvar april 1940 til 29. august 1943," Militært Tidsskrift 132, 
no. 2 (June 2003): 323-333. 
11
 Holbraad, Danish Neutrality: A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State, 33. 
12
 Roald Berg, Profesjon - union - nasjon: 1814-1905, vol. 2, Norsk Forsvarshistorie (Bergen: Eide forlag, 
2001), 298. 
13
 Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen: Militærmakt eller folkeforsvar? , 105-106. This view is still 
common among contemporary historical studies of the dissolution of the union. A recent historical investigation 
to the role of the army in 1905 concludes that the Norwegian armed forces would have been defeated in 1905, 
but that their strength was such that it would have been very costly for Sweden to make Norway remain in the 
union by force. Vigar Aabrek, Landforsvaret 1905: Tilbakeblikk etter 100 år (Oslo: InfoMediaHuset AS, 2005), 
154-155.   
14
 Roald Berg, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie. Bind 2: Norge på egen hånd 1905-1920 (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1995), 54, 65-66. 
15
 Rolf Rasch-Engh, Forsvar og forsvarssyn før og etter 1905: Fiendebilde og befestningsutbygging etter 
Karlstadforliket (Kvam: Silver Fox forlag, 2005), Chapter IX and X. 
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assumed in Norway that Great Britain would ultimately come to Norway’s aid should a threat 
materialise.16 It was thought to be in Britain’s interest that no other power gained control of 
the Norwegian coastline, and that the Royal Navy’s power was such that no great power 
would be able to seize the country while simultaneously fighting the UK. Until 1940 
Norwegian politicians were therefore in a position to "have their cake and eat it too",17 
enjoying the protection of a great power, while being able to indulge in neutralism and a 
moralistic criticism of great power politics. 
In contrast to Denmark, two months of organised resistance followed the German 
invasion of Norway in April 1940, but British naval power was trumped by German airpower 
and resistance ultimately proved futile.18 The Norwegian Government and Armed Forces 
continued the war from exile, as did a number of Norwegians in the resistance in occupied 
Norway. When the government and military returned in May 1945, it was with their honour 
intact.19 
Since the Napoleonic Wars Norway and Denmark had very different military 
experience. Denmark had suffered defeat in 1814 and 1864, and a humiliating lack of 
organised resistance by official organs of the state to the 1940–1945 occupation. Norway, on 
the other hand, saw 1814 not as a defeat but as the joyous start of independence. 1905 proved 
that the Armed Forces, when supported by the population, could deter a potential enemy. 
Finally, the campaign in Norway in April–June 1940 seemed to demonstrate that the country 
was indeed defensible, as long as military assistance was prepared in advanced rather than 
                                                 
16
 Odd-Bjørn Fure, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie. Bind 3: Mellomkrigstid 1920-1940 (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1996), 243-254. See also Olav Riste, "Was 1949 a Turning Point? Norway and the Western 
Powers 1947–1950," in Western Security: The Formative Years: European and Atlantic Defence 1947–1953, ed. 
Olav Riste (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1985). ———, "Frå integritetstraktat til atompolitikk: Det 
stormaktsgaranterte Norge 1905–1983," in Forsvarsstudier III: Årbok for Forsvarshistorisk forskningssenter, 
Forsvarets høgskole, 1983–1984, ed. Rolf Tamnes (Oslo: Tanum-Norli, 1984), 15-16. 
17
 Helge Ø. Pharo, "Scandinavia," in The Origins of the Cold War in Europe, ed. David Reynolds (New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 1994), 199. 
18
 Jakob Sverdrup, Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie. Bind 4: Inn i storpolitikken 1940–1949 (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1996), 15-64. Olav Riste, "Formative periodar I norsk tryggingspolitikks utvikling," in 
Isolasjonisme, atlantisk samarbeid og nordpolitikk. IFS Info 2/96 (Oslo: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, 1996), 6. 
For a detailed summary of the campaign in Norway April-June 1940, see Rolf Hobson and Tom Kristiansen, 
Total krig, nøytralitet og politisk splittelse 1905–1940, vol. 3, Norsk Forsvarshistorie (Bergen: Eide forlag, 
2001), 263-318. 
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 Because Denmark had not taken an active part in the allied war efforts, about 2,500 Danes were allowed to 
volunteer for the British army in 1945. The Danish government felt it had a dept to repay Great Britain, and 
hoped by this to save some of the nation’s lost honour. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Fra Palæstina til Afghanistan - 
danske soldater i international tjeneste 1945-2005," in Hvor som helst i det britiske verdensrige: Danske 
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improvised at the last minute.20 Norway hence emerged from the period 1905–1945 with a 
positive view of what the country’s defence forces could achieve when provided with the 
necessary resources and allied assistance. This positive legacy from 1905 and 1940 formed 
the basis for the continuation of what Ståle Ulriksen defines as the "Norwegian defence 
tradition".21 This was the belief in the validity of having large, conscripted armed forces with 
close (often local) ties to the territory and nation, but little emphasis on acting as a foreign 
policy tool of the state. 
Denmark did not share Norway’s optimistic evaluation of what could be achieved with 
military means. Due to its exposed geographical location, but also due to Danish historical 
experience, Danish defence preparations through the Cold War had a very symbolic 
character.22 The lesson of 1864 and 1940 seemed to be that there was little Denmark could do 
to resist a continental invader, and therefore spending money on the military was a waste of 
resources better spent elsewhere.23 There was a sense that "Denmark’s fate would be decided 
by others irrespective of what she did".24 This was not necessarily very explicitly stated, but 
can be described as an "unspoken assumption" among Danish politicians.25 Danish policy has 
been described as a "passing buck" or "free riding" strategy by Bertel Heurlin.26 It was more 
important for Denmark that its defence forces were considered "credible" by its own allies, 
who would ultimately protect it from a foreign invader, than by the expected enemy.27 The 
Danish historian Nikolaj Petersen argues that "[Danish] defence efforts tended to be symbolic; 
enough to qualify for the NATO guarantee, but not to put up a meaningful deterrent".28 In this 
sense the defeatist attitude from the 1864 to 1940 period still persisted in Denmark through 
the Cold War, as the ability to defend oneself by independent means was considered 
negligible by the political class.29 
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Despite their different military experience, both Norway and Denmark arrived at 
somewhat similar conclusions about their security and defence policy after the Second World 
War. Both countries negotiated with Sweden for a possible Scandinavian defence union, but 
came to the conclusion that such an agreement could not provide the security guaranties and 
preferential arms deliveries they needed. Norway therefore chose to pursue membership in the 
Atlantic alliance, followed shortly afterwards by Denmark, and both countries became 
original signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty.30 After having experienced the failure of 
neutralism in the German attack in April 1940, both concluded that their security would 
henceforth rest upon a combination of their national defence effort and assistance by the 
Western Great Powers. In this their paths diverged markedly from their Nordic neighbours, 
Finland and Sweden.31  
Joining an alliance represented a sharp break with neutrality for both Norway and 
Denmark. However, there was nevertheless a stronger sense of foreign policy continuity about 
the path taken after World War Two in Norway than in Denmark. For Denmark, the break 
with neutrality and pragmatic accommodation towards Germany was something which 
changed the conditions of Danish security policy completely.32 More so than Norway, Danish 
NATO membership was therefore "half-heartedly"33 from the start and Denmark was 
sometimes described, perhaps somewhat unfairly, as the "weakest link" in NATO.34 
Norwegian security policy in the period 1905–1940 had been implicitly tied to the idea of 
British support for Norwegian independence. The Norwegian historian Olav Riste therefore 
argues that it is possible to see NATO membership in 1949 not as a vital "turning point" for 
Norway, but rather also as a codification of the existing national security strategy which was 
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"to ‘nail the Anglo-Saxon powers’ to their presumed responsibility for the security of the 
area".35 There was therefore a stronger feeling of continuity in the security and defence policy 
of Norway than in Denmark after 1945, a factor that may explain the greater enthusiasm for 
NATO membership in Norway. 
 
Norway and Denmark During the Cold War 
Both Norway and Denmark occupied geopoliticall positions of great importance in the 
emerging Cold War. Norway’s long Atlantic coast had great strategic importance for the 
western powers, as did Denmark’s location by the exit from the Baltic Sea, and its possession 
of Greenland.36 Throughout the Cold War both Norway and Denmark were to pursue a 
balancing act between "the two parameters of ‘integration’ and ‘screening’" in the Western 
Alliance, e.g. by rejecting allied bases and nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime.37 
In this way Norway and Denmark were said to play their part in maintaining a particular 
"Nordic balance" which ensured that the Nordic countries remained an area of relative low 
tension during much of the Cold War.38 By regulating access by their alliance partners to their 
territory, and especially the United States, Denmark and Norway were also able to exert 
influence upon their much larger allies.39 
During the Cold War both countries were part of NATO’s Northern European 
Command, which also included Schleswig-Holstein and a part of northern Germany. An 
isolated Warsaw Pact attack on Norway or Denmark was considered unlikely, at least since 
the late 1960s, but in the event of a general conflict with NATO, there were several reasons 
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why the Warsaw Pact might want to take control of Danish and Norwegian territory.40 Such 
control of Denmark, as well as Southern Norway, would give the Soviet Baltic Fleet the 
ability to exit the Baltic Sea and operate jointly with the Soviet Northern Fleet. It would give 
Soviet naval forces in the North Sea access to bases and repair facilities in the Baltic. 
Denmark would also be an important flank against NATO’s central region, and possibly 
provide airbases for attacks against NATO naval forces and targets in the British Isles. The 
Warsaw Pact held considerable forces trained in amphibious operations in the Baltic, and the 
Soviet Baltic Fleet appeared designed to achieve control with the Baltic and its exit. 2–3 
Warsaw Pact divisions in the German Democratic Republic could also be used against 
Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland.41 
Northern Norway was strategically important due to its location between the USA and 
the Soviet Union, and due to its proximity to the Soviet naval bases on the Kola Peninsula. 
There was considerable advantage for the Soviet Union in gaining control over Northern 
Norway. It would provide better protection of its Kola bases, resupply points for its Northern 
Fleet operating in the Atlantic and airbases to support its fleet further west with land-based 
aircraft. The Soviet Union had considerable forces in the Leningrad Military District, as well 
as sufficient forces in place on the Kola Peninsula to carry out a surprise attack against parts 
of Norwegian territory.42 In case of war, the Norwegian Armed Forces would mostly have 
operated on their home territory, whereas Danish forces as part of the German led-
multinational corps LANDJUT would also have been employed in defence of Schleswig-
Holstein.43 Even Norway’s contribution to NATO’s Standing Naval Force Atlantic 
(STANAVFORLANT) would have broken away from the force and returned to national 
waters in case of a crisis or war at home.44 Hence while both Norway and Denmark were 
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"security importers", Danish forces would also have been employed in forward defence 
positions on German territory whereas the Norwegian Armed Forces were solely charged with 
fighting on and in defence of Norwegian territory. 
Since the late 1960’s both countries suffered form a discrepancy between the agreed 
defence budget and the prescribed force structure of the armed forces. The size of the defence 
budget was insufficient to modernise the force structure, due to most of the funding being tied 
to personnel expenditure.45 This was a legacy of the early Cold War period, when much of the 
infrastructure and weapons acquisitions costs had been financed by the US and NATO.46 For 
instance, Norway only had to cover 60 percent of its defence expenditure during the period 
1950–1965.47 Neither country was able to resolve this problem during the Cold War. 
 Norway and Denmark also had very similar experience with military operations 
beyond their own territories during the Cold War. Both countries maintained a combat 
brigade in Germany in the early Cold War period, first as part of the occupying forces and but 
later as contributions to allied defence efforts. The Norwegian brigade remained from 1947–
1953, whereas the Danish brigade was stationed in Germany from 1947 until 1958.48 Both the 
Norwegian and the Danish brigade maintained close cooperation with the British Army of the 
Rhine (BAOR), even if their operational role and command-and-control relationship remained 
vague.49 
But while contributing to allied defence in Germany, neither Denmark nor Norway 
would support efforts to take NATO out of its core area, nor give the organisation new tasks. 
For the duration of the Cold War, both Norway and Denmark remained vocal advocates for 
limiting NATO to its collective defence mission in the Euro-Atlantic area, and both countries 
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opposed enlarging the Atlantic alliance to include new members.50 Rather than going "out of 
area" with NATO, Norway and Denmark, together with non-aligned Sweden and Finland, 
pioneered UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War, introducing what Peter Viggo 
Jakobsen calls "the Nordic Model of peacekeeping". The Nordic states provided about 25 
percent of the personnel serving as peacekeepers during the Cold War period, about 125,000 
troops in total.51 These missions can almost all be classified as classic peacekeeping missions, 
involving only the use of force in self-defence. The one notable exception to this rule was the 
Norwegian and Danish participation in the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 
during period 1960 until 1964.52 
Both Norway and Denmark took on a number of long-running peacekeeping missions. 
Jointly they provided a battalion (DANOR) for the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) 
in Gaza 1957–1967.53 Separately Norway provided an infantry battalion (NORBATT), as well 
as initially a medical and a maintenance company plus a helicopter detachment, for the United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) from 1978 until 1998,54 and Denmark provided 
an infantry battalion for the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) from 
1964 until 1994.55 
 
The Armed Forces During the Cold War 
If we compare the state of Norway’s and Denmark’s armed forces at the very end of the Cold 
War, we come to the conclusion that they were very similar but with a few interesting 
differences. Both had peacetime structures designed as training establishments, producing 
soldiers who after the end of their service joined the reserve formations making up the bulk of 
the armed forces. Since 1973 Denmark had supplemented the conscripted units by employing 
some formations composed of enlisted soldiers.56 In the peacetime establishment Norway and 
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Denmark had about the same number of active troops. Conscripts made up about 2/3 of the 
active Norwegian forces but only 1/3 of the active Danish troops.57 
 
Table 1: Conscripts From a Youth Cohort of 18 in 1970/71 – 1998 
Country 1970/71 1979 1989 1998 
Norway 
conscripts 
27,850 (90 %) 28,250 (88 %) 21,800 (64 %) 22,700 (84 %) 
From cohort 34,000 32,000 34,000 27,000 
 
Denmark 
conscripts 
24,400 (57 %) 10,550 (27 %) 9,215 (24 %) 7,900 (23 %) 
From cohort 43,000 39,000 39,000 33,000 
Source: Data taken from Table 1: Conscripts from a Youth Cohort of the Age of 18 in Scandinavia, 1970/71-
2000 (%) in Henning Sørensen, "Conscription in Scandinavia During the Last Quarter Century: Developments 
and Arguments." Armed Forces & Society 26, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 315. 
 
As shown in Table 1, conscription was far more universal in Norway than in Denmark. 
Another major difference between the countries was in the size and composition of their 
forces. Norway could mobilize almost three times the number of reserves that Denmark could, 
despite Denmark having a larger population than Norway. Conversely, the Danish Army was 
considerably more mechanized than the Norwegian Army, having twice the number of tanks 
and armoured personnel carriers. Meanwhile, the Norwegian Navy was significantly larger 
than the Danish, having three times as many submarines and almost twice as many major 
surface combatants. Finally, the two countries air forces were quite evenly matched in terms 
of the number and quality of combat aircraft available.58 
The differences in the structure of the two countries’ armed forces can to some extend 
be explained by their different geography. Norway’s land area covers 324,000 km² while 
Denmark only covers 43,000 km².59 As the Norwegian government frequently pointed out 
during the Cold War, with limited resources the Norwegian Armed Forces had to defend a 
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land area equal to the combined territory of Denmark, the Netherlands and the Federal 
Republic of Germany.60 The 1974 Defence Commission noted that Norway’s economic and 
population base was modest in comparison with the territory the country needed to defend.61 
Cold War era security analysts considered the defence of such a huge territory to be an 
"unenviable task".62 As expressed by the Inspector-General of the Norwegian Army in 1992, 
the choice of a militia system was logical because the army "defend an area three times the 
size of England, with a population barely half that of London".63 Under such circumstances 
only total utilization of available manpower was deemed sufficient. 
In addition to being much larger than Denmark, Norway also had very different 
terrain. As stated in one Cold War era textbook on military defence in the Nordic states, while 
Denmark had an "open landscape […] favourable for air landing and mechanized troops",64 
Norway possesses an excellent defensive terrain due to "a nearly tree-less alpine landscape 
descending into the sea".65 This rugged landscape was said to be particularly suitable for light 
infantry.66 In order to exploit this favourable defensive terrain most of the high-end 
Norwegian forces were concentrated in the mountainous county of Troms, with only a small 
"trip-wire" force deployed nearer the Russian border.67 Norway also had a considerably 
longer coastline than Denmark (25,148 km to 7314 km),68 and from the late 1970’s claimed 
partially disputed maritime economic zones of approximately 2 million km², six times the area 
of continental Norway.69 All this would seem to offer good military reasons for Norway’s 
larger wartime forces, less mechanized army and larger navy. 
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There were, however, also important political reasons for the high number of 
conscripts.70 In order to construct a national and unifying military that would conscript nearly 
all able-bodied men, the Norwegian Armed Forces chose a defensive military strategy 
designed around quantity not quality. Ståle Ulriksen goes as far as to claim that Norway had a 
military structure "constructed for nation-building – not warfare".71 Critical shortage of 
equipment meant that only 2–3 of the army’s 13 mobilization brigades were adequately 
equipped at the end of the Cold War, and their training standards left much to be desired.72 
The need to equip and train such a large reserve force meant that even the few standing forces 
were never equipped with modern weaponry.73 Some of the same points could however be 
applied to the Danish mobilization units.74 The higher number of males conscripted gave the 
Norwegian military a more important role as a "nation-building" institution than the Danish 
Armed Force, but it did not necessarily increase its combat value proportionally.75 
Nevertheless, the Norwegian political establishment seemed to have had more faith in 
the value of their military forces than did the Danish political class. It was the mantra of the 
Norwegian political leadership that the Armed Forces had to be prepared to defend the 
country until allied reinforcements could arrive.76 No similar mantra existed in Denmark, 
where few policymakers seemed to envisage that the Danish military would be able to defend 
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the country that long.77 The Danish Chiefs of Defences were also systematically less 
optimistic than their Norwegian counterparts.78  
 It is telling that in international relations lingo the term "Denmarkization" came to 
refer to a country seen as free-riding on the efforts of others in a military alliance.79 The US 
had hoped that Norway could serve as a model for Denmark, which was said to be lacking in 
alliance solidarity.80 In fact, the Norwegian government itself sometimes criticised its 
southern neighbour for its lack of alliance loyalty and effort.81 In the early Cold War, 
Norwegian officials spoke of a "Danish problem", and sought to bolster Danish moral while 
bargaining to increase Danish defence efforts.82 Despite these efforts, Norway consistently 
spent more on defence than Denmark throughout the Cold War, both in relative and absolute 
terms. Denmark was normally the lowest spender amongst the NATO countries in percentage 
of GDP.83 In the 1985–1989 period defence spending in Norway was almost 3 percent of 
GDP, whereas in Denmark it was closer to 2.2 percent.84 In 1990 Denmark spent $2.2 billion 
compared to Norway’s $3.4 billion on defence,85 and Norway was able to allocate a much 
larger share of its defence expenditure on investments in new equipment and infrastructure 
than Denmark was.86 
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Conclusion: Norway the Good, Optimistic Ally; Denmark the Bad Defeatist? 
As shown above, many observers of Danish defence policy view the low mobilisation of 
personnel and resources for the Danish Armed Force in the Cold War as an indication that 
Denmark’s armed forces were thought of as being more or less symbolic. As pointed out by 
Helge Pharo, this was never explicitly stated in government publications or statements during 
the Cold War, but nevertheless existed as an "unspoken assumption".87 Bertel Heurlin finds a 
similar unspoken determinism in Danish defence policy at the end of the Cold War.88 This 
negative and dismissive view of the utility of the military meant the Danish Armed Forces 
were a low priority during the Cold War. It is perhaps indicative of this defeatism that the 
controversial right-wing politician Mogens Glistrup was able to obtain 12 percent of the 
Danish vote in 1973 after he suggested replacing the Danish Armed Forces with a telephone 
answering machine proclaiming Denmark’s surrender in Russian.89 In contrast, the 
Norwegian Armed Forces were able to mobilise more personnel and received more resources. 
A strong and credible national defence was held to be of great importance by Norwegian 
policymakers.90 Put very polemically, we can say that in the context of the Cold War, 
Denmark was the "bad boy" of the NATO class, whereas Norway was considered a "good 
boy" by comparison.91 
This was to change in the post-Cold War period, when the willingness and ability to 
participate in international military operations abroad became the new measuring stick for 
NATO member states. Whereas Norway had been a more enthusiastic member of the "old" 
alliance than its southern neighbour, Denmark would become a much more active proponent 
of the "new" NATO. While Norway had led Denmark into the Atlantic alliance in 1949, after 
1990 Denmark would take the lead whereas Norway would lag behind.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DANISH AND NORWEGIAN DEFENCE POLICY IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF THE COLD WAR 
 
In the aftermath of the Cold War both the Norwegian and the Danish Armed Forces 
underwent radical change. From being manpower intensive territorial defence forces intended 
to fight World War III, they became smaller, more capital intensive forces capable of 
expeditionary operations. In this new post-Cold War world PSOs in distant theatres of 
operations became a major day-to-day preoccupation for Danish and Norwegian soldiers. This 
change was not easy or uncontroversial in either country, but nevertheless it was carried out at 
very different speeds in the two entities. While Denmark began the transition to expeditionary 
defence as early as the beginning of the 1990s, Norway did not follow suit until a decade 
later. 
This chapter charts the transformation of the Danish and Norwegian armed forces in 
the first decade after the Cold War, and by doing so it illustrates how these two traditionally 
similar units proceeded to reform their militaries at such different speeds, and employ them in 
such very different ways. 
 
Reforming the Armed Forces After the Cold War 1990–1994 
Both Norway and Denmark established defence commissions at the end-stage of the Cold 
War, who recommended broadly speaking very similar things. The Danish commission was 
appointed in July 1988 in order to assess what changes, if any, were required in the 
organisation of the Danish defence forces in peace as well as in war.1 Submitting its findings 
in December 1989, the commission sketched out a "best case" and "worst case" scenario, 
depending upon whether the ongoing negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START) and Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) were concluded 
successfully. The enactment of these treaties was seen as very beneficial for the Western 
Alliance in general, and for the defensibility of Denmark in particular. The former scenario 
was considered much more likely than the latter.2 The commission did not envisage any 
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radical changes in the role assigned to the Danish military, but moved to rationalise the 
Danish Armed Forces. 
Most noticeable in operational terms was the recommendation to scrap the F-35 
Draken aircraft and concentrate upon the F-16.3 As agreed previously in the March 1989 
Defence Agreement,4 the Navy was to rationalise by concentrating its activities, and by 
scrapping the two elderly Peder Skram-class frigates, 6 Søløven-class missile torpedo boats 
(MTBs), and several coastguard and minesweeper ships.5 The Army was the least affected 
service. It was to draft more conscripts than previously, increasing its peacetime size 
somewhat.6 Costs were to be cut by concentrating the army’s regiments in fewer locations, 
which triggered heavy protests from the areas affected by base closures.7 Altogether the 1988 
Defence Commission represented a rationalisation of the Danish defence establishment, but 
hardly any radical departure from the past in terms of mission and organisation.8 Due to 
uncertainties about international developments, decisions where effectively postponed.9 
 In Norway, a Defence Commission was also assigned to chart the way forward. The 
commission was appointed in January 1990, and submitted its findings in March 1992. 
Despite the Norwegian Defence Commission delivering its findings over two years after the 
Danish commission, it contained the same wary conservatism. Considering the enormous 
changes that had taken place in Europe during these two years, this was remarkable, 
especially considering that evaluating the implication of the new developments in "Eastern 
Europe and East/West relations" for Norwegian defence was an important part of the 
commission’s mandate.10 The commission chose to increase the focus on the defence of 
Northern Norway, due to the improved security for Southern Norway caused by the changes 
in Eastern Europe. Instability in and conflict with Russia were seen as the main security 
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challenges.11 The planned wartime Army was to be reduced from 13 to 6 brigades and from 
28 to 17 independent battalions, the reduced land forces being more heavily mechanized than 
before. The Navy was cut from 36 to 22 MTBs and 29 to 13 coastal artillery fortresses. The 
Air Force was still to retain its present size of about 80 fighter aircrafts.12  
Altogether the Norwegian defence commission suggested, like its Danish counterpart, 
moving cautiously into the future. While rationalising the Armed Forces to make more room 
for investments in new equipment, neither of them heralded any radical changes in the 
organisation and mission of the Armed Forces. But about the same time as this cautious 
Norwegian defence commission was delivering its findings, a new course was already being 
charted for the Danish Armed Forces. 
In November 1991 NATOs heads of state and government had enacted a new Strategic 
Concept for the alliance.13 It envisaged a new conventional force structure for member states, 
dividing their force on the one hand into Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF) and Rapid 
Reaction Forces (RRF), which would be mobile and flexible, and on the other hand into more 
traditional in-place Main Defence Forces (MDF). While both Norway and Denmark 
responded positively to the new NATO Strategic Concept, Denmark was to go much further 
towards contributing to the alliance reaction forces than Norway. 
The reorientation towards expeditionary defence in Denmark began with the 
November 1992 Defence Agreement for 1993–1994. This defence agreement differed from 
the ones negotiated during the Cold War, as it was based on the absence of a defined military 
threat. The risk of an invasion of Danish territory was considered close to zero.14  It prompted 
a shift of emphasis away from territorial defence towards international operations, most 
noticeably by moving to establish a Danish International Brigade (DIB) of 4,500 soldiers.15 
The idea of setting up brigade-sized forces for international operations had been present in the 
Danish defence discourse for at least a few years, most noticeably being proposed by the 
Danish military unions, Centralforeningen for stampersonel (CS) and Hærens Konstabel- og 
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Korporalforening (HKKF) in September 1990.16 The defence minister’s Advisory and 
Analysis Group (RAG), mentioned a brigade-sized unit for NATO’s RRF as one possible 
contribution,17 and in October the RAG submitted a report which was to become the basis for 
the November 1992 Defence Agreement setting up the DIB.18 
Parallel with the creation of the DIB, Denmark also introduced the obligation for non-
conscripted members of the Armed Forces to serve in military operations abroad. From 
January 1994, all Danish regular military personal (and some civilians) had to indicate 
whether they wanted to limit their international service to only the traditional missions, 
making henceforth nearly all regular members of the Danish Armed Forces eligible for 
deployment in international operations.19 A similar law allowing the Norwegian government 
to order officers to participate in international operations was passed by the Norwegian 
Parliament in February 1996, but it only came into effect from January 1999.20 The law only 
applied for officers entering the Armed Forces from January 1999, and was only to apply 
when sufficient volunteers were lacking. This arrangement proved transitory, as in March 
2004 new legislation extended the duty to participate in international military operations to all 
regular serving members in the Norwegian Armed Forces.21 This was almost exactly 10 years 
after Denmark had introduced the same principle. 
The DIB was to be able to participate in "conflict-preventing, peace-keeping, peace-
making, humanitarian and other similar operations on a mandate from the UN or the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)." 22  In this capacity, it replaced 
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the earlier Danish commitment from 1964 to maintain a permanent Danish military force 
available for use by the United Nations.23 Until the DIBs establishment Danish peacekeeping 
had been organised "ad-hoc" and "outside the normal Army structure", just like in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces.24 The DIB would also be available as a rapid-reaction brigade for 
NATO,25 and from 1995 it was to contribute to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) by 
potentially being deployed as part of the 1st (UK) Armoured Division. The brigade would be 
structured as a Danish armoured infantry brigade, with about 20 percent regular personnel and 
80 percent being former conscripts who had signed a three year readiness contract with the 
Armed Forces. Reaction time was 7 days for the headquarters elements, and 14 days for the 
brigade as a whole.26 The brigade would enable Denmark to maintain 1,500 soldiers 
continuously in international military operations abroad.27 The Danish Navy would have one 
corvette, one submarine and two mine clearing vessels as NATO IRF and RRF contributions, 
the Air Force one F-16 squadron and a HAWK surface-to-air squadron.28 
In December 1993 the Danish Parliament passed a new Defence Act stating explicitly 
that there was now no direct military threat to Danish existence, integrity, and sovereignty.29 
The new act committed the Armed Forces to participate in "conflict prevention, peacekeeping, 
peace making [and] humanitarian missions" without any geographical limitations, as well as 
"crisis management and defence within NATOs area".30 The law marked a shift towards a 
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much wider definition of security, and towards viewing the Danish Armed Forces as a useful 
foreign policy tool rather than an instrument of last resort, intended solely to ensure national 
survival.31 
Despite the massive changes that had taken place in the years 1989–1991, Norway did 
not, like Denmark, move to shift focus from invasion defence towards participating in 
international operations. The findings of the Norwegian 1990 Defence Commission were not 
substantially revised after its publication, as the 1988 Defence Commission was in Denmark. 
When the Norwegian government passed its new Long Term Plans for the Armed Forces for 
the period 1994–1998 in January 1993, it based it almost entirely upon the 1990 Defence 
Commission’s findings.32 While talking about substantial change in regional and global 
politics, the Norwegian government expressed its view that the objectives of Norway’s 
security policy remained unchanged. Norway remained a neighbour to one of the largest 
military concentrations in the world, and therefore the defence of Northern Norway should 
remain the dimensioning task of the Armed Forces.33 The changes made in the size and 
organisation of the Armed Forces where almost entirely due to lack of resources to sustain the 
Cold War structure, rather than any desire to orientate the military towards new tasks.34 
In the early 1990s the army introduced a new concept, manoeuvre warfare doctrine, 
but this did not create any wish within the organisation to reduce the overall size or number of 
wartime brigades. Rather, a greater differentiation of the quality of the army’s brigades was 
planned in order to make them capable of performing their assigned role within the new 
concept. The central problem of the army’s doctrine remained how to fight a numerically 
superior enemy invading Norwegian territory.35 Through the early and mid 1990s a number of 
revisions were made in favour of emphasising the importance of having the Armed Forces 
contribute to international operations, but overall the changes in the structure of the armed 
were of a relatively minor and incremental nature.36 Norway decided to contribute to NATO’s 
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IRF with an infantry battalion, an F-16 squadron, a frigate and two mine clearing vessels.37 In 
addition, the number of troops available for UN operations was increased from 1,300 to 
2,000.38 Unlike the DIB, the Norwegian UN readiness forces were only trained, organised and 
equipped to be suitable for classical peacekeeping, not warfighting.39 
 
The Gulf War 1990–1991 and the Former Yugoslavia 1992–1999 
The development of the Danish and Norwegian force posture after the Cold War cannot be 
understood in isolation from developments in international relations in the 1990s. The broad 
changes taking place in the world, especially the winding down of the East-West 
confrontation, opened the way for a wave of UN interventions around the world. These were 
to be very different from the traditional Chapter VI UN peacekeeping missions, in which the 
Scandinavian countries had participated from the start.40 The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
August 1990, as well as the unravelling of Yugoslavia starting in June 1991, offered Norway 
and Denmark the opportunity to reorient their armed forces towards what was for them a new 
practice in international relations, that of using their armed forces as an instrument of foreign 
policy. Ultimately, only Denmark took this turn wholeheartedly, while Norway hesitantly 
followed up the rear. 
After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Denmark and Norway came under pressure to 
contribute to the UN coalition being amassed in the region. The most direct military 
contribution the two countries would consider at this time was towards upholding Security 
Council resolution 665, which called upon UN member states to uphold the embargo against 
Iraq.41 A day after the request was made by the Security Council the Danish government 
conferred with members of the opposition and quickly decided to contribute a Nils Juel class 
corvette to enforce the embargo, the KDM Olfert Fischer. The Danes conferred with their 
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Norwegian counterparts, who were less enthusiastic about the prospect of participating in the 
Gulf embargo.42 The Norwegian government was left in the position of having to respond to 
the Danish initiative, and the Danes now requested that Norway either provide a navy vessel 
or a supply ship for the Danish corvette. Norway decided to contribute a Coast Guard vessel, 
KV Andenes, as a supply and support ship to the Danish corvette.43 Norway also contributed a 
medical company (NORMEDCOY) from the Norwegian UN-reaction force to the Gulf 
coalition.44 
The Danish contribution was minor, but important in principle. It was the first time 
that an armed unit from the country had been sent "out-of-area" outside a UN peacekeeping 
context.45 The Norwegian contribution was less groundbreaking. The Norwegian government 
made a conscious decision not to send combat units, just support units and humanitarian and 
economic assistance.46 This followed the established Norwegian pattern of contributing 
support units to UN coalitions, such as a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (NORMASH) in the 
Korean War.47 
 Both Norway and Denmark were to become involved in enforcing the UN arms 
embargo against the former Yugoslavia through NATO’s standing naval forces. From June 
1992 NATO, together with the Western European Union (WEU), began to enforce the arms 
embargo.48 A Norwegian frigate was present in the Adriatic in the autumn of 1992 (KNM 
Bergen), the autumn of 1993 (KNM Narvik) and in two periods in 1994 and 1995 (KNM 
Narvik).49 Denmark participated with a corvette, initially the KDM Niels Juel in June 1993, 
replaced by the KDM Peter Tordenskiold in August 1993 and later the KDM Oliver Fischer in 
1994.50  
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 While naval deployment was handled through NATO, the ground forces in Yugoslavia 
were initially a more traditional UN Chapter VI peacekeeping force.51 In February 1992 the 
UN Security Council established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in order 
to "create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation for an overall 
settlement of the Yugoslav crisis".52 Denmark received a UN request to contribute to 
UNPROFOR in March 1992, and decided to contribute a reinforced battalion with five 
manoeuvre companies and a support company, a total of some 940 soldiers.53 Norway 
contributed a transport control unit of about 100 troops, 30 civilian police, a few military 
observers and some military police (143 persons in total).54 
 Both Norway and Denmark contributed to the Nordic Battalion (NORDBAT) in 
Macedonia, established in March 1993, but the Norwegians made by far the largest 
contributions. Norway sent a manoeuvre company and parts of the joint staff company (218 
troops total).55 The Danish contribution was limited to the commander of UNPROFOR’s 
Macedonian Command, Brigade General F. Særmark-Thomsen, six staff officers and a UN 
observer.56 The deployment in Macedonia was relatively uneventful, and the Norwegian 
contribution was scaled down to about 30 men from August 1994.57 
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 Things were considerably less peaceful for the Danish units in Croatia and Bosnia.58 In 
April 1993 it was decided to reinforce the Danish contingent with UNPROFOR in Croatia and 
Bosnia. The Danish Parliament voted to despatch additional sanitation, armoured transport, 
heavy mortars and anti-tank rockets, all in order to improve the forces’ security and their 
ability to perform the mission.59 The decision meant that the Danish forces in the theatre 
became more robust, and yet more robustness was to come. In August 1993 the Danish 
Parliament voted to despatch an armoured squadron to Bosnia-Herzegovina, to be part of 
NORDBAT II. Possessing 10 Leopard 1 MBTs, this represented the first time in history that 
tanks where deployed as part of a UN peacekeeping force.60 This force was to be involved in 
the heaviest fighting any Nordic military unit had seen since the Second World War. In a 
single engagement on 29th of April 1994 Danish tanks fired 72 main-gun tank rounds in anger, 
reputedly killing as many as 150 members of the Bosnian Serbian Army in the engagement.61 
This operation was widely reported in the international press, and contributed to changing the 
international perception of the Danish Armed Forces. Whereas previously Denmark was 
thought of as the "peace-loving, foot-dragging footnote country", it now gained a more 
martial reputation.62  
The Norwegian contribution on the ground in Bosnia was less robust: a medical 
company and a helicopter detachment (NORAIR).63 In June 1994 it was decided to send a 
Norwegian logistical battalion to Bosnia, which was in place in theatre about three months 
later.64 It was the Norwegian government’s policy to restrict Norwegian participation in 
peacemaking operations only to support units, such as engineers, maintenance, logistics or 
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medical units. First and foremost the Norwegians wanted to avoid peace enforcement and 
concentrate on traditional UN peacekeeping tasks, where Norway was thought to have certain 
comparative advantages.65 
In December 1995 the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) replaced 
UNPROFOR in Bosnia. IFOR numbered 60,000 troops, and was much more strongly 
equipped both in weaponry and rules of engagement (ROE) than UNPROFOR.66 Both 
Norway and Denmark agreed to have their UNPROFOR forces "switch hats" and become part 
of IFOR. The forces became part of a joint Nordic-Polish (NORPOL) Brigade. Denmark 
contributed a manoeuvre battalion with one mechanized and one armoured company, 
numbering approximately 800 troops in total.67 Norway contributed a supply battalion and a 
medical company, totalling 921 troops.68 With the change from IFOR to Stabilisation Force 
(SFOR) in December 1996 came an important change in Norway’s participation in a PSO. For 
the first time, combat units were to be deployed in a peace enforcement operation.69 The 
Norwegian government decided to contribute a mechanized infantry battalion and an 
independent mechanized infantry company (Telemark Kompani). The battalion was in place 
by February 1997. By sending combat units it was hoped that the forces would be more 
visible, and hence give more political influence.70 Less visibly, Norwegian Special Operations 
Forces were deployed in the Balkans from 1996 onwards. This represented a new, robust 
capability, as well as one of the first deployments of standing, combat ready army units in 
international operations.71  
In March 1997 Italy offered to lead a multinational intervention force to stabilize 
Albania, know as operation Alba.72 Denmark participated in the operation with a light 
reconnaissance squadron (59 soldiers) integrated into a French infantry regiment. This 
participation was possible because the Danish unit was a standing, volunteer unit with light 
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equipment, which made it possible to deploy it rapidly.73 The cooperation with the French 
worked well, and this experience contributed to the decision to work with the French again in 
Kosovo two years later.74 Norway chose not to participate in the ad hoc coalition in Albania, 
and in any case had few standing-high readiness units suitable for such a deployment. 
In February 1998 an armed insurgency broke out in Kosovo, a part of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Western diplomacy failed to defuse the conflict, which by 
early 1999 had become an outright civil war.75 On 24 March 1999 NATO aircraft started 
attacking targets in the FRY. The object of the bombing campaign was, according to most 
European leaders, to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe caused by a vicious campaign of 
persecution by FRY military and paramilitary forces against the Kosovar Albanian 
population.76 Both Denmark and Norway contributed combat aircrafts to the air campaign. 
Denmark contributed four operational F-16s, plus two reserve aircrafts, and the Danish 
aircraft were employed in both air-to-air and air-to-ground role.77 Norway made a similar 
contribution, and operated together with the Danish Air Force from the Grazzanise base in 
Italy. However, it did not prove possible to use the Norwegian F-16s in an air-to-ground role. 
Norway therefore avoided the more controversial role of attacking ground targets.78 There 
were signs of increasing Norwegian "robustness" in 1999. The Norwegian Army Special 
Operations Forces, Hærens jegerkommando (HJK), were among the first units to enter 
Pristina as part of a British Special Forces unit.79  
Both Norway and Denmark thereafter chose to make a battalion-sized contribution to 
the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), which moved into the province after the Yugoslavian 
force had agreed to withdraw. It proved challenging for Denmark to contribute a battalion to 
KFOR (approximately 875 soldiers) while simultaneously having a battalion in SFOR, and 
the size of the Danish battalion in Kosovo had to be reduced to about 500 soldiers in February 
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2001.80 Norway contributed a reinforced mechanized battalion (approximately 1200 soldiers), 
but experienced problems getting the unit ready despite winding down the deployment in 
Bosnia at the same time.81 The decision to deploy was taken on the 14th of June 1999, but the 
battalion was not fully deployed in Kosovo until the 12th of October 1999.82 The Norwegian 
deployment hence took nearly four months. While it was not a secret that Norway had never 
been able to fulfil NATOs IRF reaction-time requirement, which was readily admitted by the 
government already before the Kosovo deployment, four months was considered far too long 
a reaction time.83 Denmark also struggled with the reaction-time requirement, and it took 
eight weeks to deploy the Danish DIB battalion in Kosovo.84 In particular, Denmark had 
problems with personnel on readiness contracts that refused to go when called up for 
service.85 Both in Denmark and in Norway, the performance of the armed forces during the 
Kosovo War thus strengthened the argument that more regular, standing units with contracted 
personnel were needed if the military was to be capable of rapidly responding to this kind of 
crisis. 
 
SHIRBRIG and the Baltic States 
The Balkans were not the only area in which the Danes were pushing to use their military as a 
foreign policy tool. Denmark also took the lead, along with Canada and the Netherlands, in 
developing high-readiness forces for the UN. In January 1995 Denmark announced that it 
would establish a working group to develop a Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade 
for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG). The brigade would consist of 4,000–5,000 
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troops, and have a reaction time of 15–30 days.86 By 1999 11 countries had chosen to 
participate, and the brigade was declared available to the UN from January 2000.87 While 
Norway was a signatory country, it was the Danish minister of Defence Hans Hækkerup who 
had been the most active promoter of SHIRBRIG.88 The Danes where initially told that 
Norway had trouble in meeting the expected reaction time.89 While the Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry enthusiastically wanted to make a contribution, the Ministry of Defence and the 
Armed Forces viewed the initiative as being incompatible with Norway’s role in the alliance 
and military posture.90 The Norwegian contribution to the SHIRBRIG force pool was limited 
to a helicopter detachment, whereas Denmark contributed part of the brigade headquarters, a 
reconnaissance squadron and a military police company.91 
The issue of the Baltic countries provides another good example of Danish 
assertiveness and Norwegian carefulness. Denmark had long taken an interest in the 
independence of the Baltic states, and, after World War One, a Danish volunteer unit had 
fought in Estonia and Latvia against the Bolsheviks.92 Towards the end of the Cold War 
Denmark had been an early and outspoken supporter of the Baltic movement for 
independence, and continued to take a leading role after independence, whereas Norway 
chose to be more careful in its support.93 Danish politicians kept in close personal contact 
with the leaders of the independence movement in the Baltic countries, and Denmark 
provided significant material and moral aid to the movement.94 After independence, Denmark 
took the lead on military cooperation with the newly independent states, while Norway chose 
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to keep a lower profile.95 Because of this military activism, and due to Russian sensitivity 
about a US presence in the Baltic, Denmark often acted as Washington’s go-between in 
relations with the Baltic states.96 On several occasions the US praised Danish military 
cooperation with the Baltic states, such as taking the lead on setting up the Baltic 
peacekeeping battalion (BALTBAT), while also crediting Norway for leading the 
establishment of the Baltic air traffic control network (BALTNET)97 
Through NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), Denmark and Norway pursued a policy 
of supporting the build-up of the armed forces of the Baltic countries. Denmark led the way 
by integrating platoon-sized units from their armed forces into its own battalions in the former 
Yugoslavia from 1994.98 From February 1997 individual Baltic countries took turns 
deploying a company as part of the Danish battalion in Bosnia and Herzegovina.99 Norway 
also worked to strengthen the armed forces of the Baltic states, and in 1996 an Estonian 
company served with the Norwegian battalion in Lebanon.100 
Providing weapons to the Baltic states proved a more controversial step, as most states 
maintained an almost "unofficial arms embargo" against the newly independent Baltic 
republics in order to avoid provoking Moscow.101 Denmark again preceded Norway by 
moving to donate surplus artillery and anti-aircraft artillery in 1999.102 Norway followed in 
2000 by donating light anti-tank weapons to Estonia, but refused to donate surplus Leopard 1 
tanks because the Norwegian army did not want to be burdened helping the Estonians to 
maintain them.103 
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While Norway initially kept a low profile with regard to military cooperation and 
diplomatic support for the Baltic States and only gradually followed Denmark’s lead, the 
Danes were early and substantial in their support. The former Lithuanian Minister of Defence 
Linas Linkevicius considers it "virtually impossible to overestimate the historic role of 
Denmark [in] developing the Lithuanian Armed Forces".104 The Danes themselves also 
seemed to view themselves as the Baltic states’ "best friend".105 Indeed the Danish political 
scientist Hans Mouritzen described the Baltic states as a Danish "sphere of influence" in the 
1990s.106  
 
Defence Reforms in the Post-Bosnian War Era 1995–2001 
A new Danish Defence Agreement for the period 1995–1999 was signed in December 1995. 
The agreement further rationalised the structure of the Navy and Air Force by cutting the 
number of bases, and reduced the number of Army brigades from four to three. The Army’s 
wartime strength was reduced to 58,000 troops. The DIB received priority for new equipment, 
including approximately 50 used Leopard 2 MBTs and 20 wheeled armoured personnel 
carriers (APCs).107 Procurement priority was clearly allocated to the DIB, and, by 1999, five 
of eight investment programs were directed towards the brigade.108 The number of 
internationally deployable land units remained unchanged from the prior 1993–1994 Defence 
Agreement, but the Navy increased its contribution in the form of a submarine and a 
STANDARD FLEX 300 minesweeper, and the Air Force through a HAWK surface-to-air 
missile squadron.109 Most importantly, the agreement stipulated that a new Defence 
Commission was to be convened in 1997 and deliver its findings by 1998. The commission’s 
findings were to form the basis for the next Danish Defence Agreement after 1999.110 
 The Danish defence commission of 1997 consisted, like its predecessors, of 
politicians, officers and experts from the ministries and academia. It submitted its findings in 
                                                 
104
 H. E. Linas Linkevicius, "Participation of Lithuanian Troops in International Peace Support Operations," 
Baltic Defence Review 1/1999 (1999). 
105
 Hækkerup, På skansen: Dansk forsvarspolitik fra Murens fald til Kosovo, 66. 
106
 Mouritzen, "Denmark in the Post-Cold War Era: The Salient Action Spheres," 42-47. 
107
 Forsvarsministeriet, Aftale om forsvarets ordning 1995–1999, 3. This defence agreement proved difficult to 
reach, which is why one was only signed a year after the previous agreement had run its course. The Liberals 
(Venstre), in an unprecedented occurrence for this key party in Danish politics, kept outside the agreement until 
early 1996. Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 1973–2003, 480.  
108
 Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support Operations 1991–1999: Policies and Doctrines, 151. 
109
 Forsvarsministeriet, Aftale om forsvarets ordning 1995–1999, Bilag 2 til Aftale af 8. december 1995 om 
forsvarets ordning 1995-1999. 
110
 Ibid., Bilag 4 til Aftale af 8. december 1995 om forsvarets ordning 1995-1999. 
 45 
November 1998.111 It confirmed the general changes that had taken place since the defence 
commission of 1988 submitted its findings. The threat of a massive invasion from the east had 
been replaced by more diffuse risks, and the Armed Forces had gone from serving only as a 
"reactive and deterring security guaranty to also being an active and confidence-building 
instrument in [Danish] security policy".112 
 While Denmark was rapidly reforming its armed forces towards expeditionary 
operations, and showing more will to use them for combat than Norway, Denmark also 
demonstrated greater affinity for the "new NATO" than did Norway. In April 1999 NATO 
again revised its Strategic Concept, moving further towards enlargement and taking the 
organisation "out of area", thereby giving it a more proactive role besides its classic collective 
defence mission.113 Denmark had since the early 1990s favoured of such an "entrepreneurial" 
role, having NATO take on missions on behalf of the UN and the CSCE.114 Denmark 
therefore supported the American effort to take NATO "out of area" at the Washington 
summit in 1999, as well as to enlarge NATO membership.115 In particular, Denmark 
continued to purport its longstanding argument that the Baltic states had to receive the same 
treatment as the other Central and Eastern European countries.116 Unlike Denmark, Norway 
remained sceptical. Norway maintained a more cautious attitude towards NATO enlargement 
during the 1990s, initially suggesting the PfP as an alternative.117 Norwegian scepticism 
towards both enlargement and the new tasks were kept in check, partially for tactical reasons, 
such as the fear of being viewed as the last "Cold Warrior" within the alliance.118 
The Danish Defence Agreement 2000–2004, agreed upon in May 1999, was based on 
the conclusions drawn from the 1997 defence commission. It sought to shift the emphasis in 
the Armed Forces further from a mobilization-based territorial defence towards crisis 
                                                 
111
 Forsvarskommissionen af 1997, Fremtidens forsvar: Hovedbind (Copenhagen: Forsvarsministeriet, 1998), 6-
13. 
112
 Ibid., 17. 
113
 The North Atlantic Council, "Press Release NAC-S(99)65: The Alliance's Strategic Concept,"  (Washington 
D.C.: NATO Press Office, 24 April 1999). 
114
 Udenrigsministeriet, Principper og perspektiver i dansk udenrigspolitik - Dansk udenrigspolitik på vej mod år 
2000, 53. 
115
 Interview with Niels Helveg Petersen in Jakob Kvist and Jon Bloch Skipper, Udenrigsminister: Seks politiske 
portrætter (Copenhagen: People's Press, 2007), 301-303. 
116
 Niels Helveg Petersen, "Udenrigsministerens kommentar i "Berlingske Tidende" den 5. oktober 1995," in 
Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1995, ed. Svend Aage Christensen and Ole Wæver (Copenhagen: Dansk 
Udenrigspolitisk Institut, 1996). 
117
 Olav Riste, Norway's Foreign Relations - A History (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2005), 279-280. 
118
 Leif Mevik, Det nye NATO: en personlig beretning (Bergen: Eide forlag, 1999), 100-101. Tamnes, Norsk 
utenrikspolitikks historie: Oljealder 1965–1995, 138-139. Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tamnes, Allianseforsvar i 
endring: 1970–2000, 124-125. 
 46 
management.119 The Army’s contribution to NATO’s IRF was increased from a platoon-sized 
light Reconnaissance unit to a company-sized unit, and the DIB was given an integrated 
helicopter unit. The Navy’s contribution to NATO was reduced, due to the overall reduction 
in platforms. The Air Force added radars and a logistical unit to its existing contribution of 
one F-16 squadron and a HAWK surface-to-air battery.120 The Danish Home Guard was 
assigned more territorial defence tasks, in order to allow the other branches of the Armed 
Forces to focus more on international operations.121 All in all the change in the Danish force 
posture was not such a radical one, because the Armed Forces had already begun orienting 
themselves towards international operations before the engagement in the Balkans. As such, 
the Defence Agreement 1995–1999, the 1997 Defence Commission, and the Defence 
Agreement 2000–2004 merely continued along the path already taken in November 1992 
through the Defence Agreement for 1993–1994. 
Norway, on the other hand, was to experience a radical shift around the turn of the 
millennium. That this would happen was not initially apparent, however. Despite the 
engagement in the Balkans, the Long Term Plans for the Armed Forces for the period 1999–
2002 proposed by the government in February 1998 did not envisage radical changes to the 
Armed Forces. While stating on the one hand that "there is no military threat to Norway 
today", the government still expressed its concern that security developments were plagued by 
"uncertainty".122 The Armed Forces were still seen as needing to be dimensioned towards 
meeting a possible invasion of Norwegian territory.123 
There were critical shortages of certain types of equipment in the Norwegian Armed 
Forces around the end of the 1990s. This was especially the case for the Army, where many 
units merely existed on paper.124 The Chief of Defence therefore expressed his concern that 
the Armed Forces were not receiving the resources needed to maintain the structure laid down 
in the long-term plan for 1999–2002. In November 1998 he commissioned a defence study 
which would become the first high-level radical proposal for restructuring the Norwegian 
Armed Forces.125 It proposed moving from a total defence structure designed to ensure 
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national survival, a scenario now seen as passé, towards an armed force designed for more 
relevant scenarios requiring better and more responsive units. The later required the ability to 
deploy rapidly - both nationally and internationally.126 
In June 1999, immediately following the Kosovo War, the government presented a 
white paper entitled "Adjustment of the Armed Forces to Participation in International 
Operations".127 It created the Norwegian Army High Readiness Forces (FIST), which would 
be available for international operations. Norway now abolished the separation between 
NATO IRF and UN standby forces, a distinction Denmark had already abolished in creating 
the DIB in November 1992.128 FIST would consist of units from the Army, Navy and Air 
Force, totalling approximately 3,500 soldiers. The Army’s contribution to the High Readiness 
Forces (FIST-H) would be one mechanized battalion for rapid-reaction, and one battalion 
equivalent of follow-on forces. For the first time the Army planned to deploy tanks and 
artillery in military operations outside Norway. The Navy would contribute a frigate, a 
submarine, a minesweeping vessel, a command-and-control vessel, four missile patrol boats 
and a platoon of combat divers. The Air Force would contribute an F-16 squadron, four 
transport helicopters, a NASAMS equipped air-defence unit, two C-130 transport aircraft and 
a P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. In addition some unspecified Special Forces, intelligence and 
medical personnel would be available.129 Significantly the reform brought the Norwegian land 
units available for international operations close to the level and capabilities that Denmark 
had had since the decision to create the DIB in 1992. However, this was still only a 
modification of the existing structure of the Norwegian Armed Forces, not a wholesale 
reform. However, such a reform did indeed soon follow. 
In July 1999 a Defence Policy Committee had been appointed by the government, 
submitting its findings in June 2000.130 It was presented at the same time as the Defence 
Study 2000, but did not propose cutting the overall size of the Armed Forces quite as radically 
as suggested by the Chief of Defence. In February 2001, the Norwegian government 
presented the new Long Term Plans for the Armed Forces for the period 2002–2005, which 
based itself upon the findings of the previous Defence Study 2000 and the 2000 Defence 
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Policy Committee.131 It stated categorically that the Armed Forces were in "crisis" and that in 
their present form they were "not up to solving the tasks of the future".132 According to the 
Minister of Defence, Bjørn Tore Godal, this was a much more provocative formulation than 
what one would normally find in a government document.133 Specifically, the problems 
Norway had experienced providing relevant rapid-reaction forces to NATO operations were 
mentioned to exemplify the problem. Despite being given considerable resources and 
possessing highly qualified personnel, the Armed Forces in its present form were not able to 
deliver the capabilities required by the government.134 The Armed Forces were now to 
develop more mobile and flexible forces with shorter reaction time, available for use both 
nationally and in PSO.135 
Lacking a parliamentary majority, the government needed to negotiate with the 
opposition. This resulted in a modified plan being passed by Parliament. The Defence Policy 
Committee had proposed increasing the number of brigades retained from two to three, and 
questioned the proposal to phase out the Navy’s existing MTBs and not acquire the new 
Skjold class.136 Picking up on these suggestions, Parliament’s Standing Committee on 
Defence then recommended keeping some coastal artillery installations in mothball rather 
than discarding them completely, retaining 14 Hauk class MTBs and acquiring 6 new Skjold 
class vessels, and also maintaining the Home Guard at its present strength of 83,000 troops.137 
In the end Parliament decided to maintain a larger Army and Navy than originally envisaged 
by the government, and the Home Guard retained its present size.138 The Army was cut from 
six to three brigades, one standing (Brig N) and one reserve brigade (Brig 5) as part of the 6th 
division in Northern Norway. An independent reserve brigade was kept in Trondheim (Brig 
12), of which the FIST-H units became an administrative part.139 Despite these alterations, the 
main suggestions from the Chief of Defence and his staff were retained and implemented. 
One example of this increasing focus away from a static in-place organisation towards 
more mobility was that the Norwegian Navy now abandoned a territorial organisation in 
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favour of a functional and radically centralised structure.140 Another novelty receiving 
widespread attention was the introduction of an Army battalion employing enlisted soldiers 
on 3-year contracts rather than conscripts.141 This "new" Telemark Battalion was much more 
robust and capable than its predecessor, and could realistically be expected to participate in 
operations across the full range of military operations, including high-intensity operations, 
with a relatively short reaction time.142 An attempt was made amongst the parties in 
Parliament to emulate the Danish tradition of broad, long-term defence agreements. This had 
been the recommendation of the 2000 Defence Policy Committee.143 However, it proved 
impossible to reach any such broad-based settlement.144 
 
Conclusion: At First Divergence, Then Convergence at the Start of the 21st Century? 
As the 20th century came to a close, Norway had now emulated Denmark in taking a 
substantial step towards replacing its Cold War era invasion defence structure with a smaller, 
more deployable force. Something resembling a Norwegian brigade was now available for 
rapid deployment abroad, with forces so robust as to be realistically expected to take part in 
high-intensity warfare. Can one then reasonably talk about convergence between Danish and 
Norwegian defence policy during the period 2000–2001? Indeed the capabilities available for 
deployments abroad in the Norwegian and the Danish Armed Forces now resembled each 
other markedly with the establishment of the FIST, particularly in qualitative terms. The 
Norwegian forces were now as robust and capable of high-intensity operations as their Danish 
counterparts. Furthermore, Norwegian participation with air and land combat forces in the 
Kosovo war represented a milestone in Norwegian willingness to conduct actual warfare. The 
beginning of the new millennium thus marked a point in time at which Norway "caught up" 
with Denmark in terms of capabilities and willingness to fight. However, this convergence 
was to prove short-lived. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DANISH AND NORWEGIAN DEFENCE POLICY IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF 9/11 
 
The first decade of the new millennium saw Norwegian and Danish soldiers being sent to 
warzones in some unlikely places, namely Afghanistan and Iraq. Initially relative parity 
existed between the amount of forces the two countries sent and their assigned missions in the 
theatre of operations, further indicating that convergence had taken place in the early years of 
the 2000s. However, in 2003 Denmark took part in the Iraq war as a belligerent state, while 
Norway chose to participate in only a very limited way, technically as a non-belligerent. Then 
in 2004 Denmark undertook a radical transformation of its Armed Forces, turning them into a 
mostly professional expeditionary corps. This was followed in 2006 by a Danish decision to 
send combat forces to the war in southern Afghanistan, where Norway again chose not to 
participate. 
This chapter describes Norwegian and Danish defence policy in the post-9/11 era, and 
demonstrates how the two states remained very different in the new millennium with regard to 
focusing their armed forces towards expeditionary operations, as well as their willingness to 
participate in warfighting alongside their allies. 
 
Afghanistan 2002–2008 and Iraq 2003–2007 
Following the 11th of September 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, 
both Norway and Denmark moved to make immediate and very similar contributions to the 
American-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. In January 2002, a Danish 
Special Forces unit (Task Group FERRET) numbering approximately 100 Special Forces 
operatives and support personnel was despatched to Afghanistan, remaining in theatre until 
June.1 An unspecified but probably equal number of Norwegian Special Forces soldiers (Task 
Group NORSOF) was also in place by January 2002, and like their Danish colleagues 
remained there until June.2 Among other tasks, the Danish and Norwegian Special Forces 
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participated in Operation Anaconda in March 2002.3 Both states also sent support personnel 
such as mine clearers, and a joint Danish-Norwegian-Dutch C-130 transport aircraft 
detachment was also in Afghanistan from March until September 2002.4 
On Washington’s request, Denmark and Norway together with the Netherlands 
despatched six F-16 combat aircraft each to Kyrgyzstan in October. Their role was to provide 
combat air support (CAS) to coalition forces in Afghanistan. During their tour of duty, aircraft 
from both Denmark and Norway dropped live ammunition in support of friendly forces. For 
Norway the 27th of January 2002 therefore became an historic date. While Danish forces had 
seen combat before, including dropping bombs in Kosovo, for Norway this was supposedly 
the first official rounds fired at an enemy since 1945.5 
Unlike in the Balkans, where the Danes had always been quicker to send robust 
ground forces than the Norwegians, in Afghanistan it would initially be the other way around. 
In December 2003 Norway sent a company from the Telemark Battalion to Kabul, as part of 
the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). From July 2004 Norway also 
assumed responsibility for being the lead-nation in one of ISAFs multi-national battlegroups. 
In 2006 the Norwegian manoeuvre company moved from Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif in northern 
Afghanistan, where they were to provide the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for Northern 
Afghanistan.6 Norway already had a military presence outside Kabul at this time. In 
September 2005 the Norwegian Armed Forces assumed responsibility for a Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Maymana from the United Kingdom.7 
While the Norwegians provided robust ground forces in Afghanistan, the Danes 
initially made only limited contributions. The Danish forces varied between 50 and 140 
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soldiers in 2003 and 2004, all in various support functions.8 In 2005, additional smaller 
Danish contributions were made to the German PRT in Feyzabad, the Swedish PRT in Mazar-
e Sharif and the Lithuanian PRT in Chaghcharan.9 In this initial "PRT-phase" the Danish 
soldiers were more involved in rebuilding efforts than combat operations.10 Not until autumn 
2006 did any significant Danish ground forces arrive in Afghanistan, in the form of the light 
reconnaissance squadron from Bornholm, an artillery locating radar team, and a Civilian-
Military Co-operation (CIMIC) unit. All these new forces were deployed in the south of 
Afghanistan, in support of the British PRT and ISAF’s regional headquarters in Kandahar. 
The total number of Danish soldiers in Afghanistan in 2006 rose to approximately 390.11 
The reason why Denmark delayed so long in sending more forces to Afghanistan was 
not any greater reluctance to go, but simply that the Danish Army was overstretched. Unlike 
Norway, Denmark had chosen to join the American led "coalition of the willing" in Iraq.12 
Danish participation in the multinational invasion of Iraq was argued to be necessary in order 
to help remove a threat to peace and security in the region.13 The initial contribution had been 
the submarine DKM Sælen, the corvette DKM Olfert Fischer, and a medical detachment.14 In 
May 2003, the Danish Parliament also voted to contribute to the stabilisation forces in Iraq.15 
The force was to be part of the British-led division in southern Iraq.16 The initial contribution 
consisted of a battalion with a reconnaissance squadron, a mechanized infantry detachment, 
military police and a CIMIC unit (approximately 380 soldiers). A Latvian mechanized 
infantry unit was attached to the battalion. By October it had proved necessary to reinforce the 
battalion with more military police, a full mechanized infantry company, and some engineers. 
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This increased the size of the force to more than 500 soldiers.17 The Danish forces engaged in 
heavy urban warfare with Iraqi insurgents.18 Parallel to the military engagement, Danish 
civilian authorities were involved at many levels within the Iraqi Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA), especially as co-ordinators for the CPA in the Basra region in Southern 
Iraq, and by training police officers for the new Iraqi police force.19  
Norway did not consider itself part of the coalition forces in Iraq. The government 
decided to send military forces to Iraq only after the Security Council in May 2003 asked 
member states to assist in stabilising Iraq.20 An engineer company (approximately 136 
soldiers), initially from the Telemark Battalion, was sent to the theatre in July 2003 and was 
stationed close to Basra in southern Iraq.21 The unit was placed under British command. The 
company remained in Iraq until July 2004, when it was withdrawn. Only a few Norwegian 
staff officers remained in Iraq, as well as a few Norwegian NATO instructors for the Iraqi 
Army. The Norwegian battalion in Kosovo was similarly wound down in July 2004 in order 
to focus the Armed Forces resources on Afghanistan.22 
Due to the challenge of being engaged in three geographically separate regions (Kosovo, Iraq 
and Afghanistan), while only being dimensioned for two, the Danish Army had become 
overstretched.23 This overcommitment of the Danish Armed Forces has been described as a 
small state version of imperial overstretch.24 Not until its engagement in Iraq was wound 
down, ending in August 2007, were the Danish Armed Forces able to project considerable 
                                                 
17
 Forsvarsministeren, Årlig Redegørelse 2003, 28-32. 
18
 One ambush of a Danish unit took place in the Iraqi town of Al Hartha, 14th May 2007. The Danish 
mechanized infantry company, including a Lithuanian platoon, and the light reconnaissance company engaged in 
several hours of urban combat alongside British forces. One Danish soldier was killed, and several wounded in 
the engagement. Michael Bjerre, Jesper Larsen, and Karl Erik Stougaard, Blindt ind i Basra: Danmark og 
Irakkrigen (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2008), 215-231. 
19
 Friis Arne Petersen, "The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy 2003," in Danish Foreign Policy 
Yearbook 2004, ed. Per Carlsen and Hans Mouritzen (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 
2004), 11-13. 
20
 United Nations Security Council, "RESOLUTION 1483 (2003),"  (22 May 2003). UD, "Irak. Norske militære 
bidrag til stabiliseringsstyrken. Folkerettslige aspekter,"  (Oslo: Utenriksdepartementet, 15 December 2003). The 
Danish government requested its own report on the legal, moral and practical issues of the Iraqi war, see DIIS, 
New Threats and the Use of Force (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2005). 
21
 The company was relieved in January 2004 by another engineer unit. Jahn Rønne, "Dette gjorde norske 
soldater i Irak," Sjekkposten: Organ for FN-Veteranenes Landsforbund, no. 5 (September/October 2004): 8.   
22
 Lars J. Sølvberg, "Hæren omgrupperer til innsatsområdet Afghanistan," Aftenposten 15 July 2004. Gjeseth, 
Hæren i omveltning 1990–2008, 169-170. Jonas Gahr Støre, "Redegjørelse om Norges engasjement i 
Afghanistan og Irak,"  (Oslo: Utenriksdepartementet, 9 November 2005). 
23
 Poul Kiærskou, "Hærens nye virkelighed," Politiken 3 January 2007. Bjerre, Larsen, and Stougaard, Blindt ind 
i Basra: Danmark og Irakkrigen, 93-95. 
24
 Ole L. Frantzen, Michael H. Clemmesen, and Thomas Wegener Friis, Danmarks krigshistorie 2: 1814–2008 
(Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2008), 353. 
 54 
forces to Afghanistan.25 Once disentangled from Iraq, the Danish Armed Forces became 
heavily involved in Afghanistan. In May 2007 it was decided to send a Danish battalion to 
make up a part of the British Task Force Helmand, while reducing or winding down the 
participation in the PRTs in the north. The number of Danish soldiers deployed in 
Afghanistan was estimated to rise to approximately 640.26 The engagement also soon took on 
a qualitatively new nature. In October 2007, the Danish government decided to send an 
armoured platoon to Afghanistan, making Denmark one of the few countries to deploy tanks 
in the theatre.27 In June 2008 a detachment of four Fennec reconnaissance/observation 
helicopters were also ordered to Helmand province.28 
The Danish engagement in Afghanistan came later than the Norwegian one, but it was 
of a very different nature. Firstly, and unlike most nations contributing troops to ISAF, 
Denmark placed no national caveats on its deployed troops.29 Secondly, immediately after 
ISAF took over responsibility from the American OEF in southern Afghanistan, Danish 
troops became involved in continuous combat in the region.30 The first major encounter was 
in August 2006, when the Danish light reconnaissance squadron endured 36 days of heavy 
combat defending the village of Musa Qala against the Taliban. An estimated 25 enemy 
combatants were killed during the siege, and several Danish soldiers were wounded.31 The 
light reconnaissance squadron continued to engage regularly with the Taliban thereafter. The 
unit employed their light weapons, mortars, 84mm recoilless rifles and coalition close air 
support (CAS) during Operation Medusa and Sarwe in September 2006.32 But while the 
Danes participated willingly, the Norwegian government actively resisted calls by NATO 
allies to allow for deployment of its forces in southern Afghanistan.33  
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Two years later Danish forces engaging in fire fights with the Taliban had become 
more or less routine. On the 5th of January 2008 Danish tanks were once again engaged in 
combat, for the first time since Bosnia in 1994. This time Danish tanks fired 20 rounds from 
their main guns in the battle.34 In October 2008 the Danish battalion in Helmand engaged in 
another major operation, in which speculative reports claimed that 30 to 50 Taliban insurgents 
may have been killed.35  
The most dramatic incident for the Norwegian forces in Afghanistan occurred on the 
7th of February 2006, when the Norwegian PRT in Maymana came under attack. Six 
Norwegian soldiers were injured, and approximately four Afghans killed.36 Perhaps the 
engagement most resembling regular combat occurred in early November 2007, when 
Norwegian soldiers from the QRF engaged insurgents with small arms, heavy weapons and 
air support.37 This was the first time the CV9030N IFVs were used in combat, and the first 
time Norwegian ground forces called in coalition CAS.38 Nevertheless, for Norwegian combat 
forces in the north the service in Afghanistan was much less hazardous than for the Danes in 
the south, and direct combat with the enemy was the exception rather than the norm. Danish 
and Norwegian casualties reflected this. By March 2008 Denmark had lost 15 soldiers in 
Afghanistan, most of them as a result of direct combat with the Taliban.39 By comparison, 
Norway had lost 3 soldiers due to enemy actions as of November 2008.40 
 
Defence reforms 2002–2008 
While SHIRBRIG, as we have seen previously, was a Danish project in which Norway more 
reluctantly followed, the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support 
(NORDCAPS) was different. It was established in 1997 in order to facilitate Nordic 
cooperation in PSOs, replacing the Nordic Cooperation Group for Military UN matters 
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(NORDSAMFN).41 In 2003 it was agreed to set up a NORDCAPS force catalogue with the 
purpose of providing a Nordic multinational brigade for UN, OSCE, NATO, and UN 
operations.42 Norway and Denmark both offered their available international deployable 
forces for NORDCAPS, Denmark the DIB and Norway the FIST. While the Danish Army 
contribution was more "robust" than the Norwegian one, including armour and self-propelled 
artillery, the Norwegian Air Force and Navy contributed considerably more than their Danish 
counterparts, e.g. 12 F-16 fighters and a frigate.43 The force catalogue was never employed, 
and was eventually declared obsolete in May 2006 due to functional overlap with other 
multilateral force pools.44 Nevertheless, it does demonstrate the change in Norwegian 
capability and willingness to use military forces abroad. While SHIBRIG was initiated at a 
time at which Denmark had just experienced the success of its new "militarised" foreign 
policy in the Balkans, Norway’s armed forces at that time remained focused on the defence of 
Norwegian territory. When the NORDCAPS brigade pool was established, Norway now had 
considerable more forces to offer due to establishment of the FIST in June 1999, and the 
implementation of the new Long Term Plans for the Armed Forces for the period 2002–2005. 
However, just as Norway was starting on the path towards creating an expeditionary 
unit almost similar in robustness and size to the DIB, Denmark moved further away from 
territorial defence and towards making international operations the sine qua non of the Danish 
Armed Forces. The new Danish Defence Agreement for the period 2005–2009 took the step 
fully away from invasion defence. Since the radical shift occurred in November 1992, with 
the decision to create the DIB, the Danish Armed Forces had remained in principle 
unchanged. While increasing resources and attention had been given to units intended for 
international operations in the following two defence agreements, the old Cold War structure 
of long term conscription and static mobilisation defence forces remained in existence.45 The 
                                                 
41
 Being set up while SHIRBRIG was still under development, the Danish minister of defence Hækkerup was 
initially concerned that NORDCAPS would effectively sabotage SHIRBRIG. Hækkerup, På skansen: Dansk 
forsvarspolitik fra Murens fald til Kosovo, 59-61. This Danish scepticism of NORDCAPS seems to have 
persisted, and the NORDCAPS brigade was seen as a competitor to capabilities existing within NATO and 
SHIRBRIG. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Still Punching Above Their Weight? Nordic Cooperation in Peace 
Operations after the Cold War," in Peace Support Operations: Nordic Perspectives, ed. Eli Stamnes (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2008), 20-21. 
42
 Jakobsen, "Still Punching Above Their Weight? Nordic Cooperation in Peace Operations after the Cold War," 
10-13. 
43
 For a detailed list of forces offered in the NORCAPS force catalogue, see ———, Nordic Approaches to 
Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making? , Table 8.1 NORDCAPS force pool (2004). 
44
 ———, "Still Punching Above Their Weight? Nordic Cooperation in Peace Operations after the Cold War," 
12. 
45
 Ringsmose and Rynning, "The Impeccable Ally? Denmark, NATO, and the Uncertain Future of Top Tier 
Membership," 59. 
 57 
2004 Defence Agreement did away with this legacy force structure. It replaced it with a two-
pillar structure: a professional expeditionary force and a total defence force.46  
 The agreement was not preceded by another defence commission, but rather a smaller 
working group chaired by the diplomat Hans Henrik Bruun. The group presented its report in 
August 2003. It reiterated the findings of the 1997 Defence Commission, that there was no 
direct territorial threat to Denmark. The practical conclusions of this went much further than 
previous studies however. The group concluded that the remaining territorial defence capacity 
in the Danish Armed Forces was no longer needed, nor was there any need to retain a base 
from which to regenerate such a force.47 The group noted that a small state such as Denmark 
had limited ability to sustain a sizable force in PSOs abroad. In order to make more effective 
and visible contributions, the group recommended that Denmark move to specialise in 
delivering rapidly deployable initial-entry forces, capable of taking part in high-intensity 
warfighting operations alongside allied forces. Denmark was to be ready and able to 
contribute to NATO, UN and multilateral coalitions of the willing and capable.48 
Signed in June 2004, the new Defence Agreement aimed to do two things: firstly, to increase 
the ability to deploy military forces internationally and secondly to increase the ability of the 
Armed Forces to combat terrorism and its effects.49 The agreement drew inspiration from the 
new US national security strategy from June 2002, as well as the creation of the US 
Department of Homeland Security in January 2003.50 The existing inactive mobilisation 
forces were scrapped, and support functions were now only to be dimensioned by the 
military’s operational units. The Army was reduced to the Danish Division with two 
mechanized infantry brigades, doing away with two brigades and five territorial defence 
battalions. The 1st Brigade would be a standing brigade with mostly regular serving personnel, 
available for NATO on high readiness. The 2nd Brigade would consist of personnel on 
reaction-contracts, as well as soldiers receiving basic training.51 The Navy would receive 
three new patrol vessels (really frigates), most likely to be named the Ivar Huitfeldt class, and 
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two flexible support ships of the Absalon class. These ships would primarily be intended for 
participation in international military operations far away from Denmark.52 This was a marked 
improvement, because most of the existing Cold War era materiel in the Navy had been 
intended solely for operations in the Baltic and the North Sea.53 The Danish Air Force also 
aspired to become an "expeditionary air force", phasing out elements intended primarily to 
defend Danish airspace in favour of deployable capabilities seen as relevant for international 
military operations.54 
In the new defence agreement Denmark’s submarines were scrapped, as were the 
ground-based air defence composed of DeHawk missiles.55 By slaughtering the "sacred cows" 
of the mobilization forces and two whole weapon categories, it was possible for the Danish 
Armed Forces to develop credible deployable capabilities with the limited resources 
available.56 Conscription was reduced to four months, and trained personnel who did not 
enlist in the regular forces would spend three years as mobilisation personnel in a new total-
defence force of 12,000 lightly-armed troops.57 This new total-defence force would be 
employed, along with the police and the Home Guard, according to a total-defence concept.58 
A key task would be to defend society against the threat of international terrorism. After the 
implementation of the agreement, the Danish Armed Forces would have standing forces 
capable of rapidly responding to international crises, as well as to constantly maintain 
approximately 2,000 troops in international military operations (1,500 from the Army, 500 
from the Navy and Air Force).59 This doubling in the number of deployable troops would 
come at no extra cost to the Danish taxpayer, since the defence budget remained effectively 
fixed.60 
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In March 2004 the Norwegian government presented its Long Term Plan for the 
Armed Forces for the period 2005–2008.61 Coming only three months prior to the new Danish 
defence agreement, it showed how much Norwegian defence planning had changed since the 
Kosovo War. The new long term plan envisaged a Norwegian defence force looking 
remarkably similar to the Danish Armed Forces. In October 2004 the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) also published its first "Strategic Concept for the Armed Forces",62 intended to address 
what the MoD viewed as the decoupling of foreign- and security policy from defence policy 
after the Cold War.63 But while the goals and assigned tasks of the defence forces in both 
countries were now almost identical, a study conducted by the Norwegian MoD found that the 
Norwegian Armed Forces chose to retain greater focus on purely national tasks.64 
Like the Danish defence agreement three months later, the new Norwegian long-term 
plan at least theoretically did away with the distinction between units envisaged for national 
defence and units intended for international operations. All units in the Armed Forces were 
now in principle available for operations outside national territory.65 In practice this would be 
less the case in Norway than in Denmark however, because of the decision to retain long-term 
conscription. In Denmark, nearly all units in the standing 1st Brigade would be manned by 
volunteers. The 2nd Brigade would be mostly manned by conscripts who had volunteered for 
longer service, or personnel on readiness contracts. Only the units performing the basic four 
month training of the conscripts would be unavailable for international deployments. The 1st 
Brigade would be available to respond rapidly to international crises, while the 2nd Brigade 
would maintain the Danish Army’s long-term commitments abroad.  
In Norway only the Telemark Battalion within the Brigade North would be a standing 
unit composed of volunteers. The other deployable units within the brigade would consist of 
personnel on readiness contracts. The entire brigade would be available for deployment 
internationally, the first time that Norway had aimed to produce a brigade-sized expeditionary 
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force.66 However, the Norwegian brigade would have a considerably longer reaction time than 
the Danish brigade.67 The Chief of the Danish Army Operational Command emphasised how 
the 1st Brigade, along with augmentations from the Danish Division, was to have a "first in – 
first out" capacity "in the full range of missions".68 The implicit mission was to deploy and 
fight alongside US and UK initial entry forces in high-intensity operations.69 Such ambitious 
tasks were not foreseen for the Norwegian brigade, which was more likely to be deployed as a 
rotating brigade in an ongoing operation, due to its long preparation time. 
The Norwegian Navy was to be primarily tasked with solving national maritime tasks, 
but was also to have a capacity for contributing to international military operations. 
Participation in and possibly the leadership of STANAVFORLANT were particularly 
mentioned.70 The Navy was to receive new high quality equipment. The major decision, made 
in May 1999, was to acquire at least 5 new frigates. They were to replace the ageing 1960-era 
Oslo class.71 The new 5300 ton Fridtjof Nansen class frigates and the Skjold class MTB were 
generally considered to be technologically impressive warships.72 The Fridtjof Nansen class 
frigates alone were the most expensive acquisition ever made by the Norwegian Armed 
Forces.73 While the Danes were investing in capabilities designed primarily for expeditionary 
operations, particularly in the Army, the Norwegians allocated more resources towards the 
Navy, which retained most of its focus on handling national tasks.74 
As the February 2001 Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces for the period 2002–2005 
had led to a "paradigm change" for the Norwegian Army, Navy and Air Force,75 the March 
2004 Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces did the same for the Home Guard.76 Both in 
Norway and Denmark the respective 2004 defence plans transformed the Home Guard into a 
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force designed for assisting the police and civilian authorities e.g. with combating terrorism. 
Both created a prioritised reaction force within their guard, of 5,000 and 3,000 soldiers 
respectively. This force would be able to react rapidly, and receive better training and 
equipment than their regular Home Guard units.77 In Norway an additional 20,000 strong 
reinforcement force would make up a mobile component of the guard. Another 25,000 would 
be available for securing vital infrastructure. A 33,000 strong reserve would exist, which 
would be equipped with uniforms, but not receive training or assigned weapons.78 In Denmark 
the 50,000 strong guard was divided into an active and a passive component. In order to take 
part in an active unit one had to perform at least 24 hours of service every year.79 Only those 
committing themselves to perform this service would be issued weapons. About 23,000 
members of the guard were active as of December 2007.80 The Danish Home Guard remained 
more specialised than the Norwegian one, having for example a dedicated Police Home Guard 
(Politihjemmeværnet) tasked with providing assistance to the civilian police.81      
In February 2004, as part of the Headline Goals process to establish a European Rapid 
Reaction Force (ERRF), the United Kingdom, France and Germany agreed to establish 
battalion-sized EU battlegroups available for rapid reaction.82 In November 2004, Norway 
declared together with Sweden and Finland that it would contribute to building a Nordic 
multinational EU battlegroup, the Nordic Battlegroup. The Norwegian contribution would 
consist of about 200 soldiers, serving in support functions such as medical service, logistics 
and strategic lift.83 Due to the Danish reservations against the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP), Denmark did not participate in the battlegroup.84 However, the 2004 Defence 
Agreement did state that the structure of the Danish Armed Forces would be such that an 
immediate entry into ESDP would be possible following a lifting of the Danish reservation.85 
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This nevertheless represented a departure from earlier practice for Nordic multinational 
forces, when Denmark had normally taken the lead. While Denmark had led the way in 
SHIBRIG in the 1990s, and both Norway and Denmark had made relatively equal 
contributions to the 2003 NORDCAPS force catalogue, now only Norway participated while 
Denmark was opting out. The self-imposed Danish restrictions thus allowed Norway to be a 
more active player in an important new multinational military cooperation than Denmark, 
changing the earlier trend from the mid 1990s with Danish activism and Norwegian 
reluctance. Since the EU summit in Nice in December 2000 approved the ESDP relations with 
contributing third countries, Norway had in fact been more integrated into the ESDP than 
Denmark, despite not being a member of the EU.86 
In January 2005 a new law regulating the personnel in the Norwegian Armed Forces 
came into effect, creating a new class of professional non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in 
the military.87 The law was based upon the findings of a group chaired by Commander Arne 
Røksund.88 When introducing the new law, the Norwegian government argued that the Armed 
Forces had suffered from a surplus of older officers, combined with a lack of qualified 
younger officers and NCOs to command lower-level units, which made reforming the 
personnel structure of the military necessary.89 Norway therefore effectively chose to embrace 
the Danish model of employing professional NCOs, explicitly modelling its new NCO corps 
on the Danish system.90 
In January 2008 a new Defence Study was presented by the Norwegian Chief of 
Defence, aiming towards further professionalisation of the Norwegian Armed Forces.91 It 
recommended slashing the MTBs, reducing the Home Guard to 30,000 troops and converting 
two conscript battalions to a volunteer battalion.92 The Defence Policy Committee, which 
submitted its findings in October 2007, agreed with most of the military recommendations. It 
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did however support retaining one conscripted manoeuvre battalion while adding the one 
professional battalion, and it also wanted a Home Guard numbering 40,000.93  
In March 2008 the Norwegian government presented its new Long Term Plan for the 
Armed Forces for the period 2009–2012, based on the Defence Policy Committee 
recommendations.94 It chose to make only relatively modest changes to the overall structure 
of the Armed Forces, but rationalised it by reducing the number of bases and units somewhat. 
There was an increased focus on responsiveness, to be accomplished by increasing the 
number of regular contracted soldiers and soldiers on reaction-contracts. However, the most 
controversial proposal put forward by the Chief of Defence, to replace the two conscript-
based manoeuvre battalions in Brigade North with an all-volunteer battalion, was rejected by 
the government. The 6 Skjold class MTBs were retained, and the Home Guard was given an 
authorised strength of 45,000.95 Norway therefore did not choose to move as radically towards 
an all-volunteer force as Denmark did. While rejecting further professionalisation of the 
Army, as in Denmark four years previously, the Norwegian authorities did follow Denmark in 
moving towards a new total-defence concept, aimed amongst other things at combating 
terrorism.96 
 
Conclusions: Divergence Persisted Into the 21st Century 
In the introduction I used two images taken twelve years apart to illustrate a difference in the 
deployments and tasks undertaken by the Norwegian and Danish Armed Forces in the post 
Cold-War era. Chapter 2 and 3 have further fleshed out this difference. While the Danes 
undertook combat missions in dangerous places, the Norwegians initially only took on 
support roles. When Norway changed its policy, and began contributing combat formations 
towards the end of the 1990s, these were still deployed in safer places and therefore not 
employed in direct combat. 
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We have also seen that there were some marked differences in priority given to 
international versus purely national tasks in the armed forces of the two countries. Again, a 
snapshot image taken twelve years apart can illustrate this. In 1994 Denmark worked to 
establish the DIB, a mechanized infantry brigade available for deployments outside Denmark. 
This brigade would be available for NATO, the UN and the CSCE, and would be able to 
participate in the full range of military missions, including high-intensity warfare. At the same 
time Norway established its IRF battalion, a lightly mechanized battalion intended primarily 
for NATO operations, but possibly also the CSCE. A separate infantry battalion existed for 
UN operations, intended only for traditional peacekeeping. In 2006, twelve years later, the 
Norwegian UN battalion had merged with the IRF battalion and become the Telemark 
Battalion, a mechanized battalion staffed with professional soldiers. Meanwhile, Denmark had 
now established an all-volunteer mechanized brigade, the 1st Brigade, which would 
compliment the successor to the DIB, the 2nd Brigade. 
The picture presented is of course oversimplified, as it does not reflect the totality of 
the resources made available for deployments abroad.97 Nevertheless, it does reflect a broad 
trend: when Norway was capable of rapidly deploying a battalion abroad, Denmark was 
capable of sending a brigade. When Norway created one all-volunteer battalion, Denmark 
created a brigade. Denmark consistently stayed one level above Norway in terms of its 
capabilities as well as its willingness to participate in dangerous, high-intensive warfare 
missions far from native soil. While differences had narrowed somewhat after the Norwegian 
defence reforms in 1999 and 2001, they nevertheless grew again once Denmark moved to 
abolish territorial defence and long-term conscription altogether in 2004. The countries also 
went separate ways when Denmark decided to participate in the Iraq War in 2003 and to send 
combat forces to southern Afghanistan in 2006. Thus in the 21st Century an inversion had 
taken place. During the Cold War Atlanticism had been stronger in Norway than in Denmark, 
and it was the former country that had led the latter into NATO.98 In the 21st Century the 
tables had turned. Denmark and the United States now criticised Norway for its supposedly 
inadequate effort in Afghanistan.99 
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SECTION II 
 
UNDERSTANDING DIVERGENCE: WHY DANISH AND NORWEGIAN 
DEFENCE POLICY DIFFERED AFTER THE COLD WAR 
 
The preceding section charted the development in Danish and Norwegian defence policy from 
approximately 1990 until 2008. While the two nation’s armed forces forces shared similar 
missions and force postures around about 1990, a decade later these missions and postures 
had become very different indeed. Anthony Forester, in his 2006 study of armed forces and 
society in Europe, concludes that, in the 21st century, the armed forces of Denmark and 
Norway parted ways, and now belonged in his view to different categories. While Norway 
retained a Territorial Defence model, the type of armed forces both countries had possessed 
during the Cold War, Denmark had transformed its military into a Late Modern force.1  
 
Table 2: Different Typologies of Armed Forces 
Territorial Defence Model Late Modern Model 
Have generally been willing to engage in 
peacekeeping tasks only to a very limited 
degree, with still less enthusiasm for high 
intensity peacemaking and war-fighting 
operations, and relatively few resources have 
therefore been allocated to the development 
of a rapidly deployable forces. 
[Has a] dual mission providing what might 
be termed a "residual Territorial Defence 
function", but in parallel a commitment to 
provide a significant contribution as a 
proportion of overall sizes to international 
peacekeeping. 
Source: Anthony Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 54, 
62. 
 
Forester also concluded that Denmark had moved towards a war-fighting focused 
conceptualisation of peacekeeping which included high-intensity warfare, and was more 
willing to make use of force without a Security Council mandate, when circumstances 
required action (the so-called "post-Westphalia" position).2  
It is important to reiterate once more that we are talking about a difference of degree. 
While the reorientation towards international operations has been higher in the Danish Armed 
Forces than in the Norwegian, the latter have nevertheless undergone one of the greatest 
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public-sector reforms in modern Norwegian history.3Also, while it is true that Danes have 
shown a higher willingness to take part in high-intensity combat than the Norwegians, the 
picture changes if we compare the Danish Armed Forces with their US or UK counterparts.4 
Finally, while the Danish military has been more positive towards an all-volunteer force than 
the Norwegian Armed Forces, Norway and Denmark nevertheless remain two of the few 
NATO countries to retain conscription at all.5 Thus one should not overemphasise the 
differences between Norway and Denmark compared to other countries.6 
Nevertheless, there are substantial differences, which need to be accounted for. Why 
did Denmark give much more attention and resources to international military operations than 
Norway, and why were the Danes much more willing to engage in combat operations in risky 
areas of the world? Section II will examine one by one the four main factors identified as 
driving this early and persistent reform and employment of the Danish Armed Forces towards 
expeditionary missions, and will also explain why the Norwegian military only did so at a 
more measured pace. When viewed together, these factors provide the answer to the second 
part of the research question, why Norway and Denmark’s defence policies diverged after the 
Cold War. 
Initially, Chapter 4 will address Norway and Denmark’s different geopolitical 
environments after the Cold War. Denmark’s newfound strategic security was a key 
underlying reason why reorientation towards expeditionary defence was possible in Denmark, 
but less so in Norway. This factor is dealt with first because it represents a necessary 
condition for Denmark’s path towards expeditionary defence, and a constraint on Norway’s 
ability to do the same. 
Thereafter, Chapter 5 will look at individual leadership as the instigator of change in 
Denmark. That the reorientation started so early in Denmark, and was carried out with such 
determination, cannot be understood without examining the individual decision makers who 
pushed through this change in Denmark. These leaders broke with tradition and succeeded in 
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building stable political support for the new policy of military activism which proved 
enduring. The absence of similarly driven reformers in Norway until 2000–2001 was an 
important reason for the country’s much slower pace of change. Norwegian leaders were also 
less able to build broad political support for making tough choices and setting priorities. This 
continued to hamper the ability to make effective military contributions abroad. 
Chapter 6 will look at military culture, a factor which was an important facilitator for 
change in Denmark but which served as a hindrance in Norway. The reformist leaders in 
Denmark were aided by a Danish Armed Forces culture which welcomed and supported 
internationalisation. The Danish military also had a personnel structure making it easier to 
adapt the organisation to the new paradigm of projecting military force abroad. In Norway the 
Armed Forces fought internationalisation, and had a personnel structure making them less 
suitable for more demanding and dangerous missions abroad. 
Finally, Chapter 7 will study the different strategic cultures in Norway and Denmark. 
After the Cold War Danish elites and society grew to believe that the use of force was 
occasionally necessary and effective. This consensus gradually emerged from the successful 
post-Cold War use of the Danish military abroad, and in turn resulted in more frequent 
employment of the Danish Armed Forces in warfighting-situations abroad. Norwegian elites 
were however reluctant to even talk about warfighting. Norwegians did not see military 
means as the answer, nor did they feel equally threatened by distant phenomena such as 
terrorism. They also continued to view the Armed Forces’ traditional defence and nation 
building tasks at home as being important. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DANISH AND NORWEGIAN DEFENCE POLICY IN THE POST-COLD 
WAR ERA: THE IMPACT OF GEOPOLITICS 
 
Norway has access to rich natural resources in vast ocean areas, and borders on to a great 
power in the north. These two factors largely define [Norway’s] regional dimension.1 
The 2004 Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces 
 
With its newly gained and unique level of security in relation to traditional conventional 
threats, Denmark in the 1990s developed an interest in preserving the global and especially 
regional framework for this security.2 
The 2003 Bruun report on Danish defence policy 
 
A key factor causing the divergence in Norwegian and Danish defence policy after the Cold 
War was their different geopolitical situations. Even with the end of the Cold War and the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Norway was left with two geopolitical problems which 
precluded a radical and immediate reorientation towards expeditionary operations: the shared 
border with Russia and the huge and partially disputed maritime economic zones. Denmark, 
however, faced neither a lingering territorial threat, nor the same need to exercise authority 
and sovereignty in its maritime economic zones. Consequentially, these two geopolitical 
differences between Norway and Denmark allowed for the rapid transformation of the Danish 
Armed Forces and its employment abroad, while forcing Norway to remain focused upon 
national issues even in the post-Cold War era. 
 This chapter accounts for the different geopolitical calculations made by Norwegian 
and Danish policymakers after the Cold War, and in particular its impact on defence reform 
and weapons procurement. It argues that their different geopolitical situations allowed for the 
rapid Danish reorientation towards international deployments, while Norway’s different 
security environment did not allow for a similar rapid and radical change of priorities. 
 
The Security Environment of the 1990s 
The insight that the disappearance of a territorial threat opens up a space for reorienting the 
armed forces is hardly unique to Denmark. Karl W. Haltiner, in his study of the decline of 
mass armies in Europe, finds that countries closely integrated into multilateral security 
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institutions, and facing no territorial threat, have reoriented their armed forces more towards 
standing, volunteer forces intended for expeditionary operations.3 In this Denmark and 
Norway seem to be no exceptions. The Danish academic Bertel Heurlin finds that, for all the 
Nordic states, geographical proximity to Russia provides a major source of explanation for the 
degree of change away from territorial defence after the Cold War. Norway, Sweden and 
Finland all shared proximity to, and therefore continued to feel uneasy about, its giant 
neighbour in the east. Denmark, however, was suddenly surrounded by friendly states to its 
east acting as a buffer against Russia.4  
By the early 1990s local Danish and German air and sea forces were able to counter all 
likely threats in Denmark’s vicinity. The Danish Army was consequentially left with only a 
very limited operational role on Danish territory.5 A number of official acts and inquiries 
coming directly on the eve of the Cold War recognised the new security situation facing 
Denmark, and moved official Danish policy towards a more comprehensive view of security.6 
Denmark’s relocation from the frontlines to the backwater of the alliance thus made it 
possible to reorient the Armed Forces, and especially the Army, towards crises management 
away from Denmark proper.7 Thus from an early point in the post-Cold War era the 
disappearance of a concrete threat to Danish territory enabled the reorientation of Danish 
defence policy towards combating "chaos" on the fringes of the international system. 
Denmark could now move from being a security importer preparing to fight a concrete threat 
to its territory, to being a security exporter willing to combat diffuse threats both regionally 
and globally.8 Heurlin argues that since Denmark was "[f]aced with an international 
environment without any possible conventional military threats, the only usable choice for the 
Danish military was in international operations."9 The Armed Forces were also transformed 
into a foreign policy instrument in order to retain influence in the new NATO, and especially 
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with the sole superpower.10 As the Danish journalist Jørgen Dragsdahl expresses it: "[the 
armed forces] are to be visible and harvest good-will in Washington".11 Heurlin thus sees the 
shift towards expeditionary operations as a result of Denmark’s altered geopolitical position. 
Indeed the Danish relationship with the American superpower has been central in 21st 
century Danish security policy. Per Stig Møller, the foreign minister of Denmark since 2001, 
Emphasised the tremendous benefits Denmark reaped from the close bilateral ties that it 
enjoyed with the US. This close relationship was seen as giving Demark a say on the major 
international issues of the day.12 When announcing Denmark’s intention of joining the 
American coalition in the Gulf in 2003, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen argued that 
supporting the United States would always be in Denmark’s interests.13 Denmark’s "opt-out" 
from ESDP in 1992–93 served to make the country all the more dependent upon NATO and 
its relationship with the United States.14 
The Danish political scientist Hans Mouritzen further argue that with German 
unification Denmark faced the unpleasant scenario of being placed in Germany’s shadow 
once more. The EU served as a way of preventing this, by tying Germany into a European 
political structure from which it could be controlled. However, without full integration in the 
EU, due to the opt-out on defence, a strong and well-functioning NATO would have to serve 
as the Danish instrument for tying Germany down effectively. This dependence therefore 
made Danish military activism within the alliance crucial for Danish security.15 
Henning Sørensen, unlike Heurlin and Mouritzen, sees the transformation as less of a 
necessity and rather more of a luxury. Sørensen argues that the increased sense of security 
after the Cold War allowed Denmark to move towards selective security, allowing the state to 
employ its armed forces to deal with problems that did not directly constitute an existential 
threat to Denmark. The structure of the Armed Forces came to reflect this selective security 
environment, offering soldiers a number of different options depending upon what kind of 
service they would like to provide to the state and society, rather than universal conscription 
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designed to defend the survival of the nation.16 However, whether they see the new Danish 
Armed Forces as a necessity or a matter of choice and "luxury", both Heurlin and Sørensen 
agree that Denmark’s changed geopolitical circumstances represented the key factor driving 
the change in mission and organisation of the Armed Forces. 
But while Danish officers and politicians in the early 1990s asked publicly "where is 
the front?",17 and looked for new tasks for the Armed Forces, there was little such existential 
soul-searching within the Norwegian officer corps and political leadership. As the Norwegian 
historian Olav Riste points out, due to its next-door neighbour, "Norway had good reasons for 
seeing that the end of the Cold War was not “the end of History”".18 The massive military 
presence in the Leningrad Military District did not disappear overnight, nor did the Northern 
Fleet on the Kola Peninsula with it strategic nuclear missile submarines. Russian democracy 
was seen as unstable, and Russia still had an unsolved territorial dispute with Norway. There 
remained a long-term uncertainty due to neighbouring Russia, and Riste attributes the relative 
stability of Norwegian defence spending after the end of the Cold War to this uncertainty.19 
Even if Russia slashed its military spending to a "normal" European level, there would still 
exist a huge local military disparity between Norway and Russia.20 The Norwegian historian 
Rolf Tamnes similarly finds that the Norwegian government felt that certain "geostrategic" 
factors still persisted after the Cold War.21 Norway was still located "within the Russian great 
power sphere of influence",22 and the great natural resources located in the partially disputed 
northern areas were seen as a potential source of conflict with Moscow.23 Norwegian security 
and defence policy therefore exhibited greater continuity in the post-Cold War era than in 
most other NATO countries, at least prior to the eastern enlargement.24  
It therefore remained the guiding principle for Norwegian defence planning 
throughout the 1990s that a military invasion of Northern Norway still remained a possibility. 
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Norwegian intelligence saw the high north as having increased its strategic importance for 
Russia, and viewed the Russian forces in the region as sufficient to launching an isolated 
attack upon Northern Norway.25 There remained uncertainty in Norway about how stable 
Russian was in the 1990s, due to the economic troubles and political instability plaguing the 
country.26 The Armed Forces also need to maintain air and sea power capable of conducting 
surveillance and exercise authority and sovereignty in the Norwegian maritime economic 
zones, a mission with increased importance as Norway began to develop its oil and gas 
resources further north. 
The Norwegian view of the importance of geopolitical continuity was shared by 
prominent politicians in Denmark. That geopolitics played an important role for the 
divergence in defence policy is certainly the impression of the former Danish Minister of 
Defence, Hans Hækkerup. He explains the continuation of Norway’s territorial defence 
posture by arguing that "having Russia as a neighbour rather than the Soviet Union does not 
make much of a difference".27 Hækkerup argues that Denmark had a much stronger feeling of 
suddenly being in a very different geopolitical situation, and that this facilitated the move 
from invasion defence towards an expeditionary defence posture. Danish activism in the 
defence field was made possible by its new geopolitical circumstances.28 In particular, 
Poland’s transformation from foe to friend drove this change in threat perception. Hækkerup 
argues that Poland’s accession to NATO was supported so enthusiastically by Denmark 
because it "would change Denmark’s geographical placement decisively".29 
Like Hækkerup, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen also sees Danish assertiveness as being 
partially driven by its new geopolitical circumstances. Especially Danish policy towards the 
Baltic states towards the end of the Cold War and after is seen by Ellemann-Jensen as having 
been about exploiting the possibility for action which suddenly opened up, further facilitated 
by Denmark’s dual membership in both NATO and the EU.30 Danish outspokenness on the 
Baltic issue can hence at least partially be explained by its strategic distance from Moscow.31 
By way of contrast, Norway did not have such vital interests in the Baltic region as Denmark, 
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being more concerned about the Barents Sea. Furthermore, Norway’s shared border with 
Russia made it wary of engaging itself in opposition to Russian interests.32 Clive Archer 
describes Norway’s policy as having been "Russia first", which was also the case for Sweden 
and Finland. Only Denmark gave priority to the relationship with the Baltic states.33 Thus 
while Denmark during the Cold War could hardly be defended, the post-Cold War world left 
Denmark safely at a distance from "the realities of great power politics".34  
While the shared border with Russia continued to dominate Norwegian security and 
defence policy, Norway’s huge maritime economic zones also tied down a great deal of 
Norway’s military resources. The enlargement between 1977 and 1980 of the maritime 
economic zones to 200 nautical miles had given Norway approximately 2 million km² of 
oceanic territory. This huge area had to be managed, under conditions where the legal rights 
of Norwegian authorities to do so were constantly being challenged.35 The Norwegian Coast 
Guard, Navy and Air Force were all involved in day-to-day surveillance activities in these 
areas, ready to exercise Norwegian authority and sovereignty.36 The discovery of large 
quantities of petroleum in the North Sea in 1969 had also given Norway new responsibilities, 
and by the 1990s Norway had become the world’s second largest producer of oil, and 
Europe’s second largest source of natural gas.37 While the direct defence implications were 
modest, being mainly the responsibility of the Special Forces, the growing importance of 
Norway’s energy resources was frequently invoked as a reason why the country needed to 
maintain air and sea forces capable of maintaining situation awareness and exercising 
authority and sovereignty in its maritime economic zones.38 
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Defence Reform in the 21st Century 
Differences in their respective geopolitical situations seem to offer several convincing reasons 
for Norwegian continuity and Danish change in defence policy after the Cold War The 
question then becomes, if proximity to Russia and oceanic jurisdiction were the key reasons 
for the continuity of the territorial defence posture of the Norwegian Armed Forces, why then 
did Norway choose to reform its military in the early 21st century? Did geopolitics diminish in 
importance around the turn of the millennium? I argue that geopolitics still played a 
prominent role, but that circumstances had changed since the early 1990s. 
Firstly, Norway experienced a similar problem to Denmark: diminishing allied interest 
in its territory.39 As one Norwegian Foreign Minister expressed the attitude in Washington, 
"the problem with Norway is that there is no problem with Norway".40 Like Denmark, 
Norway was no longer able to maintain a relationship with the United States based simply 
upon American interests in Norway’s strategic location. Providing Norwegian forces for US-
led multilateral military operations, mostly within NATO, consequentially became a new way 
of maintaining friendly relations with the now sole superpower.41 By doing so, Norway hoped 
to maintain NATO, and by association the American security guaranty which made up the 
cornerstone of the alliance.42 It became a common argument among the political leadership 
that if Norway expected to receive allied assistance when needed, the country had to 
contribute to the alliance in turn.43 It is indicative that when the new long term plan, initially 
unveiled in 2001, began to be implemented, it was warmly welcomed by top NATO 
officials.44 
However, even as Norway reformed its armed forces towards meeting NATO’s 
requirement for a more modern and expeditionary-capable force, this was always done with a 
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view towards keeping NATO’s classic collective defence role relevant.45 When legitimising 
sending Norwegian troops to Afghanistan, Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre emphasised that 
due to Norway’s "location, geography and resources" it needed the alliance.46 
Secondly, the nature of the threat from the east had changed after the Cold War. 
Specifically, Norway’s strategic environment had changed due to the deterioration of the 
Russian military, and due to the advancements made in military technology.47 The Norwegian 
shift away from conscripted reserve units and towards more regular contracted units in 2001 
was therefore in some respect driven by the realisation that Russia continued to be a potential 
threat, but that scenarios involving Russia had changed from the threat of a massive Russian 
military invasion to more limited scenarios. 
That the Russian conventional forces had decreased tremendously in size and 
capabilities in the decade after the Cold War, including on the Kola Peninsula, was something 
of which the Norwegian authorities were keenly aware.48 Qualitative reforms in the Russian 
Armed Forces meant that Russia was also expected to develop more limited means of 
accomplishing their military objectives, such as stand-off guided munitions, rather than 
having to carry out a full-scale conventional ground invasion.49 In the Norwegian defence 
establishment the large, mobilization-based, relatively static invasion defence army therefore 
came to be seen as increasingly unsuitable to face the most likely scenarios involving Russian 
forces. A massive invasion designed to take control of most of Norway now seemed very 
implausible. Rather, limited Russian military operations against Norway were more likely, 
designed to achieve limited aims. Under these circumstances better and more mobile units, 
with shorter reaction time, would be required to win in this type of limited warfare scenario.50 
Crises-management now replaced invasion-defence tasks for the Norwegian military units in 
Northern Norway.51 The seriousness of these new tasks were underlined by the fact that the 
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use of force in or near Norway could in fact be said to have increased after the Cold War, 
because such limited use of force would not necessarily lead to any automatic escalation.52 
Under these circumstances, quality and response time became more important for the 
Norwegian Armed Forces than quantity and endurance. 
Thirdly, and finally, the Norwegian maritime economic zones increased in importance 
in the new century. This was due to the abundant food resources, as well as the future 
potential as an energy region and as a maritime transport hub across Eurasia through the 
Northeast Passage.53 By 2008 the Norwegian Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen considered 
strategic competition concerning access to these resources to be the most likely source of 
conflict in the region. This confrontation would most likely take the form of a tactical 
confrontation involving mainly air and sea forces, and possibly short-term air- or sea-
launched raids with limited land forces against valuable military and economic targets.54 
The types of units needed for these new tasks were mobile and flexible forces, 
available all year, with short reaction time and the ability to work alongside units from allied 
countries. In short, they would be nearly identical to the types of units needed to participate in 
international operations abroad.55 The Coastal Artillery provided was a good example. 
Because technology had made fixed coastal artillery vulnerable, the Coastal Artillery was in 
1998 converted to smaller, more agile, high-technological, mobile forces.56 The new Coastal 
Ranger Command (Kystjegerkommandoen), established in 2001, was gradually converted 
from one intended to train conscripts, to a standing, volunteer force.57 In the fall of 2005 the 
unit was active with four Combat Boat 90s on an exercise with British and Dutch marines off 
the coast of Senegal, and also had a Reconnaissance squad in Afghanistan, while maintaining 
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their readiness for contingencies in Norway.58 Thus the new organisation proved equally 
employable on Norwegian territory as well as on the global arena. 
Similar to the Coastal Artillery, the Norwegian Army had through the 1990s remained 
bound to their static defence concept behind the Lyngen-line, only really capable of tactical 
mobility in the mountainous Troms County. Such limited tactical mobility was now no longer 
sufficient, because the Army would have to be rapidly strategically deployable and be capable 
of winning in limited scenarios. The threat of vertical envelopment created by an increasingly 
air-mobile Russian military further made the old, relatively static defensive concept 
unsuitable for modern conditions.59 The new, smaller Army had increased availability, 
responsiveness, mobility, firepower and protection, and at least parts of it would in principle 
be equally capable of deploying to win a limited tactical engagement in Northern Afghanistan 
as in Northern Norway.60 
Even as the Norwegian Armed Forces became remarkably similar to the Danish 
military after 2001, the motives for the Norwegian reforms were nevertheless different. The 
restructuring towards a smaller number of volunteer units was not justified solely or even 
primarily by the requirements of PSOs in distant theatres, but rather by the need for military 
forces available for national contingencies requiring the capacity for rapid reaction.61 
The importance of the High North was however not a constant size, but fluctuated 
during the 1990s and 2000s. From 2005 the new Red-Green government became increasingly 
committed, at least rhetorically, to conducting an active High North policy. 62 Increasing the 
presence of the Armed Forces was part of this policy, and the High North can therefore be 
said to have experienced a renaissance in Norwegian security and defence policy towards the 
end of the period examined here, after having decreased markedly in importance following 
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the end of the Cold War.63 As expressed by the State Secretary in the Ministry of Defence: 
"Many of the geopolitical factors we used to think of as obsolete are once again relevant."64 
While careful to emphasise that there was no new Cold War, Norwegian policymakers 
remained aware of Russia’s military resurgence and the growing geopolitical and energy 
importance of the High North.65 
 
Procuring Weapons for Going Abroad or Staying at Home? 
The continued territorial focus in Norway and comparatively expeditionary focus in Denmark 
is clearly shown in weapon procurement decisions taken in the early 21st century. When the 
Norwegian government made the decision to acquire the F-35 to replace the F-16 in the 
autumn of 2008, the primary importance of the new aircraft were said to be its role in national 
crises management, surveillance and ability to enforce national sovereignty.66 Indeed the 
main competitor to the F-35, the JAS Gripen, was considered adequate for NATO missions 
abroad, but was ultimately rejected because it failed the requirements for national tasks.67 In 
contrast, in a study conducted by the Danish Institute for Military Studies, the main criterion 
for a future Danish aircraft was held to be the ability to contribute to international military 
missions abroad, with a national capacity for homeland defence ("air policing") being listed 
only as a second criterion.68 
The five new Fridtjof Nansen class frigates which began to be phased into Norwegian 
service during 2006 offers another case in point. Not having been requested by NATO, the 
need to acquire the frigates was primarily legitimised by references to national priorities in 
national waters.69 Strengthening the capacity for crisis management in Norwegian waters was 
considered their most important operations task by the government.70 Similarly, the Skjold 
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class MTBs were also not legitimised by their capacity for force-projection abroad, being 
optimised for anti-invasion operations in coastal areas.71 Norway also continued to maintain a 
strong Coast Guard, numbering 15 vessels in 2008, whose main task was exercising 
Norwegian sovereignty and authority in its northern waters.72 The Coast Guard was equipped 
with new vessels, acquiring five small Nornen class patrol ships in 2006–2007, and three new 
Barentshav class vessels displacing 4000 tons were being constructed in 2008.73 Northern and 
maritime dimensions hence took on a relatively greater importance in post-Cold War 
Norwegian defence policy, leading to greater prioritising of the Navy at the expense of the 
traditionally dominant Army.74 The service mainly concerned with operations abroad 
therefore diminished compared with one focusing mainly on national tasks.  
The Danish on their part reduced the size of their navy more rapidly than the 
Norwegians after the Cold War, and concentrated their new acquisitions around larger 
platforms suitable for operations outside the Danish Navy’s traditional Baltic theatre of 
operations. This indicates the increased priority assigned in Denmark to PSOs and NATO 
standing naval forces away from national waters.75 While patrolling the Danish economic 
zones around Greenland and the Faeroe Islands continued to be an important national task, 
this would now be the sole responsibility of the Thetis, Agdleq, and Knud Rasmussen class 
arctic patrol ships.76 Force projection and sea-to-land operations were the priority within the 
new Danish Navy. The new 6.300 tons Absalon class had the ability to carry up to 200 extra 
soldiers in addition to is 100 regular crewmembers, had a roll-on-roll off platform which 
could accommodate even the heavy 62 ton Leopard II MBT, and was equipped with a 127mm 
canon that could provide naval fire support up to 100 km inland.77 The Danish Navy’s 
ambition was to "create a fleet that can do on water what Danish soldiers are doing on land", 
meaning to contribute to international military operations far away from Denmark proper.78 
The Danish Navy can in some respects be said to have returned to the days of the 18th and 19th 
century, when Danish ships-of-the-line displayed the Danish flag and protected Danish ships 
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in distant waters.79 For example, the DKM Absalon in August 2008 assumed command of the 
Combined Task Force 150, the international naval force conducting anti-terrorism operations, 
as well as protecting shipping from terrorist and pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa.80 
 
Conclusion: Geopolitics, the Necessary but Insufficient Factor 
While Denmark has since the end of the Cold War transformed its armed forces into a 
professional expeditionary corps, safe in the knowledge that no conventional military threat to 
Danish territory exists, Norway has not enjoyed the same feeling of safety and security. Due 
to its uncertainty vis-à-vis its great power neighbour in the northeast, and its need to exercise 
authority and sovereignty within its huge maritime economic areas, Norway has retained a 
stronger territorial focus in its defence forces, even as its armed force has moved away from 
mobilization forces towards more standing, responsive, volunteer units. This is one important 
reason why Norway has had fewer capabilities available for deployment abroad, despite 
spending much more on its armed forces than Denmark. 
But while geopolitical differences provide an important and indeed necessary 
condition for the divergence in Norwegian and Danish defence policy after the post-Cold War 
era, they fail to provide a sufficient explanation for the differences. The enhanced security 
environment only gave Denmark the opportunity to reorient its Armed Forces towards 
expeditionary operations, but it does not explain why this opportunity was seized so early and 
so decisively. Also, Norway’s move away from invasion defence came rather late. The new 
geopolitical situation had been apparent for some time before the defence reform of 2001. 
Because geopolitics alone only provides part of the answer, in the following three 
chapters we will therefore examine in turn the role of the individual leaders and the cultural 
factors that decided the shape of Danish and Norwegian defence policies after the Cold War.
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DANISH AND NORWEGIAN DEFENCE POLICY IN THE POST-COLD 
WAR ERA: THE IMPACT OF LEADERSHIP 
 
If the Alliance were to falter, we [the Norwegians] would be among the last ones to 
leave the sinking ship.1  
Johan Jørgen Holst, Norwegian Minister of Defence 
 
When the Cold War was over, the work began to restore Denmark’s ruined credibility 
as an ally and partner in international cooperation.2  
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 
A central reason for the divergence between Norwegian and Danish defence policy in the 
post-Cold War era was the different desires of key policymakers for change. The key decision 
makers as well as the broader political elite in Norway were generally hesitant about making 
great changes to defence policy before the turn of the century, while in Denmark key decision 
makers actively sought to create a new political consensus for new policies. These leaders 
sought to remake Danish defence policy so that the Armed Forces would act as instruments 
for Danish interests and values abroad, and especially to ensure that Denmark was seen as 
being in the vanguard of the Atlantic community. In this endeavour they greatly succeeded. 
 This chapter will highlight the importance of individuals with fresh ideas and new 
projects. This is a factor that has all too frequently been dismissed in the literature on post-
Cold War Nordic defence policy, often in favour of more "objective" material factors, such as 
geopolitics. 
 
Denmark: The Coming of the "Dynamic Duo" 
The Danish academic Peter Viggo Jakobsen argues that while a "zero-threat environment"3 
which "moved Denmark from the frontline to the backwater"4 was indeed a requirement for 
the rapid Danish transition to expeditionary defence, it also required dynamic leadership to 
build political consensus and public support for it. To send Danish combat troops abroad was 
                                                 
1
 Johan Jørgen Holst, in an interview with International Defence Review (No. 9, 1989, p. 1161. Quoted in 
Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North, 303. 
2
 Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Fodfeil: Da Danmark svigtede under Den Kolde Krig (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2004), 
291. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are the author’s. 
3
 Jakobsen, "The Danish Approach to UN Peace Operations after the Cold War: A New Model in the Making?," 
117. 
4
 ———, Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making? , 92. 
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in no way a "natural" choice, and it broke decisively with past practice in Denmark.5 Jakobsen 
especially identifies two successful defence policy entrepreneurs, the Liberal Foreign Minister 
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and the Social Democratic Minister of Defence Hans Hækkerup, whom 
he describes as the "dynamic duo" of Danish defence policy in the early post-Cold War 
years.6 
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen served as Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1982 until 
1993. He was deeply dissatisfied with what he perceived as Denmark’s wholly inadequate 
support to its allies during the Cold War, which he described as virtual appeasement of the 
Soviet Union.7 Ellemann-Jensen felt ashamed by the role that Denmark had played in NATO 
as a "footnote-country".8 The new policy term introduced by him in 1989, "active 
internationalism", was meant to remedy Denmark’s established reputation as a "wimp-state" 
("pusling-land").9 Denmark was now to become a reliable and predictable ally, which stood 
by its friends. This was particularly important in relations with the United States.10 This 
change of policy was enabled by the restoration of consensus in Danish politics, which took 
place following the election of 1988, and the close cooperation between Ellemann-Jensen and 
Hans Hækkerup. 
Ellemann-Jensen saw the 1990/91 Gulf War as an opportunity to rebuild Denmark’s 
reputation as a reliable ally, and to move the frontier of what was considered possible with 
respect to the employment of the Danish military. Ellemann-Jensen therefore actively sought 
to change Denmark’s foreign policy approach by sending the KDM Olfert Fischer to the Gulf 
in 1990. In this he was supported by the future Minister of Defence Hækkerup, who was then 
a member of the Defence Committee in the Danish Parliament and defence policy spokesman 
for the Social Democrats.11 Despatching the KDM Olfert Fischer to the Gulf was the closest 
to actual participation in the US coalition that Danish domestic politics would allow, and it 
only proved possible due to close cooperation between Ellemann-Jensen, Vice-Admiral Hans 
Garde who was then Chief of Defence Staff (Chefen for Forsvarsstaben), and Hans 
Hækkerup.12 
                                                 
5
 ———, "Stealing the Show: Peace Operations and Danish Defence Transformation after the Cold War," 41-42. 
6
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 See his book on this topic, Ellemann-Jensen, Fodfeil: Da Danmark svigtede under Den Kolde Krig. 
8
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 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making? , 93-94. Hækkerup, På 
skansen: Dansk forsvarspolitik fra Murens fald til Kosovo, 94-98. 
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 Ellemann-Jensen, Fodfeil: Da Danmark svigtede under Den Kolde Krig, 298-302. ———, Din egen dag er 
kort: Oplevelser og indtryk, 247-249. Hækkerup, På skansen: Dansk forsvarspolitik fra Murens fald til Kosovo, 
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To Ellemann-Jensen the Gulf War marked a watershed in that Denmark, unlike in the 
past, did not let its allies down this time.13 Hans Hækkerup also viewed sending a warship to 
the Gulf in 1990 as important in order to change the Danish attitude towards the application of 
military force.14 Like Ellemann-Jensen, Hækkerup had been very uncomfortable with 
Denmark’s footnote-policy, but like the Liberal foreign minister he legitimised staying on 
despite the policy because his resignation would not have changed it.15 Upon becoming 
Minister of Defence in January 1993 Hækkerup continued the policy of employing the Armed 
Forces proactively abroad, most noticeably in the Balkans. Hækkerup stood his ground and 
pushed for the deployment of the Danish tank squadron to Bosnia, despite the scepticism of 
the UN. As a result, unlike the Dutch, who deployed to the safe area of Srebrenica without 
their heavy-weapons, the Danes came heavily armed to their zone in Tuzla. The result was 
disaster and humiliation for the Dutch battalion in Srebrenica, and comparative success for the 
joint Swedish-Danish-Norwegian battalion in Tuzla.16 
Hækkerup also took a strong interest in the organisation of the DIB, which he regarded 
as "the Jewel in the Crown" of the November 1992 Defence Agreement.17 Hækkerup himself 
described the DIB as his "pet project".18 His enthusiasm for the brigade was such that its first 
commander, the then brigadier general Finn Særmark-Thomsen, was initially concerned about 
undue interference from the minister.19 This strong political patronage was an important 
reason why the DIB received a clear procurement priority with the Danish Armed Forces.20 
SHIRBRIG experienced similar personal patronage by Hækkerup. His fear that his personal 
prestige project would fail if not used was the main reason why SHIRBRIG was deployed to 
Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000.21 If the UN called and SHIRBRIG did not respond, Hækkerup 
                                                                                                                                                        
94-98. On the request of Ellemann-Jensen, the Danish businessman Mærsk Mc-Kinney Møller put his 
considerable merchant fleet at the disposal of the US, free of charge. This was however not "official" Danish aid 
to the coalition. Ellemann-Jensen, Vejen, jeg valgte: Ti Mands Minde-foredrag på Vartov, 212. 
13
 Ellemann-Jensen, Din egen dag er kort: Oplevelser og indtryk, 239.  
14
 Hækkerup, På skansen: Dansk forsvarspolitik fra Murens fald til Kosovo, 97-98. 
15
 Ibid., 140-142. 
16
 Lyng et al., Ved forenede kræfter: Forsvarets øverste militære ledelse, Forsvarschefsembedet og forsvarets 
udvikling 1950–2000, 212-213. Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the 
Making? , 93-94. The French Force Commander of UNPROFOR, General Jean Cot, was initially strongly 
opposed to the decision to deploy tanks to Bosnia. Særmark-Thomsen, Troldmandens lærling: Et soldaterliv, 
111.  
17
 Hækkerup, På skansen: Dansk forsvarspolitik fra Murens fald til Kosovo, 178. 
18
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20
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21
 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making? , 95-96. Hækkerup again 
worked together with SHIRBRIGs first commander, brigadier general Finn Særmark-Thomsen, to find 
employment for the brigade. Særmark-Thomsen remarks on Hækkerups very active involvement in the setting 
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feared it would fall apart. As he puts it, "a soufflé rises only once".22 The UN Mission in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) therefore became a brief return to "traditional" non-robust UN 
peacekeeping for Denmark.23 
The Liberal politician Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who served as Prime Minister from 
2001 until 2009, continued taking the "dynamic duo" project a step further from the 1990s. 
This demonstrates both that their dynamic leadership had been a success, but also shows the 
emergence of a new leader daring to challenged domestic constraints and past practice. The 
need to make a break with the embarrassing past and reinvent Denmark as a good and 
assertive ally which "punched above its weight" was an important mantra for Rasmussen. A 
new chapter in this break with the past came when he decided on Danish participation in the 
2003 invasion of Iraq.24 The logic of Denmark having a "debt of honour" to its allies thus still 
played a part when Denmark joined the US/UK coalition.25 Rasmussen viewed past Danish 
foreign policy as having been "to hide behind others and follow a passive adaptation-
policy".26  
Rasmussen therefore successfully took up the rhetoric of Ellemann-Jensen in the early 
1990s and, to a lesser extent, Hækkerup up until 2000. They all sought to make a clear break 
with the Danish attitude during the Cold War of being a "reluctant ally"27 with "neutralist 
tendencies"28 and to remake the country into America’s "best ally".29 Perhaps most 
remarkable was the fact that they managed to build broad cross-party political support for the 
new policy, which endured for two decades almost without cracks. Only with regard to 
participation in the Iraq War did the consensus actually break down, but this was quickly 
restored when the Social Democrats supported the presence of Danish troops to stabilize the 
country.30 However, it should be noted that unlike the previous experience in the Gulf and the 
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Balkans, participation in Iraq has subsequently been seen as less successful.31 Hans-Henrik 
Holm argues that Danish activism in fact declined in the early 21st century.32 
While an early desire for change in Denmark was a decisive reason for the rapid 
change of Danish defence policy, another cause of its continued success has been an ability to 
make difficult choices about priorities. In this the senior leadership of the Danish Armed 
Forces also played a crucial role, and particularly so with the milestone 2004 Defence 
Agreement. While the August 2003 Bruun report was given little media attention,33 the so-
called K-note ("Capacity Memorandum") from the Danish Defence Command received a lot 
of attention. Presented publicly in September 2003 by Chief of Defence General Jesper Helsø, 
this was the first time that the Armed Forces themselves had taken a leading role in the 
political debate about defence reform.34 The K-note effectively sidelined those who opposed 
abolishing the remnants of territorial defence, and speeded up the road towards a new defence 
agreement. With the K-note the Armed Forces themselves led the way towards expeditionary 
defence.35 They made sure that the tools in the military toolbox "would be of an expeditionary 
nature".36 
This prioritising of expeditionary capabilities was aided by a political leadership who 
dared to cut entire military capabilities. Minister of Defence Søren Gade presided over the 
2004 Defence Agreement which disbanded the Navy’s submarines, the Air Force’s ground-to-
air missiles and the Army’s Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).37 Denmark’s low 
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defence spending left a choice between starving the military or transformation, and the 
civilian and military leadership boldly chose the latter.38 
 
Norway in the 1990s: In the Mire of Complacency 
In Norway no similar political entrepreneurship as in Denmark was forthcoming after the 
Cold War. The political leadership mostly supported the status quo as far as the Armed Forces 
were concerned, and if anything there was a general lack of political interest in military 
affairs.39 The Conservative Minister of Defence from October 1989 until November 1990 Per 
Ditlev-Simonsen cautioned that "tampering" with the Armed Forces was undesirable at this 
point in time.40 In this he was supported by his Chief of Defence, Admiral Torolf Rein, who 
called for prudence and no dramatic changes to the mission or shape of the Armed Forces.41 
The 1990 Defence Commission, chaired by the former Conservative Prime Minister Kåre 
Willoch, did argue that the Armed Forces should be prepared to participate in peace 
enforcement operations under the auspices of the UN or the CSCE.42 Overall however the 
recommendations given by the commission in 1992 were very conservative considering that 
the same year Denmark moved to establish the DIB.43 Generally, the Norwegian government 
seemed more comfortable to continue focusing on traditional peacekeeping.44 
In his vision for Norway’s security policy in the 1990s, the well known academic and 
Labour politician Johan Jørgen Holst, who served as Minister of Defence 1986–1989 and 
1990–1993, made no concrete mention of future Norwegian participation in international 
military operations.45 This was despite the fact that he was an enthusiastic and energetic 
participant in the process of reshaping NATO for the post-Cold War era.46 Holst supported the 
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idea of NATO being available to implement enforcement missions in the interest of regional 
order, provided that a mandate was given by the UN and the CSCE.47 This implied that the 
Norwegian IRF force could also be used for such missions. However, when Parliament 
discussed the governments’ proposal to create the IRF battalion in June 1993, little discussion 
was sparked off by the proposal. It seemed that few politicians really thought the unit would 
be utilized for warfighting abroad.48 The only politicians interested in debating the proposal 
came from the Socialist Lefts Party, which traditionally opposed anything involving NATO.49 
The IRF battalion represented the only real innovation in the structure of the Armed Forces 
towards making them more capable of deploying abroad, as the Navy and Air Force already 
possessed units capable of embarking on IRF missions.50 Nevertheless Ståle Ulriksen argues 
that even this relatively limited force bore the mark of being more symbolic than real.51 
There was a feeling in Norway that things had changed less radically by the events of 
1989/1991 than in Denmark, hence preserving NATOs historic role remained essential. Thus 
the government spent much time and energy salvaging what could be salvaged of existing 
equipment prepositioning programs, NATO headquarters and dedicated allied 
reinforcements.52 Less energy was spent on reforming the Armed Forces, whose main task 
was still invasion defence. Leif Mevik, who served as Norway’s NATO ambassador during 
the period 1992–1998, experienced how Norway was increasingly seen as out of touch with 
what other NATO countries viewed as the defence and security challenges of the day.53 This 
criticism was sometimes voiced publicly by NATO officials.54 As the 1990s passed, Norway 
became more and more a "special case" in an alliance increasingly oriented towards other 
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tasks than collective defence.55 Norwegian foreign ministers and ministers of defence 
continued to focus upon the relevance of Article 5, the High North and Russia.56 While 
always careful to emphasise the new comprehensive security challenges, this commitment 
was much stronger in rhetoric than in reality. 
The Labour politician Jørgen Kosmo served as Minster of Defence from 1993 until 
1997. He was thus the main player involved in implementing the Long Term Plan for the 
Armed Forces for the period 1994–1998, as well as developing the following plan for the 
period 1999–2002. Together with his Chief of Defence, General Arne Solli, Kosmo adopted a 
cautious approach towards implementing the long-term plan. Under Kosmo and Solli plans to 
downsize the Armed Forces further were halted, and personnel expenditure again took up a 
growing size of the budget, at the expense of planned equipment acquisitions.57 When 
planning for the 1999–2002 period began, Kosmo mainly wanted to examine the economic 
feasibility of a continued invasion defence structure. Any major changes to the organisation of 
the Armed Forces or the present system of conscription were ruled out prima facie.58 Under 
Kosmo and his successors, the Christian Democrat Dag Jostein Fjærvoll (1997–1999), 
"uncertainty" became a watchword legitimising continuity in defence policy.59 Fjærvoll could 
see "no responsible alternative" to continuing with a conscripted, mobilization-based total 
defence force.60 
That there were few calls from prominent politicians for a radical reorientation of 
Norwegian defence policy in the 1990s can in part be attributed to the fact that few votes were 
to be gained, but many could be lost over the issue.61 By one calculation, in 1992 almost 9 
percent of the working population of Northern Norway was directly employed by the Armed 
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Forces, and 15 percent if counting indirect effects. In some Northern Norwegian 
municipalities direct military employment exceeded 40 percent.62 The Norwegian Armed 
Forces had therefore become an important source of employment in these relatively rural 
areas, a factor complicating any attempts to rationalise and reform the Armed Forces. The 
"municipality-military complex" which had emerged during the Cold War, consisting of local 
base commanders, municipality and country politicians, and local businessmen, proved 
effective at squashing attempts to rationalise the number of bases.63  The drawn out political 
decision-making process required to enact change left ample opportunity for local 
communities to mobilize effectively against reforms they considered undesirable, such as 
those involving base closures.64 Furthermore, maintaining settlements in rural communities in 
Northern Norway had itself become "securitised"65 during the Cold War, making it legitimate 
to argue that having many spread-out bases was a security gain in itself.66 Many defence 
policy decisions were in fact taken with rural settlement policy in mind from the outset.67 
 
Norway After 2000: Taking the Turn Away From Invasion Defence 
Around the turn of the new millennium, Norway reached a "turning point" in its defence 
policy. Several key political and military leaders now became convinced that the Norwegian 
Armed Forces were in a crisis, and that radical reforms were needed. The reasons for this 
change of mind came about for two reasons: resource imbalance and task imbalance. Firstly, 
due to shrinking budgets, failure to cut costs and inaccurate planning costs, the Armed Forces 
were held to be unable to invest sufficient founds in force modernisation and training. 
Secondly, even if adequate funding had been provided, the structure of the Armed Forces was 
such that it would still be incapable of delivering the kind of relevant military power 
demanded by the political leadership. In Norwegian defence policy documents these factors 
were collectively referred to as the "dual imbalance".68 
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The first imbalance was said to be making the Armed Forces into a "technical 
museum" because of lack of funding for new equipment.69 Planned equipment acquisitions 
were being postponed regularly.70 The latter imbalance had been bluntly demonstrated by the 
Kosovo War. When the Norwegian units arrived in Kosovo three months after KFOR had 
already deployed there, its British commander Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson was 
supposed to have asked sarcastically asked "what took you so long? Have you been 
walking?"71 Clearly the slow responsiveness of the Army was an embarrassment to the 
Norwegian political leadership.72 Members of the foreign policy elite seem to have mistakenly 
believed that the Armed Forces were in fact capable of rapid reaction.73 While the Danish 
leadership experienced the same unpleasant surprise, the Danish Armed Forces nevertheless 
performed better than their Norwegian counterparts.74 The political consensus in Norway after 
the Kosovo War was that Norway needed more capabilities, with higher quality and shorter 
response time.75 
Much of the intellectual and ideological impetus for the reforms came from within the 
Armed Forces themselves,76 the key figure being the future Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen. 
Since early in his career he had been an advocate for a standing military with a high-number 
of service members on contracts.77 After the Cold War he continued to argue that this new age 
required higher quality and more standing forces with shorter reaction time.78 Diesen was 
convinced that the role of the military had fundamentally changed in the new age, and that the 
Norwegian Armed Forces had to keep up with the times.79 He argued that the old invasion 
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defence force was neither appropriate nor affordable anymore.80 The Armed Forces were now 
to become a standing, more-volunteer, capital-intensive, power-political instrument for the 
state, adapted for limited rather than total war.81  
In November 1998 Diesen was given responsibility for drawing up Defence Study 
2000.82 While the triggering reason for this study was financial,83 it soon became a vehicle for 
updating the Armed Forces to a new international and technological reality.84 The study was 
closely coordinated with the work of the Defence Policy Committee, whose support provided 
exstra weight.85 His leading role in drawing up Defence Study 2000 therefore made Diesen 
the chief ideological architect for the transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces.86  
The reforms were carried out under the leadership of two reform-driven ministers of 
defence. First, the plans for a new defence were drawn up during the tenure of the Labour 
politician Bjørn Tore Godal, who served as the Norwegian Minister of Defence in the vital 
period 2000–2001. This was the period when the radical new Long Term Plan for the Armed 
Forces for the period 2002–2005 was being developed. Thereafter, with the change of 
government in October 2001, the Conservative Kristin Krohn Devold served as Minister of 
Defence for the entirety of its implementation period. 
Godal argued that the threat of a full-scale invasion was now long gone, and that any 
new threat would take at least 10–15 years to re-emerge.87 New multi-dimensional challenges 
were replacing yesterday’s threats.88 However, as he saw it, the Armed Forces were still 
adapted to yesterday’s scenarios. Norway needed military instruments that could rapidly be 
utilized along with other instruments, both in the High North and if necessary "out of area" 
alongside allies.89 The present invasion defence structure was no longer economically 
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sustainable,90 but more importantly it was no longer needed nor suitable to face the new 
challenges of the post-Cold War era.91 Territorial defence tasks could now mostly be 
transferred to the Home Guard.92 The responses to the proposals were fierce. Godal compares 
the effect of the long-term plan on many groups in Norway to a "sleeping beauty" being 
awakened not by a prince, but by a monster who told the people of a reality they did not want 
to hear.93 However, by providing political leadership and acting as a public spokesman for the 
reforms, Godal played a decisive role in ensuring that most of the ideas for a "new defence"94 
were in the end adopted, despite widespread opposition.95 Implementation of the reforms 
were, however, to be the responsibility of Godals successor, Kristin Krohn Devold. She 
proved to have an equal zeal to that of her predecessor for adapting the Armed Forces to new 
tasks.  
It was during Devold’s period as Minister of Defence that the Norwegian Armed 
Forces first began to be employed actively in combat operations abroad. Within a month of 
assuming office, she had offered substantial Norwegian forces for the US lead War of 
Terror.96 Within two month of assuming her post, Norwegian Special Forces were involved in 
combat operations in Afghanistan,97 something that was noticed and appreciated by the US.98 
Devold wanted the Armed Forces to have shorter response time and the capability to solve 
more complex missions.99 She especially wanted more "deployable forces",100 declaring in the 
American press that "we want to be relevant".101 
Devold became an active exponent of developing niche capacities for use abroad 
alongside larger allies, her stated strategy being to "identify what you are good at, and 
concentrate on it" because "that way you can play with the big boys even if you are small".102 
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Her enthusiasm for military transformation and the use of Norway’s Armed Forces abroad 
made her quite popular with Norway’s NATO allies, enough to make her a serious candidate 
for the post of General Secretary of NATO.103 
However, Godal and Devold were less successful at building broad, cross-party 
political support to set clear defence policy priorities. Unlike in Denmark, Parliament was 
unwilling to sanction an expeditionary concept which emphasising "first in, first out" capacity 
at the expense of sustainability, but was equally unwilling to accept the technical 
obsolescence of the Norwegian forces. It ended up in a requirement that the Norwegian 
Armed Forces "had to be both modern and large, and should underscore NATO as well as UN 
related operations."104 Parliament also refused to cut whole military capacities, insisting for 
instance on acquiring and retaining the Skjold class MTBs despite repeated military studies 
recommending that these be cut.105 Great reluctance was also shown to trimming base and 
support structure as much as was advised by the Armed Forces.106 The Norwegian MoD 
identified the greater political ambivalence reigning in Norway about setting priorities as the 
key reason why the Danes were able to get seemingly the same range of deployable 
capabilities from their armed forces, despite a much lower defence budget.107 
 
Conclusion: Leadership Determined When the "Turn" Was Taken 
In a way Uffe Ellemann-Jensen played the part of the forerunner in Danish defence policy; he 
advocated the new policy to come even before the security environment enabling it had fully 
materialised. His ambitious "active internationalism" in the Gulf and towards the Baltic states 
came, thus, slightly ahead of their time. Hans Hækkerup worked to consolidate the embryonic 
new practices begun by Ellemann-Jensen and himself by despatching the Danish Armed 
Forces to cut their teeth in Croatia and Bosnia in the early to mid 1990s. By this point the 
beneficial post-Cold War security environment which Denmark enjoyed had been realised, 
but Hækkerup’s determination to see the Armed Forces play a decisive part in risky 
operations in the Balkans drove a change that was in no way predetermined by the country’s 
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new strategic situation. The rallying cry of breaking with the past continued into the new 
century, with Anders Fogh Rasmussen assuming the same rhetoric as Ellemann-Jensen and 
Hækkerup when Denmark when to war in Iraq. Thus early, decisive and successful leadership 
was a vital factor in driving Denmark’s rapid transformation from "weakest link" into one of 
NATO’s most willing members when it came to warfighting. The Armed Forces senior 
leadership then completed the final transformation towards expeditionary operations by 
introducing the K-note in late 2003. 
In Norway no ambitious leader with a program for radical change came to the 
forefront after the Cold War. However, the structure introduced by the 1992 Defence 
Commission was neither economically sustainable nor military appropriate for the security 
environment facing Norway in the late 1990s.The failure of political leadership to enact 
timely reforms therefore made the 1990s a "lost decade" in Norwegian defence policy.108 That 
little was done to downsize and restructure the Armed Forces resulted in a feeling of crises in 
2000, when the Armed Forces proved inappropriately organised and much too expensive. 
At this point two political leaders did come forward in Norway, and they were willing 
both to propose and carry through massive reorganisation. Godal’s program of reform was, 
however, drawn up by ambitious reformers within the Armed Forces themselves, chief of 
these being Brigadier Sverre Diesen. They were subsequently enacted by the energetic 
Devold, who worked successfully to change the reputation Norway had acquired in the 1990s 
of being out of sync with its allies. 
In summary, when we regard the overall effect of leadership in the two countries, what 
conclusions can be drawn? Decisive political leadership in Denmark, driven by a strong cross-
party desire for change, was a key reason for early and persistent reform of and active use of 
the Danish Armed Forces. In Norway comfortable complacency and hesitation about the 
direction to take contributed to maintaining the status quo in the 1990s. Thus leadership 
proved very important in causing the divergence between Norwegian and Danish defence 
policy after the Cold War.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DANISH AND NORWEGIAN DEFENCE POLICY IN THE POST-COLD 
WAR ERA: THE IMPACT OF MILITARY CULTURE 
 
During the Cold War we used to joke that everything would be O.K., because it was all just a 
joke […] When we started receiving the first fallen Danish soldiers from international 
operations […] the joke was over .1 
Col. Lars R. Møller 
 
Many of my colleagues say they joined the military to defend Norway, and not to embark on 
foreign adventures.2 
Gen. Sverre Diesen 
 
One important reason for the divergence between Norwegian and Danish defence policy since 
the end of the Cold War was the countries’ different military cultures. While the Danish 
Armed Forces quickly became a willing and capable foreign policy tool, the Norwegian 
military was neither as capable of performing the new expeditionary missions, nor as willing 
to do so. The reasons were threefold. Firstly, the Danish military became involved in combat 
operations abroad much sooner after the Cold War, and thus changed its internal priorities 
towards expeditionary warfighting more quickly than the Norwegian Armed Forces. 
Secondly, the Danish Armed Forces had traditionally depended less on conscripts than their 
Norwegian counterparts, and because standing, volunteered units were more easily 
employable for warfighting abroad, they thus had a personnel structure more suitable for 
expeditionary missions. Thirdly, the Danish Armed Forces had a stronger tradition of 
performing missions outside the borders of Denmark proper. In Norway, however, the 
traditional mission of the Armed Forces was more tied to the territory of Norway. The 
Norwegian Armed Forces therefore resisted the state’s attempt to task them with a growing 
number of new and demanding missions abroad, while the Danish Armed Forces quickly 
accepted and supported the new expeditionary missions. 
 This chapter will highlight the significance of different organisational cultures within 
the Danish and Norwegian Armed Forces, and argue that while the former acted as a catalyst, 
the latter was an inhibitor in determining the speed at which the two organisations became 
willing and capable of performing the new post-Cold War missions. 
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Diverging Experience in the 1990s 
In proportion to its population, Denmark was to contribute more troops than any other nation 
to the UN mission in the former Yugoslavia, and those forces were involved in the most 
intense combat engagements Danish forces had experienced since the Second World War.3 
Between 1992 and 1997 over one third of all Danish Army officers and nearly half of all 
NCOs had done service in Bosnia.4 This war-like experience which the Danish soldiers faced 
in the Balkans in 1992–1995 contributed to changing the Danish Armed Forces self-
understanding. When Danish officers came face-to-face with the harsh new reality of PSOs in 
the post-Cold War era, so different from the "beach party" days in Cyprus, even older officers 
came to experience a change of their world view.5 Henning-A. Frantzen argues that the 
experience in the Balkans led the Danish Armed Forces to adopt a "robust"6 approach to PSO, 
a "‘warfighting first’ doctrine".7 Generally the Armed Forces came to accept their new role as 
a foreign policy instrument within this warfighting focused framework, whereas previously, 
peacekeeping duty had been a side-show and a bad career move for officers.8 
While these deployments, as it were, continued the Danish tradition of participation in 
UN peacekeeping operation, the risk involved and the very robust nature of the Danish 
contribution were something new.9 The consequences of makings a mistake abroad were no 
longer merely a bungled exercise in West-Germany, but would literally result in Danish 
soldiers returning in coffins.10 Consequently, the requirements of international military 
operations quickly grew in importance with respect to determining force structure and 
procurement priorities of the Armed Forces, eventually supplanting all other considerations.11 
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The "hot" combat-exposed parts of the organisation started dominating the military, at the 
expense of the "cold" peacetime establishment.12 
How the Danish approach to PSOs was changed by the experience in the Balkans can 
be illustrated by how differently they organised their camps and military units in Croatia and 
Bosnia. In Croatia the camps had been located on the demarcation line, and been designed 
more for convenience than defensibility. In contrast, the camps built in Bosnia were 
established well away from the buffer zone and built-up areas, with clear fields of fire around 
the base. The organisation of the battalion sent to Bosnia was also more robust, being 
organised into regular manoeuvre companies rather than observation teams. This was due to 
experience from the Croatian deployment of small observation posts teams being too 
vulnerable to intimidation or being taken hostage by the warring parties.13 
While they were assigned to perform PSO mission, Danish officers argued that little 
special PSO training or doctrine was needed, because the ability to solve PSO missions were 
based on the ability to fight.14 The commander of the Danish battalion in the NORPOL 
brigade argued that the Danish battalion was better prepared for the mission because it was 
organised like a regular Danish mechanised infantry battalion. The other battalions in the 
brigade, including the Norwegian battalion, were specially equipped, trained and organised 
for PSOs. Because the Danish battalion was more robust and prepared for warfighting, its 
commander claimed it would be better able to solve the full range of tasks to which it could 
be assigned in Bosnia.15 Similarly, the Danish commander of the Multinational Corps 
Northeast (MCN-NE) emphasised that the most important ability of the corps was its 
warfighting ability, upon which all other tasks relied, even thought its most probable mission 
was low-intensity PSOs.16 
The Norwegian contingents to the Balkans in the period 1992–1995 were primarily 
involved in support functions, and did not, therefore, gain first-hand experience of engaging 
in regular platoon and company size combat engagement as did the Danes. While serving in 
support functions in Bosnia by no means meant serving in the rear, the Norwegian units in 
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theatre did not have combat as their assigned role.17 While the Norwegian forces experienced 
the same quantitative shift that their Danish counterparts did when it came to deploying 
abroad, they did not to the same degree experience the same qualitative shift in terms of the 
types of missions they were asked to perform.18 Consequently, due to the different size and 
role of the Norwegian forces serving in international operations, the embedding of new 
practises did not take place to the degree in the Norwegian Armed Forces as the Danish 
military. The view within the Norwegian Armed Forces continued to be that international 
operations were "an unwelcome diversion of personnel and resources, rather than an 
opportunity to gain valuable experiences".19 
During the transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR in Bosnia, attitudes in the Norwegian 
military began to change. Norwegian officers serving in SFOR in Bosnia in 1996–1997 began 
to sense a shift in the attitude of the Armed Forces towards a more positive view of 
participating in international operations.20 High ranking officers spoke out in favour of 
revising the existing practice of only sending support units. The commander of the Norwegian 
contingent in the NORPOL brigade, Colonel Kjell Grandhagen, argued firstly that Norway 
did not enjoy any "comparative advantage" when it came to logistics and medical services. 
Problems with recruiting such personnel rather meant that only sending such units was 
becoming a "comparative disadvantage".21 Secondly, Grandhagen felt that the types of 
contributions that Norway was making did not provide merit in the Atlantic alliance. As a 
consequence of this, Grandhagen argued that Norway should send manoeuvre units to 
Bosnia.22 The Colonel also argued in favour of more robust units, capable of forcing their will 
upon uncooperative parties in the area of operations.23 Other officers argued for making more 
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use of Norwegian Special Forces in robust PSOs abroad, including as initial entry forces and 
for direct action missions.24 
The trickle in favour of changing the priorities of the Armed Forces became a flood 
after the Kosovo War, with officers such as Lieutenant Colonel Robert Mood returning from 
abroad with vocal calls for change.25 The officers who returned from both actual and virtual 
combat operations abroad returned with new ideas about how the Norwegian Armed Forces 
should be structured, organised, trained and equipped. They challenged those officers whose 
world view remained fixed on the peace-time training establishment that the Norwegian 
Armed Forces had been during the Cold War.26 In Lebanon and Bosnia in the 1990s 
Norwegian Army units had only been trained and organised for peacekeeping. After Kosovo 
there was a new emphasis on capacity for high-intensity warfighting being the benchmark for 
all other activities.27 The transition that happened in Denmark in the early 1990s, of the "hot" 
parts of the organisation challenging the "cold" peacetime establishment, now also took place 
in Norway. 
The early Danish emphasis on robustness in peacekeeping was well ahead of its time. 
It was fully in line with the recommendations of the Brahimi Report submitted to the UN 
General Assembly in August 2000, which emphasised the need for bigger, better equipped 
forces capable of offering a credible deterrent.28 While sending well-equipped forces with 
robust rules of engagements became a norm in UN peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report, 
this had already become the norm for Denmark by the mid 1990s.29 
SHIRBRIG, the Danish UN prestige project, was initially an exception to the Danish 
emphasis on robustness. It was constructed as a more traditional, infantry-based peacekeeping 
brigade. However, in June 2004, the Danish government and most of the opposition parties 
agreed in the Danish Defence Agreement for the period 2005–2009 that Denmark would work 
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towards enabling SHIRBRIG to deploy as a more robust brigade in the future, capable of 
executing Chapter VII missions of the UN Charter.30  
In contrast to the Danish emphasis on robust, warfighting-capable units, the 
Norwegian UN readiness force remained structured around lightly equipped infantry until 
their merger with the Norwegian NATO IRF units in 1999. The Norwegian unit was only 
capable of classic, consent-based peacekeeping missions, as opposed to the new muscular 
Chapter VI and-a-half "strategic peacekeeping" which became common in the 1990s.31 The 
supposedly warfighting-capable IRF battalion was itself proven to have been inadequately 
robust when required to deploy to Kosovo in 1999. When the battalion was initially 
established, it consisted of an infantry company equipped with wheeled lightly armoured 
vehicles and two infantry companies mounted in unarmoured tracked all-terrain vehicles. 
Considering that the forces were in principle intended for high-intensity warfare, the battalion 
seemed inadequately equipped in terms of protection and firepower.32 
 
Personnel Policy: Top-Heavy "People’s Defence" or Slim "Professional" Force 
While not sharing the Danish Armed Forces quick and positive experience with robust 
peacekeeping in the Balkans, there were also more deep-seated reasons why the Norwegian 
military was a less manageable foreign policy instrument than the Danish Armed Forces. The 
Norwegian approach to international military operations in the post-Cold War era represents 
what Peter Viggo Jakobsen has called "an interesting combination of civilian activism and 
military food-dragging".33 This implies that the Norwegian military was a less-than-willing 
instrument, even for those Norwegian politicians who did have a desire to employ the Armed 
Forces abroad.  
Bjørn Tore Godal describes the confrontation over the 2002–2005 Long Term Defence 
Plan as a "collision between two different views on what the tasks of the Armed Forces 
were".34 A large group of "surplus" officers of colonel and lieutenant colonel rank, in alliance 
with retired senior officers and so called "friends of the Armed Forces" made up the 
traditionalists and the reactionaries opposing the reforms. This group was, according to 
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Godal, still thinking in terms of yesterday’s security challenges.35 Godal sees an important 
reason for this strong opposition to reform in the Norwegian military lying in it being a very 
top-heavy force. Despite being much smaller than the Swedish military, the Norwegian 
Armed Forces had twice as many admirals and generals.36 In 2002 Norway had three times as 
many officers at lieutenant colonel/commander level as Denmark did (9 percent of all military 
personnel in Norway, compared to 3 percent in Denmark).37 In Denmark three-fourths of the 
Armed Forces were either enlisted soldiers or sergeants. In Norway the corresponding number 
was about one-fourth.38 
If the Norwegian armed force was to become capable of carrying out sustained 
military operations abroad, it had to be streamlined with more young, low-level "trigger-
pullers" and fewer old, high-ranking desk officers. One key motive given by the leader of the 
working-group who proposed to re-introduce a professional NCO corps after the reform in 
2001 was to address this problem.39 Naturally, the officers being made obsolete would be 
inclined to resist this process. Indeed, the new law was opposed by two of the three military 
unions, Befalets Fellesorganisasjon (BFO) and Norges Offisersforbund (NOF).40 A more 
profound question was, however, at stake in the reform. The reformists wanted to reduce the 
number of "surplus" traditionalist officers. While a voluntary separation package offered by 
the Norwegian government had slimmed the ranks of the Armed Forces, it was feared that if 
nothing was done to change the existing system for educating officers, a new group of 
"surplus" older senior officers would be produced. These officers would re-entrench 
themselves and again make reforming the Armed Forces difficult.41  
Another aspect of the NCO reform was the question of egalitarianism in the Armed 
Forces. The representatives of the military unions argued that the (re)introduction of a 
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professional NCO-corps would introduce an elitist class system into the Armed Forces.42 The 
new system was claimed to be a violation of "Norwegian values".43 Norway had maintained a 
professional NCO corps until 1927, when a unified officer/NCO corps was formed.44 An 
important reason for the abolition of the division between the officer and the NCO corps had 
been to secure equal access to education and do away with outdated social divides.45 As a 
consequence of this reform not only did Norway have a more top-heavy military hierarchy 
than Denmark, but it also systematically had less experienced leaders at lower level.  
Norway had stood out within the Atlantic alliance during the Cold War for lacking 
specialised leaders at the squad and section level, and this absence was frequently commented 
on by Norway’s allies.46 In most alliance countries, e.g. Denmark, this was where the 
technical expertise in low-level tactics and weapons would lie.47 Critics would have it that the 
Norwegian system was designed to be egalitarian and to serve nation-building purposes, at the 
expense of military effectiveness. With increasing military involvement abroad in the 1990s, 
resulting in increased risk for members of the Armed Forces, senior Norwegian officers and 
public intellectuals became vocal spokesmen for revising the system and introducing 
professional NCOs.48 Eventually the new system was introduced in January 2005, modelled 
on the Danish system, giving Norway a military personnel system somewhat similar to the 
Danish one.49 
There was however another key personnel difference making the Danish Armed 
Forces much more capable of expeditionary operations than its Norwegian counterparts; 
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namely the much stronger tradition for employing contracted enlisted soldiers.50 In 2002 46 
percent of all Danish active regular soldiers were volunteer enlisted soldiers, compared to 9 
percent in Norway.51 Meanwhile, in Denmark 25 percent of the total number of active soldiers 
were conscripts, whereas the corresponding number in Norway was 57 percent.52 The high 
number of conscripts in Norway represented an obstacle to projecting military force abroad. 
In the early UNEF and ONUC missions the ordering of conscripts abroad had been practiced 
in Norway, but since UNIFIL this had ceased completely.53 Because ordering conscripts 
abroad was considered impossible in both countries by the post-Cold War era, having more 
volunteer enlisted soldiers gave Denmark an advantage when it came to making contributions 
to NATO and UN PSOs.54 
Employing volunteer soldiers had been much more common during the Cold War in 
Denmark than in Norway, and the idea of an all-volunteer force had in fact enjoyed 
significant political support. It is interesting that, unlike in Norway, the Home Guard in 
Denmark had always been a voluntary organisation.55 While initially conceived as a voluntary 
force in Norway as well, concerns about recruitment and calls for a proper "people’s defence" 
(folkeforsvar) resulted in the introduction of conscription for the Home Guard.56 More 
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important than the principle of relying on volunteers or conscripting soldiers was the issue of 
whether to employ regular, standing forces on contract ("professional soldiers"). The 1973 
Danish Defence Agreement had introduced a mixture of units manned by contracted enlisted 
soldiers (konstabler) alongside conscripted units, and the Social Democratic Party had been in 
favour of an all-volunteer, standing military from the early 1970s until the late 1980s.57 The 
military unions (CS and HKKF) also supported more widespread professionalisation. In 
September 1990 they proposed reducing the Army to two brigades manned by regular 
contracted soldiers, reserving conscripts for 7 local defence battalions and the Royal Guard 
battalion. Mobilization based units were to be cut to a minimum.58 
In Norway a much weaker tradition existed for employing volunteer enlisted soldiers. 
Proposals to recruit a large number of volunteer enlisted soldiers (grenaderer) during the Cold 
War always met strong opposition. Consequently this group was restricted to just a few 
specialists with certain technical skills for the duration of the East-West confrontation. The 
Norwegian Army never had more than approximately 250 contracted enlisted soldiers during 
this period.59 This did not change markedly with the establishment of the IRF-battalion in 
1993, as there continued to be a deep ambivalence about "elite" units within the ranks of the 
Armed Forces as well as in the Norwegian political elite.60 The traditionally prioritised Border 
Guard and Royal Guard battalions were given priority over the new battalion when conscripts 
were scarce, demonstrating that units with strictly national tasks were still held to have higher 
priority.61 This scepticism about elite units can arguably be traced back to the strong 
Norwegian emphasis on egalitarianism.62 Historical accounts from the Second World War 
tended to idealise the Norwegian citizen-soldier, who took up arms despite lack of proper 
military equipment or training.63 
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Resistance against all-volunteer units in Norway persisted beyond the reorientation of 
the Armed Forces after 2001. When the Chief of Defence proposed replacing two conscripted 
battalions with a volunteer battalion in 2008, the military unions lobbied for a larger Army, 
with four conscripted and only the one already existing all-volunteer battalion.64 In Denmark 
there was hence a stronger tradition for advocating a smaller military, employing contracted 
soldiers, to which Norway really had no equivalent. Furthermore, this tradition persisted even 
into the new millennium, continuing to affect the force posture of the Norwegian Armed 
Forces away from employing more contracted units. 
 
Different Responses to Internationalisation 
While the debates about the personnel structure of the Armed Forces were important, being 
linked to the Armed Forces ability to participate in international military operations, a more 
direct debate dealt with the issue of whether such participation was an obligation or a choice 
for serving members of the military. It is interesting to note that while the Danish military 
unions argued for greater international orientation of the Danish Armed Forces, the 
Norwegian military unions did exactly the opposite. This is all the more interesting because, 
during the Cold War, the Armed Forces in both countries had shared a negative attitude 
towards their one major source of military deployments abroad: peacekeeping. 
This attitude changed relatively rapidly in Denmark after the Cold War. This was 
partly driven by the positive experience of carrying out robust peacekeeping in the Balkans, as 
outlined above. However, there were also some deeper reasons. First of all, the conceptual 
leap of employing the Armed Forces outside national territory was smaller in Denmark than 
in Norway. Unlike the Norwegian Armed Forces, the Danish military had been charged 
during the Cold War with defending not only their own territory, but they would also have 
been employed in a forward-defence role in parts of Germany as well. To do this they had 
been tightly integrated with German land, air and sea forces through LANDJUT and 
BALTAP.65 Because the Danish PSO doctrine came to emphasise robustness and the capacity 
for warfighting over and above classic peacekeeping and the missions were initially in the 
Balkans, the new international tasks could be seen as a continuation of the old NATO tasks of 
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defending the near abroad as an extension of defending Denmark.66 By 1993–94 high-ranking 
members of the Danish officer corps were no longer being taught the defence of Danish 
territory, but were insted learning conflict resolution, crises management and the conduct of 
joint operations without reference to any particular geographical area. Examples were taken 
from all over the world.67 
The shift towards projecting forces outside national territory hence came as less of a 
revolution in Denmark than in Norway, where the Armed Forces had solely been tasked with 
defending Norwegian territory in case of a general war.68 However, the mental shift required 
was probably even greater than this would suggest. Norwegian national-romanticism has 
historically been particularly tied to Norwegian landscapes and geography, and historical 
accounts tended to reflect this by mainly focusing on events that took place within the borders 
of the realm.69 Norwegian military history had therefore traditionally ignored historical 
accounts of military operations outside Norwegian territory. The objective had been to present 
the Armed Forces primarily as an institution tied to the territory and nation of Norway, so as 
better to be able to function as a nation building institution.70 Hence Norwegian officers saw it 
less natural, even in historical terms, to do warfighting abroad than their Danish counterparts. 
The difference in mentalities can be seen in the different responses to increasing 
internationalisation within the armed forces of the two countries. There seemed to have been 
little grass root resistance to further internationalisation within the Danish Armed Forces. 
Indeed the military unions themselves created the momentum towards setting up the DIB by 
in September 1990 proposing to create a reserve brigade manned by volunteer soldiers for 
operations outside Denmark.71 When service in international operations finally became 
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obligatory from January 1994, only five percent of the serving members of the Armed Forces 
chose to reserve themselves against this.72 Vice-Admiral Hans Garde, the Chief of Defence 
Staff, interpreted this low number of reservations as meaning that there was widespread 
support for the new international tasks that Danish Armed Forces were becoming involved 
in.73 
In contrast, when in 1995 the Norwegian government proposed making participation 
in international military missions obligatory, this caused widespread debate and controversy. 
It was particularly controversial within the ranks of the Armed Forces, evoking strong 
opposition from the ranks of the largest military unions (BFO and NOF).74 Major General 
(ret.) Werner Christie led the charge against the government. A soldier’s duty was to protect 
home and fatherland against those who would threaten its liberty, and Christie did not believe 
that peace enforcement missions in distant conflict zones bore any relation to this objective.75 
Christie also opposed the move to make service abroad more rewarding for officers’ careers.76 
Being ordered to fight in distant conflicts would according to Christie reduce Norwegian 
soldiers to the level of mercenaries.77 The resulting law, passed in February 1996, only came 
into effect in January 1999, and would only apply to officers entering the Armed Forces from 
that date.78 This proved only a transitory measure however, and a genuine universal obligation 
to serve abroad was finally introduced in March 2004.79 By then military obstructionism had 
delayed the introduction of this legislation for a full decade after it had been introduced in 
Denmark. 
The Norwegian academic and politician Espen Barth Eide, as well as Ulriksen, argue 
that this resistance to ordering soldiers to go abroad was due to a narrow view of the role of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces, not least within the institution itself.80 To change their 
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established views and ways of doing things was a "painful process" for most of the 
Norwegian officer corps,81 as well as for the "traditionalist" defence policy community.82 
 The obligation to serve abroad is an example of military foot dragging; the awarding 
of medals for doing so is another. As a result of the engagement in the Balkans, the Danish 
Armed Forces quickly felt the need to reward those distinguishing themselves in the line of 
duty. Consequentially, in 1996 the Armed Forces introduced a medal for bravery in combat, 
as well as a separate medal for those wounded in the line of duty.83 In Norway a generic 
medal for participating in international operations was finally introduced in 2000, but only in 
2005 was one introduced for soldiers who had died or been wounded in combat.84 By 2008 
the question of whether or not to award a medal for bravery in combat still remained hotly 
contested in Norway, over a decade after the first such post-World War Two medal was 
awarded in Denmark.85 
 When Norwegian defence policy did take the proverbial leap towards expeditionary 
defence, with the new long-term plans introduced in 2001 and 2004, the reforms were still 
subjected to the same fierce criticism from the older members of the officer corps. 
Commodore (Ret.) Jacob Børressen was the most articulate and persistent critic. He expressed 
his discontent with how the reforms lessening emphasis on conscription severed the ties 
between the nation and the military, and weakened Norway’s ability to control and defend its 
own territory independently of its allies. Quality should not replace quantity to the degree now 
occurring, and interoperability with allies and the ability to deploy outside Norway should not 
be a necessary goal for all parts of the Armed Forces.86 Børressen quickly became the 
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bannerman for critics of the reforms.87 The ideological architect of the reforms, the future 
Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen, had to face up to criticism that the Armed Forces had lost all 
legitimacy now that it’s raison d’être was no longer defence of the nation’s territory.88 
However, these rearguard actions against the reforms were inevitably doomed due to 
natural causes. As the polemic journalist Aslak Nore puts it, this was a generational cleavage. 
The debate was resolved as the older Cold War generation naturally declined, and new 
officers now needed a successful record of participating in international military operations in 
order to advance their careers.89 These younger officers felt that being obliged to serve abroad 
constituted a natural part of their chosen profession.90 The remaining proponents of territorial 
rather than an alliance integrated defence were successfully branded as "dinosaurs" by the 
reformists, and therefore lost much of their influence.91 A series of interviews conducted with 
members of the Norwegian Armed Forces in 2006 show that the majority now supported the 
new long-term term plan implemented in the 2002–2005 period. Most respondents felt that 
the new mobile, alliance integrated force structure was more suitable for this day and age than 
the old mobilization-based territorial defence force.92 
Consequently, it seems that a shift in attitudes towards international military 
operations away from Norwegian territory had in fact taken place around the end of the 
1990s. Members of the Armed Forces had become less convinced that there was an inherent 
conflict between defending Norwegian territory and participating in military operations 
abroad. This was particularly the case in the Army, traditionally the most sceptical service of 
the Armed Forces. The shift from participating in UN to NATO led operations also helped, 
because attitudes in the Armed Forces were much more positive towards NATO missions.93 
In her study of role perceptions in the Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold War, 
Torunn Laugen Haaland found that Norwegian soldiers had primarily considered themselves 
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"homeland defenders" and "state employees" at the end of the Cold War. A decade latter 
involvement in challenging military operations abroad had revitalised a certain "warrior role" 
in the institution, making the Armed Forces both more able and willing to participate in 
dangerous military operations abroad.94 By the time the second Norwegian battalion was 
rotated into Kosovo, warfighting skills and robustness had become the focus of the units 
deployed in theatre. Less emphasis was now put on special peacekeeping training, equipment 
and organisation.95 
The "new model army" deployed to Afghanistan in the new century was even more 
remarkably different from the army of the early 1990s. Career patterns had changed such that 
now it was considered very beneficial, even necessary, to have experience from international 
operations in order to advance in a military career.96 This "new army" considered the Cold 
War era conscript army as its "anti-thesis".97 The Cold War era officers had an understanding 
of "duty" and "honour" tied to fighting and possibly dying in direct defence of the nation.98 
The post-Cold War generation of officers and soldiers had developed pride in their 
professionalism and "a kind of warrior ethos" unknown in the old army.99 Its members viewed 
the Cold War force as having been "rigid, passive, a slow organisation with desk officers 
without combat experience".100 
The Armed Forces sought to strengthen this new expeditionary ethos. In 2004 the 
Army published a new historical work emphasising that the Norwegian military had a long 
history of participating in missions far abroad, explicitly to foster the development of an 
expeditionary culture.101 The new message was that operations abroad strengthened rather 
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than weakened the defence of Norway, and that officers doing well abroad were now being 
hand-picked for the top jobs at home.102 
 
Conclusion: Military Culture; a Facilitator in Denmark and a Hindrance in Norway 
Like many other Western military forces, both the Danish and the Norwegian armed forces 
had been mostly homebound "unblooded" armies after the Second World War.103 This 
changed with the end of the Cold War, as both countries became involved in a new type of 
PSOs around the world. Both the Norwegian and the Danish military gradually came to 
rediscover some of their warrior roots after the Cold War, embracing more of what 
Christopher Coker has called "The Warrior Ethos".104 The Danish experience in the Gulf and 
especially in the Balkans however meant that this transition was much more rapid and 
complete in the Danish Armed Forces, leading to radical changes at tactical and operational 
level in the employment of Danish forces abroad.105 The Norwegian reluctance to commit 
combat forces to the two theatres meant that the post-Cold War mentality took longer to 
penetrate the military ranks in Norway. 
An important reason for this was that the Danish military culture was more positive 
towards professionalisation and internationalisation in the first place. The Norwegian Armed 
Forces were more sceptical of employing contracted soldiers and NCOs, and remaining 
strongly wedded to the twin concepts of universal conscription and the defence of Norwegian 
territory. Hence Danish military culture facilitated the rapid transition towards expeditionary 
operations, whereas the culture of the Norwegian Armed Forces served to slow down the 
process and keep the organisation focused upon its old Cold War tasks of territorial defence 
and traditional, non-robust UN peacekeeping. 
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Chapter 7 
 
DANISH AND NORWEGIAN DEFENCE POLICY IN THE POST-COLD 
WAR ERA: THE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC CULTURE 
 
The successful Danish military participation in the Gulf and in the Balkans served finally to 
rid the country of the defeatist "what’s the use of it" attitude which had persisted since 1864.1 
-Hans Hækkerup, Danish Minister of Defence 
 
Peace and justice provide the safest shield for lands and peoples, and the people that make 
peace their purpose will thereby have gained an honourable place in the history of the world.2 
-Halvdan Koht, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 
The final factor driving the divergence between Norwegian and Danish defence policy after 
the Cold War was the countries’ different strategic cultures. Denmark’s experience with 
successfully utilizing force abroad drove a reconfiguration of its relationships with its armed 
forces, and made it reappraised the utility and morality of utilizing force. Norway, on the 
other hand, did not undergo the same change and therefore retained a more traditional Nordic 
position on sovereignty and the use of force. Also, unlike in Denmark, the Norwegian Armed 
Forces continued to have the important strategic tasks at home of defending the country and 
building the nation. Denmark also developed a threat perception different to Norway’s, 
viewing new and distant threats as national security challenges. In Norway however the 
employment of the Armed Forces abroad was more often legitimised by referring to 
humanitarian rather than national security issues. Altogether, the different views in Norway 
and Denmark on the desirability and possibility of utilizing force meant that Denmark made 
much more frequent use of it than Norway did in the post-Cold War era. 
 This chapter will demonstrate the significance of different strategic cultures in Norway 
and Denmark after the Cold War, with special emphasis on cultural effect on force 
employment, threat perception and view of international law. It argues their different strategic 
cultures represented the reason why Norwegian and Danish defence policies continued to 
diverge moving into the 21st century. 
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Denmark: Reinventing Itself as a Strategic Actor3 
The successful entrepreneurship by members of the Danish political class, made possible by a 
benign security environment, and aided by a military both able and willing to do warfighting 
abroad, all served to produce a change in Danish strategic culture. It changed fundamentally 
the conception of what was "normal" and "routine" in Danish defence policy. Having Danish 
soldiers participate in high-risk combat operations far from home certainly would certainly 
not have been "normal" just a few years previously. Now it became "an axiom that hardly 
anyone questioned".4 Once policymakers, officers and the public became accustomed to using 
the Armed Forces successfully as instruments of Danish foreign policy, and the military came 
to view this activity as its main raison d’être, the activity became self-reinforcing. Hans-
Henrik Holm finds the changing Danish conception of the use of armed force to have emerged 
from a gradually changing practice: 
 
The Minister of Defense at the time, Mr. Hans Hækkerup, fundamentally changed the 
traditional Danish approach to the role of the armed forces in Danish foreign policy. 
They were seen as a prospective tool that could be used to support a policy of active 
internationalism.5 
 
Peter Viggo Jakobsen agrees with Holm: 
 
The deployment of Olfert Fischer to the Gulf got the snowball rolling and the 
subsequent (from a Danish perspective) successful deployments in Croatia and Bosnia 
created an avalanche that changed the Danes’ understanding of their appropriate role 
in the world.6 
 
Far from being seen as useless and purely symbolic anymore, in the 1990s the Danes came to 
regard their armed forces as a useful tool for achieving security.7 The military-diplomatic 
policy towards the Baltic countries provides another example of a change having taken place 
in the Danish strategic culture since the end of the Cold War. Christian Hoppe, a section head 
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in the Danish Foreign Ministry, argued that Danish policy towards the Baltic states in the 
post-Cold War era demonstrates that Denmark had put the 1864 defeatism behind it. The old 
Danish attitude would have been to think that a small state like Denmark could have no 
influence on developments. Now the view in Denmark was that Danish activism towards the 
Baltic states, both bilaterally and multilaterally, had an impact.8  
 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen argues that what made this change in Danish defence policy 
possible was the new consensus which was built between Danish "Scandinavian 
cosmopolitanism" and "defencism". Adherents of the former ideology had traditionally been 
active supporters of the UN and sceptical to NATO and the Armed Forces. Supporters of the 
latter tradition had been enthusiastic about NATO membership and a strong defence, but less 
interested in what they viewed as an altruistic foreign policy by the cosmopolitanists.9 These 
two traditions now increasingly agreed on the need to use the Danish Armed Forces to combat 
"indirect threats" to peace and stability in Europe and beyond.10 This political consensus was 
instrumental in first setting up the DIB, and thereafter for choosing to give the highest priority 
to capabilities which were internationally deployable, such as the DIB in the Army, tactical 
transport helicopters for the Air Force and flexible support ships for the Navy.11 This clear 
priority given to internationally deployable capabilities by the Danish political and military 
leadership was combined with willingness to make use of the new expeditionary force to 
engage in high-risk combat operations. As expressed by Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, "activism 
means that Denmark had begun to think of armed interventions as a natural part of its foreign 
policy and organize its defence accordingly."12 Whether military force was useful or not was 
now no longer a matter of debate. The Armed Forces had become a self-evident part of the 
foreign policy toolkit.13 
 Sten Rynning sees the Danish relationship with its armed forces as being reminiscent 
of the mid 19th century, when Denmark was willing to employ force to achieve its aims in its 
relationship with its German neighbour states. Denmark now again sought to become a 
strategic actor. The development of an expeditionary intervention force was intended to 
secure Danish influence in NATO and with the US, as well as to further a law-governed 
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liberal world order from which Denmark would benefit.14 Poul Villaume claims that what 
emerged was something akin to a "great power" mentality in Denmark, driven forth by 
military activism and close alignment to the United States.15 Anders Wivel in turn argue that 
the Danish world view in the post-Cold War period moved at least somewhat towards that of 
the US, in seeing security and a liberal world order as requiring the position and use of 
military force.16 
 
Norway: A Humanitarian Superpower17 
In Norway few norm-entrepreneurs came forward to deliberatively change what was 
considered "natural" or "appropriate", as did Ellemann-Jensen and Hækkerup in Denmark.18 
Less assertive use of Norwegian military forces after the Cold War meant that the new 
paradigm of using the Armed Forces as a foreign policy tool took longer to develop, and when 
it did, it did not penetrate as deeply into the Norwegian collective mindset. Norway 
consequently found it much harder to adapt to the new international PSO environment, where 
use of force beyond self-defence became more common. This new paradigm was seen to run 
counter to the traditional Norwegian emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution and 
mediation.19 
The Norwegian political scientist Halvard Leira argues that Norwegian foreign policy 
culture since the late 19th century has been influenced by a strong emphasis on the peaceful 
nature of Norway and its people. This powerful "peace discourse" in the foreign policy realm 
meant that defence issues were seen as being separate from foreign policy, as the defence 
discourse lacked an international dimension. This necessitated the portrayal of Norwegian 
military engagements abroad as inherently humanitarian, and as a continuation of this peace 
tradition.20 For a Norwegian politician to challenge the established traditions by advocating a 
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more proactive use of Norwegian military forces would involve taking considerable political 
risk.21 There was therefore a poor match between the new paradigm of employing military 
force as part of wider foreign policy and domestic Norwegian practices.22 In 1990 it was 
considered "unnatural"23 to contribute combat forces to the Gulf War, and there was said to be 
"nothing in our historical tradition"24 which suggested Norway should contribute. As we have 
seen, this Norwegian reluctance to send combat troops to PSOs did not change until SFOR in 
1997. Denmark, while also exhibiting much of the same discourse, had a stronger tradition for 
thinking strategically about employing military force as part of its foreign policy, and its 
peace tradition was less missionary than its Norwegian counterpart.25 
 Torunn Laugen Haaland claims that in the early 1990s, while wanting to demonstrate 
Norway’s solidarity with its allies, the Norwegian political class did not want to be associated 
too closely with military endeavours. The solution was to emphasise "non-military" parts of 
the Armed Forces activities abroad, portraying Norwegian soldiers as military 
humanitarians.26 This patterned continued in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, even as the 
Norwegian military contribution changed towards robust combat forces. Norwegian 
politicians still continued to emphasise the non-military and humanitarian aspects of the 
Armed Forces activities abroad, downplaying and even trying to camouflage by clever 
rhetorical ploys the military aspects of the activities of the Armed Forces abroad.27 Kjell 
Magne Bondevik, the Norwegian Prime Minister during the 1999 Kosovo War, was accused 
of trivialising Norway’s military involvement by describing it as "limited military 
operations".28 It is also revealing to read the account of the Norwegian Foreign Minister 
2000–2001, Thorbjørn Jagland. While recognising that NATO’s Article 5 had been invoked, 
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he still praised the toppling of the Taliban as a "humanitarian intervention",29 and made no 
mention of Norwegian military participation.30 This fits Marc Houbens finding that 
Norwegian participations in international military operations were mostly justified with 
references to international obligations and humanitarian concerns, and far less so with 
reference to material national interests.31 Noting this, Karsten Friis argues: 
 
[T]hat Norwegians have to kill and die on another continent to secure national 
strategic security appears to have been difficult to state publicly for the government. 
The humanitarian version is safer and less controversial.32 
 
The resulting difference between rhetoric and reality was great, leading to something akin to 
cognitive dissonance.33 
 
Talking About War, Risk-Perception and Sovereignty 
The Danish government and prominent member of the public did not have the same 
inhibitions as their Norwegian counterparts when it came to talking publicly about utilizing 
military means. Prominent members of the Danish political class repeatedly stated publicly 
that the country was at war and that Denmark was being defender in Iraq and Afghanistan.34 
These public statements became so common in Denmark in the 21st century that Jacobsen 
claims that "nobody [in Denmark] raises an eyebrow" when a politician made a claim that 
Denmark was being defended in the Iraqi dessert or the mountains of Afghanistan.35 
Risk perception in Denmark related to more distant and non-classical threats, such as 
terrorism, have differed to Norway’s. In newspaper articles legitimising their respective 
military engagements abroad, the first reason listed by the Norwegian Minister of Defence 
was humanitarian and developmental, while her Danish counterpart immediately drew 
attention to Denmark’s security.36 The central-right government that came to power in 
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November 2001 rhetorically aligned itself closely with the US and the "War on Terror", 
arguing that Denmark was a belligerent in a global war on terrorism that had both an 
offensive and a defensive side.37 The US concept of "Homeland Security" was warmly 
embraced in Denmark, this now being the main task of Danish forces on Danish soil.38 
Meanwhile the government claimed to be pursuing an "offensive foreign policy", listing its 
involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq as examples.39 
The Danish government also seemed to have grown more willing than its Norwegian 
counterpart to condone the idea of engaging in war without necessarily needing to obtain a 
UN Security Council mandate.40 The 2003 Iraq War was a case in point, marking a break with 
past practice in Danish foreign policy.41 While the initial Danish decision to join the US-led 
"coalition of the willing" can to some extent be attributed to the election of the Fogh 
Rasmussen government in 2001,42 there was nevertheless little opposition to it in Danish 
society, and after the invasion the Social Democratic opposition supported the Danish 
presence in Iraq.43 Norway, however, remained insistent on the primacy of international law.44 
This clearly placed Denmark squarely in the "post-Westphalia" group of countries, as 
Anthony Forester argues, while Norway remained more tied to Westphalian norms as far as 
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the use of military force was concerned.45 Overall Norway remained committed to a more 
traditional Nordic position regarding sovereignty and the use of force, whereas Denmark has 
reappraised the utility and morality of utilizing force.46 
 Thus, even as Norway’s military contribution gradually changed from support to 
robust combat units, Norway remained much more reluctant to commit its forces to actual 
combat operations than Denmark. The effectiveness of the Danish contribution in the 1990s 
was also reinforced because Denmark tended to concentrate its deployments in fewer 
locations, whereas Norway tended to participate in a larger number of missions. Denmark also 
favoured NATO PSO missions earlier, whereas Norway continued to spread its priorities 
between the UN and NATO until the late 1990s.47 The net result was that, despite still being 
among the lowest spenders in NATO on defence, Denmark managed to achieve a solid 
reputation among its allies after the Cold War.48 In comparison, Norway lost at least some of 
the more favourable status it had enjoyed in the alliance compared to Denmark.49 
 
Lingering Strategic Rationale for the Armed Forces 
Differences in perception regarding the desirability to use force and adhere to Westphalian 
norms of sovereignty constituted important strategic differences between Norway and 
Denmark. However there was also another set of reasons. Namely, there was a difference in 
the strategic rationale for maintaining armed forces at all. It may seem paradoxical that the 
Danish scepticism about the usefulness of military force during the Cold War, characterised 
by a "deterministic"50 and "what’s the use of it"51 attitude, would transform into such a period 
of military activism in the post-Cold War era. In fact, however, it is precisely this lack of 
functions for Danish defence during the Cold War that allowed for such a rapid transition 
towards an expeditionary defence after 1990. With the primary function of providing a 
symbolic defence now obsolete, and influence in the Atlantic alliance now increasingly being 
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based on how much capabilities a country provided for international operations, conditions 
were ripe for a rapid change in Denmark.52 There were simply few inherent functions in the 
Armed Forces that remaining once providing a symbolic resistance to a Warsaw Pact invasion 
of Denmark suddenly became irrelevant. 
In Norway the role of the Armed Forces had been more diverse than in Denmark. 
Consequently, the calls for change were fewer and less successful. While the end of the Cold 
War acted as an external shock changing the traditional way in which most Western states 
organised and utilized their armed forces, neither Norwegian politicians nor the Armed Forces 
were sufficiently shocked by the end of the Cold War to call for radical changes.53 
Firstly, unlike in Denmark, the Norwegian Armed Forces were not seen as merely 
being capable of providing a symbolic defence of the nation, but were viewed as actually 
capable of defending the country.54 Secondly, the Norwegian military continued to be seen as 
an institution that should serve as homogenising vehicle for the young men of the nation.55 
Already during the 19th century the Norwegian Armed Forces had become closely tied to 
civilian society through voluntary organisations and broad parliamentary oversight.56 
Conscription in Norway was said to serve as a socialising and educational institution, gluing 
the nation together.57 For the duration of the Cold War there was little conflict between 
society’s desire to see as many young males as possible undergo conscription, and the 
functional requirements of the Armed Forces. In order to secure the territory of the state, 
virtually the entire nation would need to be mobilized in some capacity.58 With the end of the 
Cold War, however, social desirability and military functionality increasingly parted ways. 
Despite this there was little immediate debate about national service. Conscription had 
become institutionalised and tied to national myths to a degree where it was difficult to 
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challenge on functional grounds.59 Any attempt to reform the system was faced with strong 
emotional reactions.60 This made Norway different from Denmark, where the traditional 
attachment to conscription was weaker, and hence the system of long-term conscription was 
easier to reform.61  
 
Conclusion: Strategic Culture, a Significant Cause of Divergence 
The formative experiences in the 1990s established a new Danish culture for employing 
military force, including when there were doubtful international legal allowances for it. The 
country came to see the use of force as an acceptable and effective tool to utilize as part of its 
general foreign policy. Denmark also developed a different evaluation of the necessity of 
employing force, because distant threats such as terrorism, rogue states and the proliferation 
of WMDs were held to be threats to Danish national security. Furthermore, the disappearance 
of the one primary strategic function of the Danish Armed Forces after the Cold War meant 
that reorientation was easier to achieve. 
On the other hand, Norwegian strategic culture remained more tied to its pre-1989 
norms of consent and non-use of force except in self-defence. Norway also retained a stronger 
attachment to Westphalian norms and international legal principles, and did not develop an 
equal feeling of being endangered by distant threats. Rather, humanitarian and idealistic 
motives were often given for Norway’s military engagement abroad, and efforts were made to 
make them appear as pacific as possible. The Armed Forces were also still expected to defend 
the country and build the nation, giving them strategic tasks beyond expeditionary defence. 
It thus seems clear that part of the difference between Norwegian and Danish defence 
policy can be traced back to a difference in strategic culture developing during the two 
decades following the end of the Cold War. This explains why the differences persisted into 
the 21st century, after Ellemann-Jensen and Hækkerup had left politics and the Norwegian 
Armed Forces had become more willing and capable of projecting military force beyond 
national territory.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Denmark was quicker to embrace operations going beyond traditional peacekeeping, 
it was quicker to give priority to peace operations in its defence planning, and it was 
the only one to give its military forces pride of place in its foreign policy.1 
Peter Viggo Jakobsen 
 
When studying the post-Cold War security and defence policies of Norway and Denmark, one 
is struck by how much of an inversion they seem of the pattern established during the more 
than four decades they were both engaged in the Cold War. After the Second World War 
Denmark was a "reluctant ally"2 within the western camp, and throughout the Cold War it 
retained an image as the "weakest link"3 in the alliance. Norway, on the other hand, was held 
to be a "not so reluctant ally"4, and was considered one of "the most cooperative countries 
within the Alliance"5 by the Americans. 
A little over a decade after the end of the Cold War things had changed radically. 
Denmark had "adjusted significantly" after the Cold War considering its  "Cold War policy of 
an almost pacifist nature".6 Denmark was now described by one academic as the "impeccable 
ally".7 Meanwhile, Norway had by the end of the 1990s become a "special case"8 in NATO 
and was in danger of becoming "the last cold warrior" in the alliance.9 The reason for this 
inversion was the new measuring stick within the alliance: capacity and willingness to 
participate in expeditionary military operations, preferably with combat troops in high-risk 
areas. 
This chapter draws together the preceding two sections and especially seeks to 
correlate the different factors handled in Section II. It then attempts to present a few 
hypotheses about the future, drawing on recent developments in Danish and Norwegian 
defence policy. Finally, it offers a few reflections on viable prospects for future research on 
the topic, and how the thesis fits into a new form of history-writing relatively unknown in 
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Scandinavia, building bridges between, on the one hand, a technical military literature, and on 
the other hand, and a more accessible foreign policy history. 
 
Geopolitics, Leadership, Military and Strategic Culture 
As we have seen, the reasons why Norway and Denmark parted ways in their willingness and 
ability to do expeditionary warfighting in the post-Cold War era can be divided into four main 
categories: 
 
Table 3: Overview of Factors Determining Change or Continuity in Norwegian 
and Danish Defence Policy after the Cold War 
 
Norway Denmark 
Geopolitics - “Lingering threat” from 
Russia and need to exercise 
sovereignty/authority in 
maritime areas. Therefore 
territorially focused 
- No military threat to Danish 
territory after the Cold War. 
Could therefore refocus the 
Armed Forces on combating 
distant/diffuse risks 
Leadership - Political and bureaucratic 
desire for continuity 
- Successful example of 
political and bureaucratic 
inertia 
- Ambivalent leaders unwilling 
to identify clear priorities 
- Political and bureaucratic 
desire  for change 
- Successful case of political 
and bureaucratic 
entrepreneurship 
- Willingness to make tough 
choices and prioritise 
Military Culture - Strong national service 
traditions. Top heavy force. - 
- Lacked professional soldiers 
and NCOs 
- Opposition to operations 
outside of Norwegian territory 
- Weaker national service 
tradition. Balanced force.   
- Tradition for employing 
professional soldiers/NCOs 
- Stronger support for 
expeditionary operations 
Strategic Culture - Political consensus 
persisted which emphasised 
traditional role of the 
Norwegian armed forces 
- Use of the Armed Forces 
abroad seen as much as 
humanitarian as national 
security issue 
- Old Cold War functions to 
defend the state and build the 
nations still relevant 
- New political consensus 
emerged which viewed the 
Armed Forces as useful and 
employable foreign policy tool 
- Use of armed force against 
distant new threats seen as 
necessary and vital for 
national security 
- Cold War symbolic defence 
functions of the military 
obsolete in the new era 
 
The different factors played different part in different periods. 
Marked differences in Geopolitical environment remained a persistent factor 
throughout the period covered. For Denmark, geopolitical concerns decreased even more in 
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relevance throughout the period, as Denmark’s feeling of security was amplified by Poland’s 
NATO membership in 1999. Thus Danish freedom to "go global" in combating distant and 
diffuse threats grew over the years, and the necessity of doing so, if Denmark was to avoid 
being marginalised, increased. For Norway, the geopolitical environment changed to a lesser 
extent. The combination of the decline of the Russian military, new advances in military 
technology, and the drastically reduced probability of a Russian desire to occupy Norwegian 
territory, all served to make the invasion defence forces obsolete by the turn of the century. 
However, the Norwegian government remained concerned about the possible application of 
limited force in the High North. In addition, the economic importance of the High North was 
growing. This increased the need to maintain a presence in the region, to exercise sovereignty 
and authority, and to have the necessary capacity for managing a limited crisis. 
 The appearance of decisve leadership was a transitory phenomenon occurring in 
Denmark in the 1990s. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and Hans Hækkerup, working closely with 
military counterparts such as Hans Garde, managed to realise their common project of 
breaking-down well-established Danish domestic constraints on employing military force 
abroad. Their success, part skill and part luck, meant that a new domestic consensus was 
created in which it was now viewed as normal and even desirable for Danish soldiers to be 
located on the frontlines in distant wars. Bjørn Tore Godal and Kristin Krohn Devold, acting 
as the political agents for military reformers such as Sverre Diesen, played a somewhat lesser 
role in Norway. They managed to overcome domestic opposition to scrapping the Cold War 
era invasion defence force, introducing a more modern and employable structure. They did 
not, however, manage to do more than soften domestic constraints on engaging in combat 
operations abroad, which still remained controversial. They also did not successfully manage 
to set political priorities for the Armed Forces, by closing redundant bases and cutting excess 
capacities. 
Like leadership, military culture was primarily an issue in the 1990s, when 
conservative older officers in Norway fought against reducing the size of the armed forces, re-
introducing a NCO corps and being obliged to serve in international military operations 
abroad. With the military reforms after 2001, and the deployment in combat operations in 
Yugoslavia in 1999 and Afghanistan since 2002, the Norwegian Armed Forces came to 
abandon their former absolute attachment to a large conscripted force and territorial defence. 
Thus the sharp differences in military culture were a transitory phenomenon, although the 
Danish armed forces still employed more professional soldiers and remained more focused on 
high-intensity, expeditionary warfighting than their Norwegian counterparts. 
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 But while differences in military culture declined in the 2000s, the degree of 
divergence in strategic culture between the two nations grew consistently throughout the 
1990–2008 period. During the Cold War Denmark and Norway had shared a common Nordic 
outlook regarding the use of force, sovereignty, and international institutions. In the post-Cold 
War world, Norway retained much more of these classic Nordic positions than Denmark. The 
latter now reinvented itself as a strategic actor feeling it occasionally necessary to employ 
military means against the dangers of this world, whether or not this was condoned by 
international institutions. Denmark thus reinvented a new strategic role for its Armed Forces, 
as expeditionary warriors foremost and homeland security providers as a secondary new task. 
In Norway, however, the Armed Forces’ strategic tasks remained tied to a more classic role of 
defending the state and its territory, while conscriptions’ role as a nation-building instrument 
remained a much more powerful part of the popular image of the armed forces. 
 
The Present and the Future 
Both Norway and Denmark are set to continue their present level of international 
deployments, though the latter is showing the strain of doing so. While Denmark remains set 
to maintain its focus on deploying combat forces under the NATO or US/UK umbrella, 
Norway recently decided to once more send out support forces under UN command. 
The 2008 Danish Defence Commission, chaired by Hans Hækkerup, presented its 
findings in March 2009. It recommended broadly to continue the present line in Danish 
defence policy.10 While not everyone agreed, the criticism has mostly been limited to 
questioning whether the report was innovative enough.11 Thus no upheaval in Danish defence 
policy seems forthcoming in the short term. The recent appointment of the Danish Prime 
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO’s next General Secretary also seems to confirm 
Denmark’s status as a "top dog" in NATO circles, giving Denmark some room for 
complacency.12 
Denmark has until now been relatively unfettered by its Arctic positions Greenland 
and the Faeroe Islands. However, it is conceivable that the melting of the polar ice, and the 
consequent possibility of exploiting the resources and maritime transport routes of the Arctic, 
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will convince Denmark to follow Norway’s lead and reorient resources towards maintaining a 
greater military "footprint" in the area.13  
At the moment, however, the most likely reason for Denmark to reduce its 
international deployment of forces would be either the great strain on personnel and 
equipment, or a popular backlash against the mounting casualties. Retention of personnel is 
perhaps the most serious problem, seeing as how the Danish Armed Forces are now short of 
2,300 soldiers at the start of 2009.14 The strain on equipment has also been substantial, as the 
increasing Danish deployment tempo has not resulted in any comparable increase in defence 
spending. Though differences have narrowed somewhat, Norway spent more than Denmark 
on defence in the entire 1990–2007 period,15 and also invested a much higher percentage of 
its defence budgets in new equipment.16 As it is unlikely that Denmark will increase its 
defence expenditure, it is likely to either scale back on its commitments, or cut boldly in 
capacities in order to focus upon the remaining ones. If history is any guide, the latter is by far 
the most likely. 
The recent Norwegian Long Term Plans for the Armed Forces for the period 2009–
2012, presented in March 2008, did not present any upheavals on the Norwegian side. It 
broadly maintained the presence force structure of the Norwegian military, rationalising it 
somewhat. Overall the Norwegian Armed Forces remain occupied with their dual mission, a 
national, territorial one and an alliance integrated one abroad.17 The High North has received 
increased attention, and the budget for 2009 allocated more funds to increase slightly the 
Navy’s and Air Force’s presence in the region, as well as increase the Army’s readiness 
somewhat.18 Linked to Norway’s growing concern about a resurgent Russia and the growing 
importance of the High North is the government’s attempt to bring NATO "back in area". 
This is argued to be necessary in order to strengthen the organisation’s legitimacy, which in 
turn will strengthen support for "out of area" missions.19 
There seems to be little prospect of the present Red-Green government changing the 
established pattern of providing combat troops only to relatively safe locations. In 
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Afghanistan the government calls for an approach with less emphasis on the military.20 The 
Norwegian decision to send a field hospital for the UN Mission in the Central African 
Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) is also reminiscent of the pre-1997 policy of providing 
support forces,21 but it is however unlikely that this will become a regular phenomenon.22 
Norway seems for the moment to continue focusing more on rotating troops for stability 
operations, than for participation in high-intensity combat as initial entry forces.  
 
Final Remarks 
This thesis has hopefully provided a detailed comparative analysis of Norwegian and Danish 
defence policy after the Cold War, a field in which the differences between these very similar 
countries have been so remarkable as to inspire frequent comments in the media, popular 
culture, as well as academic and military studies. It is, however, by no means a 
comprehensive study, dealing as it does with nearly 20 years of history and several different 
aspects of security and defence policy. Firstly, perhaps one of the most unexpected findings I 
made, upon which no dedicated literature has to my knowledge ever been written, is the 
substantial differences between the personnel structure and traditions in Norway and 
Denmark. In many ways the Danish Armed Forces more resemble the German or British 
system than the Norwegian one. There is certainly a comparative article begging to be written 
on this subject alone, if only military researchers were to raise their gaze from their own 
particular country of study. Secondly, little has been done comparatively on Scandinavia 
within the strategic culture literature. Norway and Denmark, due to their many similarities 
and yet defence sector differences, would surely make an excellent case for an updated 
historical study of "same but different" foreign policy cultures, drawing on recent 
developments in the field of strategic culture. Finally, and most importantly, relatively little 
has been written in the cross-sectional field between military and foreign policy history in 
Scandinavia. Military history tends to be narrow and specialised, and more general political 
and foreign policy history tends to ignore military issues. While this may have its natural 
explanation in the "long peace" during the Cold War, the "militarization"23 of Scandinavian 
foreign policy over the last two decades has surely opened up a space for this type of history. 
Hopefully, this study provides one of many new contributions to this genre. 
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